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The Clean Air Act has proven to be one of the most successful and
durable statutes in American law. After the Supreme Court’s 2008
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, there was great hope that the Act
could be brought to bear on climate change, the most pressing current
environmental challenge of our time. Massachusetts was fêted as the most
important environmental case ever decided, and, upon it, the
Environmental Protection Agency under President Obama built a
sweeping program of greenhouse gas regulations, aimed first at emissions
from road vehicles, and later at fossil fuel power plants. It was the most
ambitious federal climate policy in American history. Now, twelve years
after Massachusetts was decided, that program is in ruins, largely
repealed or weakened by the climate-skeptic Trump administration.
Massachusetts has not provided a foundation for durable climate policy.
The roots of the Clean Air Act’s climate policy failures lie not just in
changes in political leadership, but also in a Supreme Court majority
increasingly skeptical of not just climate regulation but of the
administrative state in general. This and other barriers will persist
regardless of who occupies the White House. This article explores why
climate regulation under the Clean Air Act has been so much more fragile
than other regulations under the statute, which actors bear responsibility
for its failures, and what prospects remain for future federal climate
policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Almost immediately after it was decided in 2008, Massachusetts v. EPA1 was
hailed as one of the most important environmental decisions in American law.2 The
perceived significance of the case has persisted, or if anything has grown, despite
being subject to praise and criticism alike from the beginning.3 Though the decision
is complex, the reason for its alleged significance is simple: it purports to draw the
most pressing environmental problem of our (or perhaps any) time—climate
change—within the sphere of federal environmental law. Specifically, it makes
greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, subject to regulation by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act. That statute has
been among the most enduring and successful in American law, responsible for large
reductions in a range of air pollutants from a diverse array of sources since being
enacted in its modern form fifty years ago.4 If that durability, adaptability, and
flexibility5 could be brought to bear on the greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs)
responsible for climate change, it was hoped, significant progress toward avoiding
climate risks and unlocking international agreement was possible.
Now, more than a decade after Massachusetts, and shortly after the passing
of its author, Justice John Paul Stevens, it is a good time to reflect on that initial,
hopeful assessment of the case and its effects. Is Massachusetts as important in practice
as its reputation would suggest? Is the Clean Air Act a secure foundation for broad,
effective climate regulation? The answer to both questions appears to be a qualified
“no.” This is a powerful illustration of the wider failure of the American legal and
political system to address climate change. The story is a tragedy in three acts.
After Massachusetts, some commentators believed that reluctant presidential
administrations (like that of George W. Bush at the time) could no longer drag their
feet on climate policy and that future administrations eager to use the Clean Air Act’s
1.

549 U.S. 497 (2007).

2.
See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & Jim Salzman, American Idols, ENV’T F., May-June 2019, at 40 (detailing
surveys of environmental lawyers in which Massachusetts was already ranked as the most important
environmental case in 2009, and remained the second-most important, after Chevron, in 2019).
3.
See, e.g., Jonathan Cannon, The Significance of Massachusetts v. EPA, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF
53, 53 (2007) (calling the case “an enormous, if narrow, victory for environmentalists); see also Jody
Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51
(elevating Massachusetts’s significance beyond environmental law and classing it as an “expertise-forcing”
decision privileging technocratic expertise over politics); but see Cass R. Sunstein, Changing Climate
Change, 2009-2016, 42 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 231, 242, 243 (2018) (calling Massachusetts “massively
important” but concluding that “the Court was probably wrong” not to defer to the Bush EPA).
4.
See LESSONS FROM THE CLEAN AIR ACT: BUILDING DURABILITY AND ADAPTABILITY INTO
U.S. CLIMATE AND ENERGY POLICY 1-3 (Ann Carlson & Dallas Burtraw eds., 2019) [hereinafter
LESSONS FROM THE CLEAN AIR ACT]
5.
Id. at 3 (identifying the durability, adaptability, and flexibility of the Clean Air Act as crucial
to its success).
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tools need no longer fear their efforts would be easily undone.6 To be sure,
Massachusetts’ narrow (5-4) decision was controversial when it was decided and has
remained so. Opponents of climate regulation have never stopped rhetorically relitigating the case,7 nor have some of the Justices who dissented.8 But the case for
Massachusetts’ significance has always been that it laid the foundation for real climate
policy.9 The first act of the story ended with hope.
The Clean Air Act powers secured by Massachusetts became the primary
legal vehicle for climate policy at the federal level under President Obama,
particularly after the failure of cap-and-trade legislation in the Senate in 2009.10
With ambitious hopes and plans for broadening and strengthening regulation,
Massachusetts would be, it appeared by around 2010, the foundation of the first, best,
and, at least for the time being, only federal climate policy. From 2010 through 2016,
the Obama EPA enacted a sweeping regulatory program limiting greenhouse gas
emissions from a variety of sources, including, most importantly, new road vehicles
(through fuel economy standards) and fossil-fuel power plants (via the Clean Power
Plan).11 This regulatory agenda did not solve the climate change problem. It did not
even reduce U.S. emissions very much.12 But it transformed Massachusetts’ promise
into action, representing an ambitious first step that could be extended and
strengthened in the future. The second act of the story ended with apparent (if not
complete) success.
But 2016 was to be the high-water mark for Clean Air Act climate policy.
Not only would that policy program not be extended, it would be rolled back. 13 Fuel
economy standards would be stopped in their tracks, and the Clean Power Plan would
6.
See, e.g., Cannon, The Significance of Massachusetts v. EPA, supra note 3, at 59 (“The Court’s
opinion seems to leave EPA little room in dealing with climate change.”).
7.
See, e.g., Marlo Lewis, The Unbearable Lightness of UARG v. EPA, GLOBALWARMING.ORG
(July 4, 2014), http://www.globalwarming.org/2014/07/04/the-unbearable-lightness-of-uarg-v-epa/
(arguing that “the Court in Massachusetts wrongly decided that the 1970 Clean Air Act, a statute enacted
years before global warming was a gleam in Al Gore’s eye, ‘speaks directly’ to the issue of greenhouse
gases and global climate change”).
8.
See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. (UARG) v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 344 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“I believed Massachusetts v. EPA was wrongly decided at the time, and these cases further expose the flaws
with that decision.”).
9.

See infra Section I.C.

10. See Amanda Reilly & Kevin Bogardus, 7 Years Later, Failed Waxman-Markey Bill Still Makes
Waves, E&E DAILY (June 27, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060039422 (describing the failure
of the 2009 legislation in the Senate and noting that that failure “spurred the Obama administration to
aggressively use the executive branch to issue regulations aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions”).
11.

See infra Section II.

12.

See infra Section II.

13.

See infra Section III.
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never cut a single ton of carbon emissions. As of 2020, Clean Air Act climate policy
ranges from impotent to nonexistent. The third act of the story ends in near-complete
failure.
How did this happen? First, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
drawn into question the reach of the core legal holding in Massachusetts, exposing
legal vulnerability in the climate regulatory powers of the EPA under the Clean Air
Act. Arguably, these decisions have limited Massachusetts to its facts, i.e., to a single
provision of the Clean Air Act granting authority over vehicle emissions. This assault
on Massachusetts began at least as far back as 2014’s Utility Air Regulatory Group v.
EPA decision; though never viewed as anywhere near as important as Massachusetts,
the decision was, as Jody Freeman describes it, “laced with the legal equivalent of
improvised explosive devices.”14 The Court’s unprecedented choice in 2016 to stay
the Clean Power Plan before a lower court had issued a decision sealed that
regulation’s fate.15
Second, regulatory measures put into place using the authority made
available by Massachusetts have lacked the stability of typical environmental
regulation, much less that of the Clean Air Act’s air pollution limits. The climateskeptic Trump administration is rolling back or substantially weakening nearly every
such measure finalized by the Obama administration. As of early 2020, the Trump
administration is in the process of rolling back at least ninety-five environmental
rulemakings or other executive actions, including ten based on the Clean Air Act
which target greenhouse gases.16
Progress toward reducing U.S. emissions over the last decade has been
modest, and relatively few of the reductions that have been made since Massachusetts
can be clearly attributed to federal regulatory policy. Rather, efficiency
improvements and the closures of coal plants due in large part to cheap natural gas
appear to be bigger drivers of emissions reductions.17 Meanwhile, states and local
governments have supplanted the federal government’s leadership role on climate
policy.18

14.

See Jody Freeman, Why I Worry About UARG, 39 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 9, 10 (2015).

15.

See Order Granting Stay, West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016).

16. See Nadja Popovich et al., 95 Environmental Rules Being Rolled Back Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 21, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks.html.
17. See, e.g., U.S. Energy-Related CO2 Emissions Fell 1.7% in 2016, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=30712 (attributing 2016 emissions
decline to fuel switching from coal to natural gas and reductions in the energy intensity of the economy,
and noting that the transportation sector, the most highly-regulated under the Clean Air Act, was the only
sector in which emissions increased).
18. See generally Vicki Arroyo, From Paris to Pittsburgh: U.S. State and Local Leadership in an Era of
Trump, 31 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 23.
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There is little left of Massachusetts’ promise of meaningful tools to fight
climate change. The decision’s perceived significance persists for now,19 but a future
president serious about reducing greenhouse gas emissions would be ill advised to
rely on the Clean Air Act. The failure of Clean Air Act climate policy to achieve
significant and enduring environmental improvements stands in contrast to other
regulatory programs under the same statute, which have a long track record of success
and stability and have so far proven much more resilient to regulatory rollbacks.20
This article explores why the hope and promise of Massachusetts as a vehicle
for climate policy have not been fulfilled (and, in my view, why they probably never
will be). Legal and structural factors are important, but so are less scrutable and
predictable political and circumstantial factors. These legal, policy, and political
questions matter because the unfulfilled promise of Massachusetts has major current
and future environmental implications. The failure of Clean Air Act climate policy
means that progress on reducing U.S. carbon emissions will probably require major
new legislation, however dim hopes for such legislation may currently appear.
Exploring the reasons for the Clean Air Act’s failure is particularly valuable for
considering the form such legislation may take and the tradeoffs it may require.
Other tools are available to a president intent on reducing emissions without
congressional support, but they are limited, and most lack the near economy-wide
reach of the Clean Air Act.21
In order to chart a path forward for climate policy, it is first necessary to
explore how we got where we are now: a place with almost no meaningful federal
climate policy at all. And that requires starting at the beginning, with the roots of
Massachusetts itself.
Before that story, it is important to clarify the limits of the analysis in this
article. First, it is not an attempt to relitigate the decision in Massachusetts but rather
to evaluate its legal and policy implications and their durability. I have consistently
taken the view over the past decade that climate regulation is compatible with the
Clean Air Act and that ample tools exist under the statute to construct a robust,
effective, and at least somewhat flexible climate policy.22 Those views have not

19. See Ruhl and Salzman, American Idols, supra note 2, at 40 (Massachusetts ranked as second-most
important environmental case in 2019).
20.

See discussion and citations in Section III infra.

21.

See discussions and citations infra Section V.

22. See, e.g., Nathan Richardson et al., Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: Structure,
Effects, & Implications of a Knowable Pathway, 41 ENV’T L. REP. 10098 (2011); Playing Without Aces: Offsets
and the Limits of Flexibility Under Clean Air Act Climate Policy, ENV’T L. 735 (2012); Nathan Richardson,
Aviation, Carbon, and the Clean Air Act, 38 COLUM. J. OF ENV’T L. 67 (2013); Nathan Richardson & Art
Fraas, Comparing the Clean Air Act and a Carbon Price, 44 ENV’T L. REP. 10472 (2014); Nathan Richardson,
Trading Unmoored: How Strong is the Legal Foundation for Emissions Trading under §111 of the Clean Air Act?,
120 PENN ST. L. REV. 181.

Fall 2020

The Rise and Fall of Clean Air Act Climate Policy

75

changed, but neither the Trump EPA nor a majority on the Supreme Court appears
to agree.
Second, climate policy is a rich, complex, and at times contentious field, the
boundaries of which extend far beyond the limits of the single federal statutory
scheme. This Article should not be interpreted as taking a position sub rosa in longrunning climate policy arguments. Instead, this Article is a legal, regulatory, and
institutional analysis; it is only indirectly a policy prescription.

I. WHAT DID MASSACHUSETTS DO?
A. Background
The backstory of Massachusetts has been told elsewhere, including in the
opinion itself, but it is nevertheless useful to put the case in context. Its roots go back
(at least) a decade earlier than the 2007 decision. In 1997, the U.S. Senate passed the
Byrd-Hagel Resolution by a 95-0 vote, signaling it would not ratify an international
climate change agreement that did not impose binding obligations on developing
countries in addition to more developed countries including the United States.23 This
made the Kyoto Protocol, negotiated that year and signed by President Clinton in
1998, dead on arrival in the Senate.24 The Clinton administration at the time viewed
reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions as a priority, partly driven by the influence
of then-Vice President Al Gore.25 But after the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, it was clear
that domestic and not treaty law would have to provide the basis for any such effort.
For the first time, a president and his advisers would turn their attention to the
existing Clean Air Act. If the Clean Air Act granted regulatory authority over
greenhouse gas emissions, climate policy in some form could be implemented
without a treaty or new legislation.
At the time, however, and to a large extent today, it was unclear to what
degree greenhouse gas emissions were subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act.
The statute does not explicitly give EPA authority to regulate greenhouse gases or
to act against climate change. But it does grant the agency broad, flexible powers to
regulate air pollutants that harm public health and welfare. This regulatory authority
comes from a variety of provisions in the statute, each aimed at a different category
23.

Byrd-Hagel Resolution, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., S. Res. 98 (1997).

24. See White House, Statement by the Press Secretary, Nov. 12, 1998,
https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/CEQ/19981112-7790.html (stating that “President Clinton has
made clear that the United States regards the Kyoto Protocol as a work in progress, and that it will not be
submitted for ratification without the meaningful participation of key developing countries in efforts to
address climate change.)
25. See Darren Samuelsohn, Clinton Memos Show Climate Tactics, POLITICO (June 6, 2014),
https://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/clinton-library-memos-kyoto-protocol-china-india-107545
(detailing direct involvement by President Clinton and Vice-President Gore in negotiations over the
Kyoto Protocol).
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of emissions or emitters. For example, Title I of the statute covers “stationary”
sources of pollution, like factories and power plants, and includes schemes for setting
national air quality standards26 and sectoral performance standards for new and
existing sources.27 Title II covers mobile sources, including cars, trucks, and aircraft.28
Instead of listing the pollutants they cover, most sections of the statute give EPA
discretion to identify “air pollutants” and pollution sources that “endanger” health
and welfare.29 Each provision then gives the agency a set of regulatory tools intended
to reduce emissions from the covered sources.30 This flexibility allows EPA’s
regulatory authority to adjust to new science on environmental and health risks from
air pollution without Congressional intervention31 It is arguably the statute’s greatest
innovation and a key to its success in reducing U.S. air pollution.32
But climate change is a different sort of problem than those caused by the
pollutants EPA had previously regulated under the statute. It is global, rather than
local or regional, and it is an indirect effect of emissions, rather than a direct harm to
people exposed to a pollutant. Does EPA have authority under the existing statute
to limit greenhouse gas emissions? More precisely, are GHGs “air pollutants” within
the statutory definition?
In 1998, then-EPA Administrator Carol Browner claimed in congressional
testimony the answer to these questions was “yes.”33 EPA General Counsel Jonathan
Cannon confirmed this reading of the law in what is now referred to as the “Cannon
Memo,” released in April of 1998.34 The memo argued that carbon dioxide was an
“air pollutant” within the statute’s definition and potentially subject to EPA
regulatory authority.35 Regulation would require a further finding of “actual or

26.

Clean Air Act §108-110, 42 U.S.C. §§7408-7410.

27.

§111, 42 U.S.C. §7411.

28.

§202, 42 U.S.C. §7521.

29.

§§108, 111, 202, 42 U.S.C. §§7408, 7411, 7521.

30. See, e.g., §202, 42 U.S.C. §7521 (granting EPA authority to issue standards for new motor
vehicles that “cause or contribute” to emissions that the agency has determined endanger public health or
welfare).
31. See LESSONS FROM THE CLEAN AIR ACT 3, supra note 4 (identifying durability, adaptability,
and flexibility of the Clean Air Act as crucial to its success).
32.

Id.

33. See Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, General Counsel to Carol M. Browner,
Administrator, “EPA’s Authority to Regulate Pollutants Emitted by Electric Power Generation Sources”
(Apr. 10, 1998) (“Cannon Memo”).
34.

Id.

35. Id. at 2-3. Although the Cannon memo only discussed regulation of carbon dioxide emissions
from power plants, Massachusetts and the endangerment finding which followed under the Obama EPA
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potential harmful effects on public health, welfare or the environment” (an
“endangerment finding”),36 which the agency had not yet made for greenhouse gases
and would not for another decade.
By late 1998, the Clinton administration was embroiled in scandal, nearing
the end of its second term, and facing impeachment with Republican majorities in
the House and Senate. It lacked the ability or willingness to push significant climate
policy. Frustrated by the inaction, environmental groups petitioned EPA in 1999 to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions.37 The petition did not ask the agency to regulate
all such emissions, however, but only motor vehicle emissions38 using the agency’s
authority under Section202 of the Clean Air Act, which gives EPA broad authority
to set emissions standards for new motor vehicles.39 The petition cited the Cannon
Memo for the position that EPA had the power to do what the petition asked.40
EPA did not respond to the petition before President Clinton left office in
early 2001, and the Bush administration spent the next seven years trying to avoid
climate regulation. In 2001, under new leadership, EPA responded to the
environmental groups’ petition by requesting comment, generating a large volume
of public comments and expert reports.41 In 2003, almost four years after the petition
had been submitted, EPA issued a formal denial42 and withdrew the Cannon
Memo.43 The agency gave two reasons for the refusal: first, rejecting the analysis in
the Cannon Memo, it concluded that GHGs were not “air pollutants” subject to
regulation under the statute.44 Second, even if they were subject to regulation, it
would be “unwise” for the agency to do so at the time for a variety of reasons,
including that GHG regulation would interfere with the President’s leverage in

applied their analysis to the wider category of greenhouse gases, of which carbon dioxide is the most
significant.
36.

Id. at 3-4 (paraphrasing similar requirements across a variety of sections of the statute).

37 Int’l Ctr. Tech. Assessment et al., Petition for Rulemaking and Collateral Relief Seeking the
Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Motor Vehicles Under §202 of the Clean Air Act
(Oct.20,1999)[hereinafterPetitionforRulemaking],https://www.ciel.org/Publications/greenhouse_petiti
on_EPA.pdf.
38.

Id. at 2.

39.

Clean Air Act §202, 42 U.S.C. §7521.

40.

See Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 37, at 11.

41.

See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

42. See EPA, Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, Notice of Denial
of Petition for Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003).
43.

Id. at 52,925.

44.

Id. at 52,925–52,928.
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international climate negotiations, an exercise of his foreign affairs powers.45 The
agency also cited the Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, which had
rejected another agency’s claim of “jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a
significant portion of the American economy.”46
Environmental groups, now joined by states, responded to EPA’s rejection
of the petition by filing suit, seeking judicial review of EPA’s claimed bases for its
refusal to regulate.47 In 2005, the D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of EPA in a fractured
opinion (each judge wrote separately) that focused on issues of standing and agency
discretion while avoiding the interpretive question of whether greenhouse gases were
air pollutants within the scope of the Clean Air Act.48 The states and environmental
groups appealed to the Supreme Court.

B. The Decision
The resulting decision, Massachusetts, came down in April of 2007, nine
years after the Cannon Memo and only eight months before Barack Obama’s victory
in the Iowa caucuses.49 It was decided 5-4, with Justice Stevens writing the opinion,
45.

Id. at 52,929–52,933.

46. Id. at 52,925; 529 U.S. 120, 123 (2000). As I have written elsewhere, this argument by EPA
was a misapplication of Brown & Williamson. In Brown & Williamson, the court refused to defer to the
agency’s claim of authority on the basis that it had claimed broad, economically significant jurisdiction. In
other words, the Brown & Williamson court determined such interpretive “major questions” were an
exception to the general rule from Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), of deference to agencies’
statutory interpretations. In contrast to FDA’s claimed authority over cigarettes at issue in Brown &
Williamson, EPA’s 2003 denial of the environmental groups’ petition was, obviously, an agency denying
broad regulatory authority, not claiming it. This distinction matters. Brown & Williamson may have
established that agency claims of broad authority receive less deference than previously believed, but not
the opposite—that agencies receive more deference when disclaiming such authority. Moreover, Brown &
Williamson created a new wrinkle on a meta-rule (Chevron deference). It did not claim to create new rules
for the more fundamental task of statutory interpretation by agencies. At least in theory, the agency’s task
is the same before and after Brown & Williamson: to read the statute (in context and with the benefit of its
expertise) and determine the best reading of it. Deference (Chevron, as modified by Brown & Williamson)
only comes into play in judicial review of that determination. For the agency’s interpretation of the statute
to be shaped by Brown & Williamson was to put the cart before the horse. See Nathan Richardson, Keeping
Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The Resurgent “Major Questions” Doctrine, 49 CONN. L. REV. 355, 367–71
(2016).
47.

See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

48. Judge Randolph explicitly refused to address the statutory issue, instead concluding that EPA
had broad discretion to choose not to regulate in light of uncertainty in climate science. Id. at 53. Judge
Sentelle dissented from this analysis but found that the states and environmental groups lacked standing.
Id. at 59. The states and environmental groups’ suit was therefore dismissed, despite the fact that Judges
Randolph and Sentelle disagreed about why. Only Judge Tatel reached the statutory issue, finding that in
his judgment the greenhouse gases were air pollutants within the scope of the Clean Air Act and thus
susceptible to EPA regulation. Id. at 61.
49.

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Kennedy, presumably the crucial
swing vote.50 Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts each wrote in dissent, with
Justices Alito and Thomas joining both dissents and Scalia and Roberts joining each
other’s opinions.51
While Justice Stevens’s opinion is sprawling in its discussions of climate
science, practical and economic effects of climate change, standing doctrine,
separation of powers, canons of statutory construction, deference to administrative
agencies, and the history of the Clean Air Act,52 its core holdings are straightforward.
First, the majority concluded that greenhouse gases were “air pollutants” within the
statutory definition, or at least within Section202’s definition.53 Because the
majority viewed the statute as “unambiguous,” no deference to the agency’s contrary
reading was available under Chevron.54 That the Clean Air Act does not explicitly
mention climate change did not matter for this analysis, because while Congress
might not have envisioned climate change when the Clean Air Act was passed, it did
envision change in knowledge of environmental risks. The statute therefore
empowers and requires the EPA to react to new information on dangers.55
Second, the Court held that EPA’s extra-statutory reasons for declining to
regulate (like intrusion on the President’s foreign affairs powers) could not overcome
the statute’s command: “While the statute does condition the exercise of EPA’s
authority on its formation of a ‘judgment,’ that judgment must relate to whether an
air pollutant ‘cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.’”56 As the Court elaborated, the
law’s use of the term “judgement” was “not a roving license to ignore the statutory
text.”57
The Court held that the agency’s denial of the states’ and environmental
groups’ petition was improper.58 It did not, however, require the agency to regulate
50.

Id.

51.

Id.

52.

Id. at 504-535.

53. Id. at 528–29 (“[T]he definition embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe, and
underscores that intent through the repeated use of the word ‘any.’ ”). As we shall see, this distinction
becomes relevant in ensuing cases.
54.

Id. at 529. Massachusetts was a so-called Chevron Step One case.

55. Id. at 532. (Congress “did understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing
circumstances and scientific developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete. The broad
language of Section 202(a)(1) reflects an intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall
such obsolescence.”).
56.

Id. at 532–33.

57.

Id. at 533.

58.

Id. at 534-35.
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greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles or any other source, as the
Massachusetts holding has sometimes been characterized.59 Instead, the Court ruled
only that EPA “must ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute.”60 In
other words, EPA has a choice. In order to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, it must
first determine that they endanger public health or welfare and then issue an
“endangerment finding.”61 But in order not to regulate, the agency must determine
that greenhouse gas emissions do not endanger health or welfare and state that
determination in the administrative record.62 After Massachusetts, the agency could
still refuse to regulate vehicle greenhouse gas emissions; it just couldn’t use what the
Court concluded were contra- or extra-statutory justifications for doing so.
Justice Scalia’s dissent rejected the majority’s analysis of the statute;63 he
would have upheld the agency’s view that greenhouse gases are not “air pollutants”
within the statutory definition.64 Scalia’s statutory analysis is complex, involving the
intersection of multiple similar terms, only some of which are defined in the statute,65
Scalia concluded that greenhouse gases are not “air pollutants” because they do not
cause “air pollution” in the traditional sense. Unlike other pollutants traditionally
regulated under the Clean Air Act, carbon dioxide is present in relatively large
concentrations in the lower atmosphere.66 He rejected the majority’s view that the
statute was unambiguously clear and would have deferred to the agency’s view under
Chevron.67 These arguments resurfaced in later cases, in particular the view that the

59. See, e.g., Brett Maland, Note, A New Era of Green Regulation: EPA Must Regulate Climate
Altering Gases Emitted from Motor Vehicles: Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 15 MO.
ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 369 (2008). Contemporaneous media accounts of the case from experienced legal
journalists got this correct. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say E.P.A. Has Power to Act on Harmful
Gases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/03/washington/03scotus.html.
60.

Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535.

61. Id. at 534 (“The statutory question is whether sufficient information exists to make an
endangerment finding”).
62.

Id.

63. Id. at 549 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Note that Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent concludes that the
case should have been dismissed for lack of Article III standing, without discussing statutory
interpretation. Id. at 535 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
64.

Id. at 560.

65.

Id. at 554–58 (“air pollutant,” “air pollution,” “air pollution agent”).

66. Id. at 559 (“[R]egulating the buildup of CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the upper reaches
of the atmosphere, which is alleged to be causing global climate change, is not akin to regulating the
concentration of some substance that is polluting the air.”) (emphasis in original).
67. Id. at 560. (“[T]he Court utterly fails to explain why this interpretation is incorrect, let alone
so unreasonable as to be unworthy of Chevron deference.”).
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scope of the term “air pollutant” in the Clean Air Act is more complex than the
Massachusetts majority claimed.68

C. Implications
In a review published soon after the decision, Jonathan Cannon (then and
now a law professor, having left his role at EPA) called Massachusetts an “enormous,
if narrow, victory for environmentalists.”69 In 2009, a survey of academics and
practicing environmental lawyers found it to be the consensus pick as the “most
significant” environmental case,70 and a similar 2019 survey placed it second, behind
only Chevron.71 Professor Eli Savit in 2017 called it “probably the most important
environmental case in history.”72 Unsurprisingly, much has been written about the
case and its implications for environmental law,73 administrative law,74 and the law
of standing.75
Massachusetts has not escaped criticism. Of the dissenting Justices, Thomas
and Alito have called for its reversal.76 Cass Sunstein—Administrator of the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs under President Obama and generally a
defender of administrative agencies, EPA, and climate policy77—has criticized

68.

See discussion infra Section II.D.

69.

Cannon, supra note 3, at 53.

70.

See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Who’s Number One?, 26 ENV’T F. 36, 37 (2009).

71.

See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 2, at 43.

72. Eli Savit, The New Front in the Clean Air Wars: Fossil-Fuel Influence Over State Attorneys
General—And How It Might Be Checked, 115 MICH. L. REV. 839, 850 (2017) (incidentally, Savit clerked
for two judges involved in Massachusetts—Judge Tatel at the D.C. Circuit and Justice Ginsburg).
73.

See, e.g., Cannon, supra note 3.

74. See, e.g., Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action
and Inaction, 26 VA. ENV’T L.J. 461 (2008) (discussing Massachusetts’ influence on the doctrine of judicial
review of agency denials of petitions for rulemakings); see also Richardson, supra note 46, at 367-76.
75. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Future Generations: Does Massachusetts v. EPA Open
Standing for Generations to Come, 34 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 1 (2009).
76. See UARG. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 344 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I believed Massachusetts
v. EPA was wrongly decided at the time, and these cases further expose the flaws with that decision.”).
77. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 3, at 231 (“The various reforms show the extraordinary extent to
which the executive branch, relying on longstanding regulatory authorities, can reorient national policy”).
Sunstein is not, however, an unreserved supporter of agency action, having long backed cost-benefit
analysis as the touchstone guide for agency decisionmaking, to the annoyance of some who believe it
results in an anti-regulatory bias. See, e.g., Dylan Matthews, Can Technocracy be Saved? An interview with
Cass Sunstein, VOX (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/22/18001014/casssunstein-cost-benefit-analysis-technocracy-liberalism.
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Massachusetts as insufficiently deferential to the Bush EPA’s interpretation of the
Clean Air Act.78
Massachusetts’ legal significance and the degree to which it was an
environmental victory have been somewhat overstated. It took the American legal
system ten years to answer a simple question: does the Clean Air Act give EPA the
power and the duty to regulate emissions contributing to climate change?
Massachusetts’ answer was “yes, but.” Massachusetts was less transformational than it
appeared at the time (and than its continued ranking among the most important
environmental cases indicates many still believe it to be). The reality is that
Massachusetts had three distinct but closely related implications for environmental
law.79

1.

A Limited Command

First, Massachusetts did not require EPA to regulate greenhouse gases. As
noted above, EPA could continue to refuse to regulate, provided it gave a reason
grounded in the statute for not doing so. Under the Clean Air Act, EPA has some
discretion over (1) what substances in the air it considers pollutants;80 (2) which of
those pollutants are sufficiently harmful to justify regulation;81 (3) how stringently
to restrict emissions of the pollutants it does regulate;82 and (4) how to prioritize all
of these determinations.83 Massachusetts only constrained EPA’s authority regarding
the first of these, holding that the statute foreclosed EPA’s classification of

78.

Sunstein, supra note 3, at 232, 243.

79. Again, setting aside implications of the decision for standing, administrative law doctrines, or
other areas.
80. The statute does not generally list the pollutants the agency is to regulate, leaving it to the
agency to determine what compounds fit the statutory definition, as Massachusetts itself illustrates. Section
§112(b) of the Clean Air Act, listing hazardous air pollutants, is an exception to this general rule.
81. See, e.g., Clean Air Act §202(a)(1) (directing the EPA Administrator to issue standards for
motor vehicles emissions “which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”).
82. Sometimes the statute gives no guidance at all to the agency on how strictly to regulate. See,
e.g., §202(a). Other sections give guidance, but leave determination of actual levels or standards to the
agency. See, e.g., Clean Air Act §109(b)(1) (standards to be “requisite to protect the public health”
“allowing an adequate margin of safety”).
83. In a few sections, the statute requires the EPA to conduct regular reviews of emissions
standards. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 111(b)(1)(B) (requiring review of new source performance standards
every 8 years). But in most cases the agency is given no guidance on how to prioritize among the various
mandatory and discretionary authorities it is given under the statute, despite constraints on agency time
and resources. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1) (directing the agency to “prescribe [] and from time to
time revise” emissions standards for motor vehicles).
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greenhouse gases as non-air-pollutants.84 But (as noted above) EPA could still avoid
regulating GHGs under the second determination—“endangerment”—by finding
they present no danger to public health and welfare.85 Massachusetts gave no guidance
on the third and fourth determinations, stringency and prioritization, which would
each become matters of contention later when the Obama EPA planned and
implemented its regulatory agenda.86
Returning to Massachusetts’ effects for the Bush EPA, it required the agency
to confront climate science head-on: EPA could either accept the consensus scientific
view that greenhouse gas emissions cause dangerous climate change and regulate to
reduce that threat, or it could reject that consensus formally and publicly.
Massachusetts has therefore been called an expertise-forcing decision; it forced the
agency to decide whether and how to regulate based on its technocratic and scientific
expertise, not political influence.87
As noted, Massachusetts gave the agency no concrete timetable under which
it had to act. In that way, “expertise-prodding” might be a better characterization of
the decision’s impact. By the time the case was decided, the second term of George
W. Bush’s presidency was nearing its end. This made it possible to punt the climate
issue away without taking a position on climate science and endangerment. The Bush
administration did so, issuing only an advance notice of proposed rulemaking
(ANPRM) requesting comment on climate regulatory options under the Clean Air
Act.88 This required major deviation from standard regulatory procedure and sparked
conflict between EPA staff (and some agency political appointees) and the White
House.89
It would not have been possible for EPA to delay action in the wake of
Massachusetts forever, but the ANPRM illustrates the Court’s limited ability to
compel swift regulatory action. Even if the Bush EPA had been forced to act, it could
have refused to regulate by rejecting at least some of the scientific consensus on the
record, or it could have accepted the science while issuing a minimally stringent
84. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007). (“We need not and do not reach the
question whether on remand EPA must make an endangerment finding, or whether policy concerns can
inform S 535EPA’s actions in the event that it makes such a finding.”)
85. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1) (directing the agency to issue standards restricting
emissions from new motor vehicles that (in the agency’s judgment) “endanger public health and welfare”).
86.

See infra Section II.

87.

See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 52.

88. See The EPA’s Elusive Climate Change Endangerment Report, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTSDec.1,2008)[hereinafterEPA’sElusiveClimateChange],https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/
epas-elusive-climate-change-endangerment-report (detailing White House refusal to read EPA
recommendations after Massachusetts). See also Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Regulating
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (July 30, 2008) [hereinafter
ANPRM].
89.

Id.
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regulation, as the Trump EPA is doing a decade later.90 In any case, Massachusetts did
not and could not compel EPA to impose meaningful regulations.
Massachusetts exposed the tension in the Bush administration’s climate
policy: it refused to regulate, but was not willing to publicly reject the scientific
consensus. From today’s perspective, this reluctance seems charmingly quaint.
Rejection of scientific consensus is common in the current political era of “alternative
facts,”91 but would have been more politically costly a decade ago.

2.

A Limited Grant

Second, Massachusetts did not enable Clean Air Act regulation of GHGs.
Although EPA leadership was enthusiastic about climate policy under President
Obama, the Court’s ruling afforded it no new tools. EPA’s regulatory authority over
pollutants comes from Congress’ delegation in the Clean Air Act. The courts can
interpret the scope of that grant, but as the Cannon Memo illustrates, a court ruling
was not necessary to find authority to regulate GHGs under the statute. It’s true that
had the dissent prevailed in Massachusetts, the Court would have foreclosed EPA
regulation of GHGs under the statute, but the reverse is not true. The authority was
there already.
Massachusetts interpreted only one part of the Clean Air Act: Section202,
the provision that gives EPA authority to regulate emissions from motor vehicles.
As discussed below, the Obama EPA would ultimately regulate greenhouse gas
emissions not just under Section202 but also under other sections of the statute that
cover other sources, most notably power plants.92 While Massachusetts did not discuss
those other sections of the Act, it did give the agency some confidence that courts
would interpret similar or identical language in such sections to include GHGs
(environmental groups had also petitioned the agency to regulate stationary sources
before Massachusetts was decided).93 An administration opposed to GHG regulation
would presumably refuse to make such a leap from Massachusetts’ holding regarding
Section202 to analogous readings of other sections of the statute, an action that could
force a replay of Massachusetts for every major section of the Clean Air Act.94 For
90.

See discussion of the Trump EPA’s Alternative Clean Energy (ACE) Rule, infra Section III.B.

91. See Eric Bradner, Conway: Trump White House offered 'alternative facts' on crowd size, CNN (Jan.
23, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne-conway-alternative-facts/index.html.
92.

See text and citations infra Sections II.E and II.F.

93. See ANPRM at 44,399-44,400 (announcing that the agency will “examine the full range of
potential Clean Air Act regulation of GHGs, including a discussion of the issues raised by regulation of
GHG emissions of mobile and stationary sources under the Act” and discussing petitions for new source
performance standards, which the agency had initially rejected, for similar reasons to those the Court
dismissed in Massachusetts).
94. The Supreme Court has confirmed that at least one other section of the statute, §111, 42
U.S.C. §7411 (dealing with performance standards for power plants and other stationary sources), grants
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reasons discussed below, it is not at all clear that such sequels to Massachusetts would
come out the same way.95

3.

Normalization

What, then, did Massachusetts do? Why is it, despite this narrow scope,
considered such an important case? It normalized climate regulation under the Clean
Air Act and appeared to make the regulation of GHGs little different from regulation
of other pollutants under the statute. To put it in political terms, Massachusetts moved
the Clean Air Act’s Overton window96 to encompass climate. By the time
Massachusetts was decided, nearly forty years of experience with the Clean Air Act in
its modern form had shown what “normal” looked like. Painting with a broad brush,
normal under environmentally ambitious presidential administrations meant the
EPA would move to strengthen existing air pollution regulations and/or expand them
to previously unregulated pollutants.97 Under more industry-friendly
administrations, normal meant little if any tightening of existing standards (unless
forced by litigation), and no expansion to new pollutants, but, crucially, equally little
weakening of existing standards.98 As former EPA Administrator Carol Browner has
noted, under Republican administrations, the general policy toward EPA has been
one of “benign neglect.”99 This is an oversimplification. Even if Republican
EPA authority over greenhouse gases. See Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424–
25 (2011) (“The Act itself thus provides a means [§111] to seek limits on emissions of carbon dioxide from
domestic power plants.”).
95.

See infra Section II.D.

96. Named for and based on the work of Joseph P. Overton, this refers to the range of policy
options or ideas that are politically acceptable at a given point in time. See The Overton Window, Mackinac
Center for Public Policy, https://www.mackinac.org/OvertonWindow.
97. For example, under Presidents Carter, Clinton, and Obama the EPA strengthened National
Ambient Air Quality Standards for “conventional” pollutants such as ozone and particulates (or added
standards for new pollutants) nine times. See NAAQS Table, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-airpollutants/naaqs-table. As detailed in Section II, infra, the agency under President Obama would move
for the first time to regulate GHGs using a variety of provisions of the statute.
98. For example, under Presidents Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush, the EPA
strengthened the NAAQS only five times. Three of the five rules strengthening NAAQS under these
administrations (and all of them since 1987) were issued under court order or consent decree. Only once
has an existing primary NAAQS been reduced or revoked. See John Bachmann, Will the Circle be Unbroken:
A History of U.S. National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 57 J. OF THE AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS’N, 652,
662-78 (2007); National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,436, 16,438 (Mar.
27, 2008) (schedule for review of standards set by consent decree); National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Lead, 73 Fed. Reg. 66,964, 66,968 (Nov. 12, 2008) (schedule for review of standards set by
court order).
99. Alexander C. Kaufman, Scott Pruitt’s First Year Set the EPA Back Anywhere From a Few Years to
3Decades,HUFFINGTONPOST(Jan.20,2008),https://www.huffpost.com/entry/pruitt-one-year_n_5a61
0a5ce4b074ce7a06beb4.
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administrations have rarely pushed through rulemakings reducing the stringency of
Clean Air Act standards, their enforcement of existing standards has often been much
less vigorous.100 Democratic administrations have not regulated as stringently as
many climate activists would have liked either.101 But generally speaking, the Clean
Air Act has been a one-way ratchet for reasons that may have more to do with interest
group politics than the legal structure of the Act itself. Once a regulation is in place,
industry has traditionally shifted its investment decisions to comply with it, which,
to some degree, reduces the appetite for repeal.102 Regulation can also create its own
vested interests: some regulated firms and their suppliers may competitively benefit
under the new regulatory regime.103 And repealing a regulation has other costs; it
takes significant administrative resources, may create conflict between political
leadership and career staff, invites legal challenge, and carries political risk.104
Massachusetts seemed to bring greenhouse gases into this well-understood
regime, both offensively and defensively. While the Bush EPA would not be forced
to regulate, Massachusetts’ holding meant that the next administration would have to
confront the issue. Massachusetts also appeared to insulate regulatory action under the
Clean Air Act from legal challenge by establishing that greenhouse gases were within
the scope of the statute.105 The form, stringency, and timetable of Clean Air Act
climate rulemakings remained unclear.106 But, at least it appeared, there were
significant regulatory tools available to an administration interested in using them,
and the resulting regulations would have the stability evidenced by decades of
experience with the Clean Air Act in other contexts. Massachusetts was (and to a large
100. For example, the Clinton administration filed a series of lawsuits against emitters alleging
violation of New Source Review requirements that the Reagan and G.H.W. Bush administrations had not
enforced. See Anna Solomon Greenbaum and Steve Curwood, New Source Review, LIVING ON EARTH
(Sept. 7, 2001), http://www.loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=01-P13-00036&segmentID=1.
101. See, e.g., discussion infra Section II.G.
102. See, e.g., Cass R Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENV’T L.
REV. 67 (2007) (detailing early opposition by chemical firms to US regulation of aerosol propellants that
cause damage to the ozone layer, followed by acceptance and eventual support by the same firms for US
diplomatic efforts to get other countries to impose similar rules).
103. For example, after sulfur dioxide emissions were more strictly regulated in the early 1990s,
western coal mines benefited at the expense of those in the east due to the lower sulfur content of their
product. See Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic
History of a Grand Policy Experiment, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 111 (2013).
104. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Trump’s Path to Weaker Fuel Efficiency Rules May Lead to a Dead End,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/climate/trump-fuel-economyrollback.html (describing significant delays, conflicts with agency staff, and other problems with attempts
to roll back vehicle emissions standards).
105. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-529 (2007).
106. Id. at 534-535 (“We need not and do not reach the question whether on remand EPA must
make an endangerment finding, or whether policy concerns can inform EPA's actions in the event that it
makes such a finding.”)
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extent still is) perceived to be important in large part because it appeared to have
normalized climate policy under the Clean Air Act. In practice, however, climate
regulation has been far from normal.

II. THE CLEAN AIR ACT CLIMATE POLICY PROJECT
Massachusetts’ normalization of Clean Air Act climate regulation meant that
upon taking office, the Obama administration could assume that it had authority
under the Clean Air Act to regulate carbon emissions107 and that (if Massachusetts had
indeed normalized these regulatory tools) any regulations it put in place would be
more or less stable over the long term. This assumption led the Obama
administration to expend significant administrative and political resources in a series
of Clean Air Act rulemakings aimed at reducing carbon emissions from a variety of
sources, particularly after Congress’s failure to pass climate legislation in 2010. The
story of this decade-long policy project has been told extensively elsewhere—perhaps
most notably by one of its architects, Cass Sunstein, OIRA Administrator during
President Obama’s first term.108 It is worth briefly retelling that history here to
identify where it went wrong.

A. Endangerment (2007–2009)
In the 2008 presidential campaign, both Barack Obama and his opponent
John McCain promised to make action on climate change a policy priority. But no
matter how interested in climate policy the incoming Obama administration was, the
Clean Air Act (and Massachusetts) did not give EPA authority to immediately begin
limiting carbon emissions. First, the agency needed to identify pollutants that, in its
judgment, caused specific harms to health and welfare.109 This determination, an
“endangerment finding,” had to be documented, opened for public comment, and

107. See ANPRM, supra note 88, at 44,399-44,400 (detailing authority to regulate GHG emissions
under a variety of Clean Air Act provisions. See also EPA, Proposed Endangerment and Cause or
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg.
18,886, 18,888-18,894 (proposed Apr. 24, 2009) (detailing EPA’s view on the legal basis for GHG
regulation, grounded in §202 of the Clean Air Act, as interpreted by the Court in Massachusetts).
108. See generally Sunstein, supra note 3.
109. See Clean Air Act §202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §7521(a)(1) (“The Administrator shall by regulation
prescribe...standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonable be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”).
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published in the Federal Register.110 An endangerment finding would then both allow
regulation under the relevant section of the statute and compel it.111
EPA, led by newly appointed Administrator Lisa Jackson, moved quickly
to issue the required endangerment finding. Typically such a finding takes years, but
the Obama EPA was able to publish a proposed finding in April of 2009, and a final
version in December of that year—less than a year after President Obama’s
inauguration.112 Two things made this rapid timetable possible. First, the
endangerment finding relied on Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(“IPCC”) reports summarizing state-of-the-art climate science.113 The agency
determined that a separate review of climate science was not necessary, substantially
reducing the complexity of the endangerment finding process.114
Second, EPA staff had begun work on the finding under the preceding Bush
administration.115 After the Massachusetts decision, EPA staff quickly began the
formal process of answering the endangerment question. The agency soon concluded
that “the only scientifically defensible conclusion would be that global warming
emissions did endanger public health.”116 EPA drafted a formal endangerment
finding, submitting it to the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) for review
in December of 2007, seven months after Massachusetts.117 Once submitted, however,
White House officials pushed EPA to withdraw the finding.118 Steven Johnson, the
Bush-appointed EPA Administrator, refused to do so.119 White House officials then
claimed that the ninety-day OMB regulatory review process had not begun because
they had not yet opened EPA’s email to which the proposed endangerment finding

110. As a rule issued by an administrative agency not required by the relevant statute to follow
“formal” procedures, the Administrative Procedure Act requires notice-and-comment procedures for
endangerment findings. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §553.
111. See Clean Air Act §202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §7521(a)(1) To put it differently, in order not to
regulate, the agency would have to withdraw the endangerment finding with a second rulemaking; this
would become relevant later under President Trump. See infra Section III.C.
112. EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Endangerment Finding].
113. Id. at 66,497.
114. Id. This is exactly what the IPCC was created to do—provide a summary of climate science
for use by policymakers.
115. See EPA’s Elusive Climate Change, supra note 88.
116. Id.
117. Id.seealsoTimelineofEPA’sEndangermentFinding,EPA,https://www.epa.gov/sites/productio
n/files/2016-08/documents/endangermentfinding_timeline.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
118. See EPA’s Elusive Climate Change, supra note 88.
119. Id.
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was attached.120 The end result of this farce was the eventual publication of the
ANPRM in the Federal Register and resignations of high-level EPA staff.121
The ANPRM that emerged was an unusual, even bizarre, document.
Accompanied by letters from cabinet secretaries claiming that EPA regulation of
greenhouse gases would be unwise or improper, the remainder of the document,
written by EPA staff, was essentially a draft endangerment finding plus a methodical
discussion of the suitability of all major provisions of the statute for greenhouse gas
regulation. It requested comment on a variety of policy options122 but proposed no
new law or regulation and gave little indication of which options the agency was more
or less likely to pursue.123 The ANPRM created a regulatory roadmap, refused to say
where to go, and then filed away the map while suggesting that taking a trip at all
was a bad idea. Nevertheless, it provided a ready path to an endangerment finding
for the Obama EPA to pick up.124
The final finding released by EPA in late 2009 concluded that “greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere may reasonably be anticipated both to endanger public health
and to endanger public welfare” via “changes in air quality, increases in temperatures,
changes in extreme weather events, increases in food- and water-borne pathogens.”125
The same document also made a “cause or contribute” finding establishing that
emissions from motor vehicles contribute to that endangerment.126 The stage was
now set for the vehicle regulations the environmental petitioners sought more than
a decade earlier.

B. Transportation (2009-2012)
Just days after his inauguration, President Obama announced that his
administration would implement increases in federal fuel economy standards for light

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See ANPRM, supra note 88, at 44,354.
123. See id.
124. The ANPRM’s muddled state was apparently the result of policy disagreement between
agency staff, political leadership, and the White House. See EPA’s Elusive Climate Change, supra note 88.
It would nevertheless become the regulatory ‘climate change bible’ for subsequent agency action under
President Obama, something some predicted at the time. See Darren Samuelsohn, Will Much-Maligned
EPA Reg Blueprint Emerge as ‘Climate Change Bible’?, GREENWIRE (Aug. 7, 2008),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/67886.
125. EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,497 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R ch. I).
126. Id.
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vehicles (cars and trucks), which had remained largely unchanged for decades.127 The
2007 Energy Independence and Security Act (“EISA”) had set long-term goals for
improved standards and granted the National Highway Traffic Safety Agency
(“NHTSA”) authority to raise them, but the Bush administration had not
implemented any new standards.128 Historically, U.S. car manufacturers opposed
increases in fuel economy standards,129 but in 2009, the industry’s political power was
minimal, with General Motors dependent on federal bailout funds (it would enter
Chapter 11 bankruptcy within months).130
Fuel economy standards were previously understood as industrial and
energy policy and only secondarily as environmental policy, not (or at least not
explicitly) as climate policy.131 NHTSA, not EPA, was responsible for setting the
standards.132 Massachusetts and the endangerment finding, however, gave EPA
authority to regulate vehicle greenhouse gas emissions. The transportation sector is
responsible for about one-third of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, most of which is
attributable to light vehicles.133 Unlike conventional pollutants from vehicles
previously regulated by EPA, carbon dioxide is an inevitable byproduct of
combustion that cannot be captured before it is emitted from a vehicle.134 The only
way to meaningfully control carbon dioxide emissions, therefore, is to reduce fuel
consumption.135 In practice, that puts EPA in the business of regulating fuel
127. See Macon Phillips, From Peril to Progress (Update I: Full Remarks), WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Jan
26, 2009, 4:35 p.m.), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/01/26/peril-progress-environment
(posting the full remarks of President Obama on Jobs, Energy Independence, and Climate Change).
128. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, H.R. 6, 110th Cong., §102(b).
129. See RICHARD BYRNE, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, LIFE IN THE SLOW LANE:
TRACKING DECADES OF AUTOMAKER ROADBLOCKS TO FUEL ECONOMY 10 (July 28, 2003),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/slowlane-final.pdf.
130. See generally Austan D. Goolsbee & Alan B. Krueger, A Retrospective Look at Rescuing and
Restructuring General Motors and Chrysler, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2015). But see Peter Whoriskey, GM and
Chrysler, Owned by the Government, Lobby the Government, Wash. Post (Feb. 26, 2011).
131. See Byrne, supra note 129, at 3-7.
132. Id.
133. Env’t Protection Agency, EPA 430-P-20-001, Draft Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
andSinks:1990-2018,at2-25(2020)[hereinafterEPADraftInventory],https://www.epa.gov/sites/produ
ction/files/2020-02/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2020-main-text.pdf (estimating transportation sector
emissions at 27.9% of total U.S. GHG emissions, slightly more than the electric power industry at 26.9%).
134. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,327 (May 7, 2010) [hereinafter Phase I Light
Duty Standards] (“the relationship between improving fuel economy and reducing CO2 tailpipe emissions
is a very direct and close one. . . While there are emission control technologies that reduce the pollutants
(e.g., carbon monoxide) produced by imperfect combustion of fuel by capturing or converting them to
other compounds, there is no such technology for CO2.”)
135. Road vehicles do emit GHGs other than carbon dioxide, mostly related to refrigerants in air
conditioning systems. Control of these emissions was envisioned by the ensuing regulations, but in
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economy, too. It also gives a legal and policy rationale for higher fuel economy
targets.
In May of 2009, shortly after the proposed endangerment finding was
released, President Obama announced that EPA and NHTSA would collaborate to
issue new, more stringent fuel economy standards, deriving legal authority in part
from the Clean Air Act and Massachusetts.136 These Phase I standards would be
effective for 2012-2016 model year vehicles, and would achieve the 35.5 miles per
gallon fleet average fuel economy targeted by the EISA by 2016—4 years earlier
than the statute envisioned.137 The joint rulemaking was proposed later in 2009, and
finalized in April of 2010.138 With this rulemaking, Massachusetts and the Clean Air
Act substantially accelerated fuel economy improvements and associated emissions
benefits.139 EPA estimated that the Phase I standards would reduce greenhouse gas
emissions from U.S. cars and trucks by 242 million metric tons annually by 2030 and
by almost 9 billion metric tons total by 2050.140 Net benefits were estimated at
approximately $200 billion.141
Almost immediately after the 2012–2016 standards were finalized,
President Obama announced that EPA and NHTSA would begin work on standards
for subsequent model year light duty vehicles.142 These Phase II standards were
finalized in August of 2012.143 They set even more stringent standards for 2017–2025
vehicles, ultimately reaching a fleet average of 54.5 mpg by 2025.144 These standards,
EPA estimated, would reduce greenhouse gas emissions by a further 271 million

practice is a relatively small part of total emissions reductions compared to fuel economy improvements.
Id. at 25,330 (detailing credits for reductions in non-combustion GHG emissions).
136. Press Release, White House, Obama Admin., President Obama Announces National Fuel
Efficiency Policy (May 1, 2009).
137. Id.
138. Phase I Light Duty Standards, supra note 134.
139. Id. at 25,328.
140. Id. at 25,637.
141. Id.
142. Press Release, White House, Obama Admin., Presidential Memorandum Regarding Fuel
EfficiencyStandards(May21,2010),https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/presidential
-memorandum-regarding-fuel-efficiency-standards.
143. 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Phase II
Light Duty Standards].
144. Id.
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metric tons annually by 2030 and by over 10.5 billion metric tons total by 2050.145
Net benefits for the Phase II rules were estimated at $326–451 billion.146
Roughly contemporaneously with its work on the Phase II light vehicle
standards, EPA moved to issue standards applicable to greenhouse gas emissions
from heavy-duty vehicles (mostly semi-trucks, vans, and other fleet vehicles)—the
ensuing final Phase I heavy-duty standards were issued in September of 2011.147
Emissions reductions were estimated at 76 million metric tons annually by 2030,148
and 270 million metric tons total over the lifetime of affected vehicles.149 Net benefits
were estimated at forty-nine billion dollars.150
Taken together, these three rulemakings, all issued within just over two
years, substantially increased fuel economy standards for almost all new road vehicles
in the United States. Annual emissions reductions in 2030 were estimated at 1,973
million metric tons, an over 30 percent reduction of transportation-sector emissions
of relative to 2005 levels.151
In addition, EPA granted California authority to issue even stricter
standards. Under Section202 of the Clean Air Act, states are forbidden from setting
more stringent emissions standards for new vehicles than those of the federal
government (an exception to the general practice in environmental law of federal law
operating as a floor, not a regulatory ceiling).152 But the statute does allow EPA to
grant a waiver of this restriction to California, which requested such a waiver in 2005,
motivated in part by concerns over greenhouse gases.153 The Bush administration
denied the waiver in 2008.154 In July 2009, the Obama administration reversed that
145. Id. at 62,892.
146. Id. at 62,627.
147. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106 (Sept. 15, 2011).
148. Id. at 57,294.
149. Id. at 57,106.
150. Id.
151. EPA estimated 2005 transportation-sector emissions to have been about 1976 million metric
tons.SeeEPA,GreenhouseGasInventoryDataExplorer,https://cfpub.epa.gov/ghgdata/inventoryexplorer/
#transportation/allgas/source/all (“U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions from the Transportation Sector, 19902017”) (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
152. Clean Air Act §209(b), 42 U.S.C. §7543(b) (authorizing EPA to waive preemption of state
standards for any state that has adopted emissions standards for new vehicles before March 30, 1966;
California is the only such state).
153. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Denying a
Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas
Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156, 12,157 (Mar. 6, 2008).
154. Id.
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decision and granted California a waiver.155 California proceeded to issue its own
standards, though negotiations with the Obama administration led to harmonization
between the California and federal standards.156 Nevertheless, California’s standards
were based on independent legal authority, which would later become relevant when
the Trump administration rolled back the federal standards.157 Moreover, the Clean
Air Act allows other states to adopt the California standard; by 2019, thirteen states
had done so.158
With these rulemakings, EPA achieved the narrow aim of the Massachusetts
litigants—meaningful federal limits on greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles. More than that, the Phase I and Phase II standards remain to this day the
most significant climate policy ever implemented by the federal government, under
any president.159 But since all of this activity focused on one sector of the economy,
transportation, the large majority of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions would be
unaffected. The degree to which the Clean Air Act should or could provide the basis
for regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from other sectors would prove a more
difficult question.

C. Congress, Copenhagen, and Another Way to Skin the Cat (2009-2010)
Exploring whether the Clean Air Act would apply to greenhouse gas
emissions from other sectors requires a brief return to the Bush EPA’s reluctant
climate policy. At least as far back as 2002, environmental groups petitioned EPA to
regulate greenhouse gases from fossil-fuel power plants (then the most-emitting
sector of the economy)160 in the context of the performance standards under
Section111 of the Clean Air Act that the agency regularly issued for other
pollutants.161 The Bush EPA rejected these efforts, issuing updated performance
155. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Granting a
Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas
Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles; Notice, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744 (July 8, 2009).
156. See Brent Yacobucci et al., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Automobile and Truck Fuel
Economy (I) and Greenhouse Gas Standards, CRS Report 7-5700 at 2 (2012).
157. See infra Section III.A.
158. Coral Davenport, Trump to Revoke California’s Authority to Set Stricter Auto Emissions Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/17/climate/trump-california-emissionswaiver.html.
159. Only the Clean Power Plan was projected to achieve a similar magnitude of emissions
reductions, see infra Section II.E, but it was never implemented, see infra Section III.B.
160. See EPA Draft Inventory at 2-25, supra note 133 (Electric power industry estimated to be
largest-emitting sector until surpassed by transportation in 2017).
161. See Save Our Children’s Earth Found. & Sierra Club v. EPA, No. 03-cv-00770-CW,
Complaint ¶¶ 4, 32 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2003), proposed consent decree published, 68 Fed. Reg. 65,699
(Nov. 21, 2003), consent decree approved, Doc. No. 47 (Feb. 9, 2004).
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standards for power plants in 2006 that did not address greenhouse gases.162 New
York, other states, and environmental groups responded by suing the agency.163 After
Massachusetts was handed down in 2007, a D.C. Circuit panel including now-Justice
Kavanaugh remanded the case to the agency “for further proceedings in light of
Massachusetts.”164 Massachusetts, of course, said nothing about whether the agency had
authority to regulate greenhouse gases under any part of the statute other than
through mobile sources under Section202; the agency was left to make that
determination on its own.
Despite never issuing any Section202 vehicle greenhouse gas regulations,
the Bush EPA did consider regulation of other sources, as the 2007 D.C. Circuit
remand required. In the 2008 ANPRM, the agency noted:
The provisions of the CAA are interconnected in multiple ways such that a
decision to regulate one source category of GHGs [i.e., emissions from one sector]
could or would lead to regulation of other source categories... How a term is
interpreted for one part of the Act could also affect other provisions using the same
term. These CAA interconnections are by design.165
In particular, the agency speculated that an endangerment finding in one
section of the statute would compel a similar finding, and therefore regulation, under
other sections, most notably Section111 (governing performance standards for
stationary sources and the subject of the 2006 New York litigation).166 It also
speculated that regulation of greenhouse gases under any provision of the statute
would compel the agency to consider them when conducting “prevention of
significant deterioration” (“PSD”) permitting, under which the agency requires “best
available control technology” (“BACT”) for all new or substantially modified
sources.167 In the 2008 ANPRM, the agency requested comment on these potential
interconnections in the Clean Air Act.168 Finally, in December 2008, shortly before
leaving office, EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson issued the “Johnson Memo,”
concluding that regulation of greenhouse gases under any provision of the statute
(including Section202 vehicle standards) would trigger GHG inclusion in the PSD
program so long as the new source seeking a permit emitted greenhouse gases “in
162. See Standards of Performance for Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, IndustrialCommercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam
Generating Units, 71 Fed. Reg. 9866, 9869 (Feb. 27, 2006) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
163. See Order Remanding Case to EPA, New York et al. v. EPA, No. 06–1322, Document
#1068502, (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Sept. 24, 2007).
164. Id.
165. ANPRM, supra note 88, at 44,418.
166. Id. at 44,419.
167. Id. at 44,419–20.
168. Id. at 44,418.
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significant amounts.”169 Although this conclusion had little immediate effect, since
the Bush EPA had not issued any such regulations, it would prove to be a significant
problem for the Obama EPA, and would eventually be litigated to the Supreme
Court.170
Through at least the first two years of the Obama administration there was
little, if any, apparent interest in Clean Air Act climate policy beyond the vehicle
emissions standards under Section202 of the statute at issue in Massachusetts.
Instead, the administration’s focus was on new, comprehensive climate legislation
that would create a nationwide cap-and-trade system, as promised in the 2008
campaign. The House passed the American Clean Energy and Security (“WaxmanMarkey”) Act in May of 2009.171 The bill would have created a national renewable
electricity mandate and cap-and-trade market with limited auctioning of allowances,
and would have directed federal funding to electric vehicles, energy efficiency, and
electric grid modernization.172 These policies were projected to reduce U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions by seventeen percent relative to 2005 levels by 2020, and
by eighty-three percent by 2050.173
Formally, the Waxman-Markey bill would have substantially amended the
Clean Air Act.174 It would have delegated new authority to EPA related to the capand-trade system but also would have stripped the agency of authority to regulate
emissions purely on climate grounds under much of its traditional authority under
the statute—with the notable exception of the mobile source standards under
Section202.175 EPA would have overseen a national carbon market but would only
have retained the power to set specific carbon emissions standards for new vehicles.
In legal terms, the bill would have reinforced the holding in Massachusetts while
restricting its reach.

169. See Memorandum from Stephen L. Johnson, EPA Administrator, to EPA Regional
Administrators, EPA’s Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by Federal
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Permit Program, at 1 (Dec. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Johnson
Memo], https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/co2_psd.pdf.
170. See infra Section II.D.
171. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
172. Id. at Subtitle C (Clean Transportation); Subtitle F (Transmission Planning); Title II (Energy
Efficiency).
173. See JOHN LARSEN ET AL., WORLD RES. INST., WRI SUMMARY OF H.R. 2454, THE
AMERICANCLEANENERGYANDSECURITYACT(WAXMAN-MARKEY)(July31,2009),https://wriorg.s
3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/uploads/wri_summary_of_aces_0731.pdf.
174. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454 §331, 111th Cong. (adding
a new Title VIII to the Clean Air Act).
175. Id. at §831-835 (forbidding the EPA from regulating GHGs under a variety of Clean Air Act
provisions solely on the basis of climate effects; no such limitation is applied to §202 vehicle standards).
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The bill never became law. Both chambers spent late 2009 and early 2010
focused on health care reform, and by the time the Affordable Care Act and its related
amendments passed in March of 2010, Democrats had lost their filibuster-proof
majority in the Senate and had expended budget reconciliation as a vehicle for
passing legislation by majority vote.176 Cap-and-trade could therefore only pass with
at least some Republican support, unavailable in a midterm election year marked by
growing partisanship.177 The reasons for the bill’s failure remain contested, with
commentators accusing the Obama administration, outside environmental groups,
and both parties in Congress of authoring its demise.178
Waxman-Markey’s failure created a domestic and international policy
problem for the Obama administration. Not only was action on climate a campaign
promise, there was also hope for agreement on a new, legally binding, post-Kyoto
emissions treaty at the upcoming United Nations climate conference in Copenhagen
in December of 2009.179 Such an agreement was impossible without U.S.
participation, and that required a vehicle for credible commitment to emissions
reductions under U.S. law.180 The international community was unwilling to repeat
the Kyoto experience, with the U.S. Congress undercutting an agreement made by

176. See David Reich and Richard Kogan, Introduction to Budget “Reconciliation,” CENTER ON
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federalbudget/introduction-to-budget-reconciliation (describing Senate rules limiting the reconciliation process
to a single spending, tax, and debt bill per budget resolution). Apparently, passing cap-and-trade via
reconciliation was considered in 2009 but rejected. See ERIC POOLEY, THE CLIMATE WAR: TRUE
BELIEVERS, POWER BROKERS, AND THE FIGHT TO SAVE THE EARTH 349 (2010). In theory, it might
have been possible to pass both cap-and-trade and the amendments to the ACA that were in the March
2010 reconciliation bill together, but at the time the Senate had not even debated cap-and-trade.
177. See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, When Did Mitch McConnell Say He Wanted to Make Obama a ‘One-Term
President’?, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2017) (quoting Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s 2010
statement that “[t]he single most important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a oneterm president...I don’t want the President to fail, I want him to change”).
178. See, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL, NAMING THE PROBLEM: WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO COUNTER
EXTREMISM AND ENGAGE AMERICANS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST GLOBAL WARMING 96 (Jan. 2013),
https://scholars.org/sites/scholars/files/skocpol_captrade_report_january_2013_0.pdf (noting that “each
player tended to blame others and conclude that whatever approach he/she/it favored all along would be
the best one to double-down on moving forward”; Skocpol allocates significant blame to strategic errors
by environmental groups). See also Joe Romm, What Theda Skocpol Gets Wrong About the Climate Bill Fight,
THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 18, 2013), https://thinkprogress.org/what-theda-skocpol-gets-wrong-about-theclimate-bill-fight-9e1c2a859871/ (placing blame for the bill’s failure on the Obama administration and
Republican opponents).
179. See, e.g., Shawn McCarthy, Optimism Marks Opening of Copenhagen Climate Summit, THE
GLOBEANDMAIL(Dec.6,2009),https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/optimism-marksopening-of-copenhagen-climate-summit/article4294689/.
180. See id. (discussing Canadian unwillingness to make commitments without US involvement
and the need for legal support for President Obama’s emissions reduction pledges).
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the president.181 The cap-and-trade bill intended to be the credible commitment that
would assuage fears of a Kyoto repeat had already failed by the time diplomats met
in Copenhagen, and only narrow hope remained that the Senate would revisit climate
legislation early in the following year.182 These plans were also in vain; the Senate
finally abandoned any consideration of cap-and-trade legislation in mid-2010.183 The
November 2010 midterm elections marked a further setback for President Obama
and for prospects for climate legislation, with Republicans taking control of the
House.
At a press conference the day after the midterm election, Obama signaled
a shift in thinking:
The EPA is under a court order that says greenhouse gases are a
pollutant that fall under their jurisdiction. And I think one of the
things that’s very important for me is not to have us ignore the
science, but rather to find ways that we can solve these problems
that don’t hurt the economy, that encourage the development of
clean energy in this country, that, in fact, may give us
opportunities to create entire new industries and create jobs that—
and that put us in a competitive posture around the world. So I
think it’s too early to say whether or not we can make some
progress on that front. I think we can. Cap and trade was just one
way of skinning the cat; it was not the only way. It was a means,
not an end. And I’m going to be looking for other means to
address this problem.184
The “other means” to which Obama was referring were actions against stationary
sources under the Clean Air Act. A month later, EPA settled with the environmental
groups seeking stationary-source regulation by agreeing to implement emissions
standards for both new and existing power plants and refineries by 2012 under
Section111 of the Clean Air Act.185 This marked the first step in a large-scale
181. See id.
182. Id. See also The Future of Climate Policy Could Be Found in Copenhagen, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN
(Nov. 1, 2009), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/keys-to-copenhagen/.
183. See Gail Russel Chaddock and Tarini Parti, Harry Reid: Senate will abandon cap-and-trade energy
reform,CHRISTIANSCIENCEMONITOR(July22,2010),https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2010
/0722/Harry-Reid-Senate-will-abandon-cap-and-trade-energy-reform.
184. See Press Release, White House, Obama Admin., Press Conference by the President (Nov. 3,
2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/03/press-conference-president.
185. See Env’t Protection Agency, FACT SHEET: SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS TO ADDRESS
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC GENERATING UNITS AND REFINERIES (2013)
[hereinafterEPASETTLEMENTAGREEMENTSFACTSHEET],https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/si
tes/production/files/2013-09/documents/settlementfactsheet.pdf (fact sheet detailing settlement
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regulatory program that had seemed unlikely if not impossible a few months earlier.
The 2008 ANPRM provided a rough roadmap, and the settlement agreements
seemed to commit EPA to a timeline, but specifics were vague. They would largely
remain so for almost four years. Almost no public action on stationary sources would
be taken before the 2012 election. But while working on stationary-source rules
behind the scenes, the agency was also racing to head off a serious regulatory side
effect of its vehicle rules that would lead to the first legal test of its climate regulatory
program.

D. The Pyrrhic Victory of UARG
In mid-2010, while cap-and-trade was still under consideration in the
Senate, EPA released what it called the “Tailoring Rule.”186 Now that the agency had
regulated greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act with the Phase I light vehicle
emissions standards, the Johnson Memo’s interpretation of the statute meant that
greenhouse gas emissions would be included in the PSD program.187 That
interpretation threatened to consume a monstrous amount of administrative
resources and extend the reach of EPA regulators to every sector of the economy,
affecting small projects that the agency had no interest in regulating, and likely
threatening the agency’s social license to regulate. As the agency put it in the “Does
this action apply to me?” section of the Rule’s preamble: “Entities affected by this
action include sources in all sectors of the economy, including commercial and
residential sources.”188
The PSD program requires all new or modified stationary sources to
undergo a review process conducted by EPA—or, frequently, delegated to states—
in which they must demonstrate that they will employ “best available control
technology” for all regulated pollutants emitted in “significant” quantities.189 This is
a case-by-case technology review, and is de rigueur, albeit administratively costly, for
large industrial facilities.190 The problem in the greenhouse gas context comes from
the “significant quantities” threshold analysis. Greenhouse gases are emitted by
almost every building or facility in the country. Of course, those emissions aren’t
“significant” in any reasonable definition of the term. But the Clean Air Act does not
agreements); see also Settlement Agreement between EPA, State, and Environmental Petitioners (Dec.
16, 2020), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/boilerghgsettlement.pdf
[hereinafter Boiler GHG Settlement].
186. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed.
Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71) [hereinafter Tailoring Rule].
187. See Johnson Memo, supra note 169.
188. Tailoring Rule, supra note 186.
189. Tailoring Rule, supra note 186, at 31,520.
190. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 186, at 31,534-36.
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delegate the threshold for significance to the agency’s judgment; rather, it specifies
quantities in the statute: 250 tons per year of any regulated pollutant (or 100 tons per
year for certain categories of sources).191 Those thresholds make sense for pollutants
traditionally regulated under the statute: 250 tons per year is a substantial amount
of, say, sulfur dioxide emissions. Only a large industrial facility that expects to be
subject to air pollution regulation emits that much. But carbon dioxide is emitted in
far larger quantities.192 The 250-ton threshold would draw a huge number of
heretofore unregulated “commercial and residential sources” into EPA’s PSD
program including, for example, hospitals and large apartment buildings.193 The
agency estimated that over six million new PSD permits would be required, several
orders of magnitude greater than the number of such permits the agency typically
issued, with an average of sixty thousand dollars in related expenses per permit.194
The Tailoring Rule’s Step One dodged this looming disaster by initially
excluding all emissions sources from the PSD program that would be included based
on their greenhouse gas emissions.195 Sources brought into the PSD program via their
emissions of other regulated pollutants, so-called “anyway sources,” would still be
subject to BACT analysis for their GHG emissions, but only if they emitted more
than 75,000 tons per year.196 In the Tailoring Rule’s Step Two, beginning a year later
in 2011, sources could be brought into the PSD program based on GHG emissions
alone, but only those emitting greater than 100,000 tons per year.197 A Step Three
under which these thresholds might fall was discussed in the Rule, but EPA gave no
details.198 In short, the Tailoring Rule excluded all but the largest GHG emitters
from PSD, indefinitely. It did not do so by altering the thresholds in the statute,
something beyond the agency’s authority. Instead, it claimed that the “absurd results”
that would ensue from a literal application of those thresholds, and the
“administrative necessity” of avoiding six million PSD reviews gave the agency, as a
matter of legal interpretation entitled to Chevron deference, the right to revise the
thresholds in practice, phasing them in over time.199
Despite the Tailoring Rule’s claims regarding “Step Three,” the agency had
no credible intention of regulating sources down to 250 tons per year of GHG
191. Clean Air Act §165(a), 42 U.S.C. §74791(1).
192. Tailoring Rule, supra note 186, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,535.
193. Id. at 31,514.
194. Id. at 31,556, 31,596.
195. Id. at 31,516.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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emissions in the PSD program. Another way to view the Rule was therefore as a
move to buy time and plead to Congress to revise or eliminate the rigid thresholds
in the statute. The Tailoring Rule was, in any case, a brazen attempt to evade the
plain text of the Clean Air Act—something of which the agency’s critics regularly
accuse it,200 though here the effect was to reduce, not increase the agency’s regulatory
authority. Litigation ensued.
States and industry groups filed a wide range of claims alleging that EPA
had acted illegally.201 Among other assertions, they alleged that the endangerment
finding, vehicle standards (the “Tailpipe Rule”), and the Tailoring Rule all exceeded
the agency’s Clean Air Act authority and that the agency had acted arbitrarily and
capriciously.202 The D.C. Circuit panel opinion dismissed the challenges to the
endangerment finding and vehicle standards.203 It then ruled that the agency’s
interpretation of the PSD triggers in the statute (dating back to the Johnson Memo)
was correct: the language “any air pollutant,” the court said, “unambiguously means
‘any air pollutant regulated under the CAA;’” the court then cited Massachusetts’
holding that this definition included greenhouse gases.204 “It is crystal clear,” the
court concluded, “that PSD permittees must install BACT for greenhouse gases.”205
EPA was therefore correct that a serious problem existed that the Tailoring
Rule was designed to address. But the D.C. Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge
of that rule on the grounds that they lacked standing, because they had suffered no
injury the court could redress.206 The Tailoring Rule, after all, operated to exempt
sources from requirements, not impose them. Granting the plaintiffs’ requested relief
and throwing out the Tailoring Rule would cause more injury than it remedied.207
Industry plaintiffs sought en banc review, which the D.C. Circuit rejected over the
dissent of then-Judge Kavanaugh.208 Plaintiffs then appealed to the Supreme Court.
It is worth pausing to consider why industry plaintiffs, particularly the large
electric utilities that led the case at the Supreme Court level, pressed the issue. The
200. See, e.g., EPA Clean Power Plan Violates Plain Text of Clean Air Act, Murray Energy Tells Court,
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Dec. 17, 2014), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-andenergy/epa-clean-power-plan-violates-plain-text-of-clean-air-act-murray-energy-tells-court.
201. Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
202. Id. at 116.
203. Id. at 113.
204. Id. at 113, 136.
205. Id. at 137.
206. Id. at 146.
207. Id. (“Indeed, the Timing and Tailoring Rules actually mitigate Petitioners’ purported
injuries.”).
208. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, Order on Petitions for Rehearing en Banc,
2012 WL 6621785, at *32 (Dec. 20, 2012).
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large coal and gas power plants they operated were largely unaffected by the
Tailoring Rule because they were already subject to PSD permitting due to emissions
of other pollutants, and (again) to the extent the Rule did apply, it reduced regulatory
burdens. Why pay to fight EPA on this? It is tempting to answer that industry groups
reflexively challenge any major EPA rulemaking, but that’s not really true. A more
nuanced suggestion is that some industry players might have been disadvantaged by
the Tailoring Rule insofar as it excused smaller competitors from permitting
requirements while imposing them on large facilities.209 But this seems unlikely for
large electric power plants, which face little if any competition from smaller emitters,
and in any case, this competitive standing argument appears not to have been
advanced in briefing. The true reason for the litigation appears to have been to
“heighten the contradictions” in EPA’s Clean Air Act climate policy.210 Overturning
the Tailoring Rule might have forced the agency to reconsider the wisdom of
regulating greenhouse gases from vehicles, lest it be forced to impose unpopular and
expensive permitting requirements.211 It might even have been possible to get a
reviewing court to overturn Massachusetts if it could be convinced of a fundamental
inconsistency in the Clean Air Act as applied to climate. If this was the plaintiffs’
goal, it failed in the short run but may prove a success in the long run, fitting for such
a bank-shot strategy.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari with respect to only one question—
whether EPA’s regulation of greenhouse gases from vehicles did, as the Johnson
Memo first established, trigger PSD permitting requirements.212 EPA and the D.C.
Circuit had concluded that it did.213 But if it did not, then the legally suspect

209. See Nathan Richardson, Standing and the Tailoring Rule, RESOURCES (Aug. 28, 2012),
https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-resources/standing-and-the-tailoring-rule/.
210. See Jonathan H. Adler, En Banc Petitions in D.C. Circuit Greenhouse Gas Litigation, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 28, 2012), http://volokh.com/2012/08/28/en-banc-petitions-in-d-c-circuitgreenhouse-gas-litigation/ (suggesting that “rejecting the ‘Tailoring Rule’ could force the EPA to consider
alternative ways to avoid the ‘absurd results’ it fears from applying the Act as written to greenhouse
gases—alternatives that might well exempt some of the industry petitioners from regulation”).
211. Of course, EPA could not have withdrawn the vehicle rules and refused to regulate at all; the
endangerment finding compels regulation, and even if that were also withdrawn, Massachusetts itself
requires some finding on greenhouse gases. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases under the Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/endangermentand-cause-or-contribute-findings-greenhouse-gases-under-section-202a-clean (last visited July 5, 2020).
Nevertheless, the agency could conceivably have halted regulation and pled for Congress to bail them out
of the dilemma with changes to the statute. Legislation stripping the agency of authority to regulate
greenhouse gases was being considered in Congress at the time. See John M. Broder, House Panel Votes to
Strip E.P.A. of Power to Regulate Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011,
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/science/earth/11climate.html).
212. UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 314 (2014).
213. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,535; Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d
102, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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Tailoring Rule wasn’t necessary. The 2014 result, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA
(“UARG”) was a fractured opinion reaching far beyond the question presented.214
Formally, EPA lost the case: the Tailoring Rule was struck down.215 UARG was a
tactical win and a strategic loss for the agency. It was not forced to subject large
numbers of sources to PSD permitting,216 but UARG revealed deep skepticism on
the Court of the legal foundations of the agency’s regulatory climate policy.
The Court’s UARG opinion is in some respects simple. All nine justices
agreed that EPA need not subject small emitters to PSD regulations.217 I suspect that
an agency has never been so pleased with a 9-0 loss at the Supreme Court. But there
were major differences among the Justices’ reasoning for reaching that result, with at
least three separate camps. The Chief Justice’s role in adjudicating the dispute
between those camps appears to have been pivotal. Explaining why requires some
reading between the lines of the three opinions in UARG and some speculation about
how the Justices came to their positions.
Some of the Justices’ positions are crystal-clear. Two of them, Thomas and
Alito, would have used UARG as a vehicle to overturn Massachusetts. In their view,
Massachusetts was wrongly decided and the PSD over-inclusion problem at issue in
UARG “further expose[d] the flaws” in it, forcing the agency to “effectively amend”
the Clean Air Act via its Tailoring Rule.218 In Justices Thomas and Alito’s view, the
only options available to EPA were to regulate thousands of small sources or to halt
Clean Air Act regulation of greenhouse gases by withdrawing the endangerment
finding—exposing the agency to further litigation on the grounds that such a
withdrawal is inconsistent with climate science and therefore arbitrary and
capricious.219 The Court should have recognized that Massachusetts had trapped the
agency in this Catch-22. Reversing Massachusetts would have at least given the agency
another option—withdrawal of the endangerment finding on the grounds that
greenhouse gas regulation is inconsistent with the regulatory design of the statute,
one of the Bush EPA’s justifications for not regulating that the Massachusetts court
had rejected as extra-statutory.220
214. See UARG, 573 U.S. at 334.
215. Id. at 332–33.
216. See id. at 315; infra Part II.D.
217. See UARG, 573 U.S. at 315.
218. Id. at 344 (Alito, J., dissenting).
219. See id. at 343-50.
220. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 512-13, 533-34 (2007). A more radical rejection of
Massachusetts is also possible. Instead of ruling that regulating GHGs under the Clean Air Act (or not)
was within EPA’s discretion (the Bush EPA’s position), it could have ruled that GHG regulation is legally
impermissible regardless of the agency’s view. More precisely, the Court could have determined that the
text and context of the Clean Air Act foreclose any interpretation that would allow GHG regulation,
despite deference under Chevron. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
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Justice Scalia and the Chief Justice likely found Thomas and Alito’s view
tempting, given their dissent in Massachusetts. It would have been easy to conclude
that the low tonnage limits in the PSD program and resulting Tailoring Rule were
an illustration of the “regulatory train wreck” or “glorious mess” of Clean Air Act
climate regulation commentators predicted in the wake of Massachusetts.221 Such
problems might have provided sufficient basis for overturning Massachusetts despite
stare decisis.222
Even if so tempted, however, Scalia and Roberts realized that joining Alito
and Thomas’ dissent would have been insufficient to make that dissent a majority
opinion. Whatever their reservations about the impracticality of the PSD program
for greenhouse gases (about which more below), none of the four liberal-leaning
Justices were ever likely to sign on to overturning Massachusetts. Nor was Justice
Kennedy, the apparent swing vote in Massachusetts, likely to change his mind and
reject that holding.
What, then, were the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia to do? Well, if you
can’t beat them (the four liberal justices plus Kennedy), join ‘em. For any Justice,
joining a majority at least gives you a chance to shape the opinion that emerges. But
if you’re the Chief Justice, it gives you an even greater power—you can assign the
opinion to yourself, or any other Justice you like, so long as the opinion is able to
keep a majority. The Chief Justice doesn’t just get a voice, he gets to be the voice (or
delegate it). Of course, Roberts could not just “join” the liberal justices and Kennedy,
and write an opinion overturning Massachusetts that they wouldn’t accept. But he also
did not need to convince five Justices to join an opinion—just one, presumably
Justice Kennedy. The coup de grace was assigning the opinion Justice Scalia, author of
the dissent in Massachusetts.

(1984). Such a holding would have resolved the agency’s Catch-22 in UARG by forcing withdrawal of the
endangerment finding. In short, Alito and Thomas’ dissent does not say whether they would overrule
Massachusetts or reverse it. See UARG, 573 U.S. 344 (Alito, J. dissenting). Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Massachusetts, joined by both Alito and Thomas, relies heavily on Chevron deference, so it appears unlikely
(though not certain) that a radical reversal was on the cards. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 558 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
221. See Darren Samuelsohn, Pronouncements of ‘Glorious Mess’ at EPA Spark Fight, E&E NEWS
(Apr. 23, 2008), https://www.eenews.net/stories/63711/print (reporting statement by President Bush that
Massachusetts “would make the federal government act like a local planning and zoning board, and have
crippling effects on our entire economy,” by White House officials that a government loss in the case
would lead to a “regulatory train wreck,” and another statement by Congressman John Dingell (D-MI)
that EPA regulation of climate would be a “glorious mess”).
222. The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia had signaled acceptance of Massachusetts as settled law by
signing on to Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in 2011’s American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, in
which the Court found that suits under the federal common law of nuisance over climate harms were
displaced by the Clean Air Act. See American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423 (2011).
Justices Alito and Thomas also joined that majority, but in a brief concurrence signaled their continuing
rejection of Massachusetts. See id. at 430 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Scalia’s majority opinion in UARG is fractured, in the sense that different
parts were joined by different groups of Justices. Only Scalia himself, Roberts, and
Kennedy signed on to the entire opinion.223 All nine Justices signed on to
introductory and background material in Sections I and II of the opinion. All nine
also rejected EPA’s Tailoring Rule as an improper rewriting of the statute, though
the four liberal Justices only did so implicitly.224 This meant that, as a formal matter,
the agency lost the case.
But seven Justices agreed in Part II-B-2 of the opinion that the agency
should get what it wanted all along: the ability to include greenhouse gas emissions
from large sources in the PSD permitting process to which they were already subject,
without including thousands of small sources.225 The “best available control
technology” that such large “anyway sources” were required to install to pass PSD
review could include greenhouse gas controls, the Court ruled.226 This was the
pragmatic solution to the Catch-22 that a rejection of the Tailoring Rule would have
otherwise subjected the agency to, and was likely necessary for Justice Kennedy to
sign on to the opinion. Justices Alito and Thomas refused to accept inclusion of
“anyway” sources because, as noted above, they rejected the entire premise of
greenhouse gas regulation under the Clean Air Act.227 But the four liberal Justices
were willing to sign on to this part of the opinion with Kennedy, Roberts, and Scalia.
Up to this point, I’ve described an opinion quite similar to what Kennedy
and the liberal Justices would likely have written had Roberts and Scalia simply
joined Thomas and Alito in dissent. But the remainder of Scalia’s UARG opinion
differs sharply from the reasoning the liberal Justices would have preferred (as their
dissent indicates). Moreover, it does so in a way that undermines Massachusetts.
Despite losing those four votes, Scalia’s statutory analysis in Section II-A of his
opinion still commanded a majority of the Court because Alito and Thomas joined
it.228 That they did so is perhaps all the evidence needed to show that this part of the
opinion does violence to Massachusetts, but it is still useful to explain how.
Scalia’s opinion ruled that EPA under both Bush and Obama had
misinterpreted the Clean Air Act. Recall that the agency, in the Johnson Memo and
again in the Tailoring Rule, had concluded that the statute’s requirement of PSD
223. See UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014).
224. See id. at 325–26, 338-39 (Breyer, J., concurring) (providing alternative reading of the statute
under which the Tailoring Rule’s rejection of the numerical thresholds in the statute is unnecessary; no
such alternative reading would be necessary if the Tailoring Rule were acceptable).
225. See id. at 331.
226. Id. Because motor-vehicle carbon emissions were being regulated, greenhouse gases were a
“‘pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter (i.e., the entire Act)” and thus included within the
scope of BACT.
227. Id. at 344 (Alito, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 304. This makes the two other opinions partial concurrences and partial dissents.
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permitting for major emitters of “any air pollutant” included emitters of greenhouse
gases; Massachusetts had resolved that question (it seemed), and the statute therefore
“compelled” such a reading.229 Scalia rejected this reading of Massachusetts, ruling
instead that greenhouse gases might be “air pollutants” in one part of the statute but
not another.230 Context—specifically, the universally acknowledged “absurd results”
of regulating small greenhouse gas emitters under PSD—was, in Scalia’s view,
sufficient to overcome the standard assumption that “identical words used in
different parts of the same act are intended [by Congress] to have the same
meaning.”231 In defense of this interpretation, Scalia pointed to multiple instances of
EPA adopting a narrower reading of “any air pollutant” language in the statute in
other regulatory contexts.232
Scalia’s opinion found that a varying scope of definition was not only a
permissible reading but one compelled by the statute. Thus, the agency’s reading was
entitled to no deference under Chevron.233 This likely came as some surprise to
agency lawyers: they had argued their interpretation of the statute was the only
reasonable one, only to have the Court rule that, in fact, only the opposite
interpretation was correct.234 There is some irony here—Scalia indicated in his
dissent in Massachusetts that he would have ruled in favor of the Bush EPA’s
interpretation largely on grounds of deference under Chevron,235 the same deference
he denied the Obama EPA in UARG regarding identical language elsewhere in the
statute.236
Interpreting “any air pollutant” to exclude greenhouse gases in the PSD
context got the agency out of having to regulate small emitters and, combined with
the opinion’s aforementioned blessing of greenhouse gas BACT for “anyway”
sources, gave the agency what it ultimately wanted. But UARG was nevertheless a
blow to Massachusetts specifically and to the agency’s ambitions for climate regulation
229. Id. at 315.
230. Id. at 319.
231. Id. at 319–20.
232. Id. at 316–18.
233. Id. at 320–25.
234. This state of disagreement prompts a meta-inquiry on Chevron. If the agency and the Court
view opposite readings of statutory language as unambiguous, isn’t that compelling evidence that the
statute is (in fact) ambiguous, and therefore that the agency interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference?
No, as it turns out: if the Court rules that the statute is unambiguous (or that the agency’s interpretation
is outside whatever zone of ambiguity exists), the agency’s reading is irrelevant. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (“[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter”). However much interpretive authority Chevron allocates from courts to agencies,
UARG illustrates that courts retain the final say on matters of statutory interpretation.
235. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 551–53 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
236. UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 319 (2014).
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under the Clean Air Act generally. Justice Scalia was clear about this in the majority
opinion:
Massachusetts does not strip EPA of authority to exclude
greenhouse gases from the class of regulable air pollutants under
other parts of the Act where their inclusion would be inconsistent
with the statutory scheme. The Act-wide definition to which the
Court gave a “sweeping” and “capacious” interpretation [] is not a
command to regulate, but a description of the universe of
substances EPA may consider regulating under the Act’s operative
provisions.237
After UARG, Massachusetts, in short, was far less definitive than it claimed to be.
The four liberal Justices recognized the attack on Massachusetts and refused
to join the statutory interpretation portion of Scalia’s UARG opinion. Instead, they
offered an alternative interpretive approach in their dissent that would have left
Massachusetts intact. They argued that the scope of PSD regulation in the statute
could be flexibly read with respect to the sources included, rather than the pollutants.
“Given the purposes of the PSD program and the Act as a whole,” Justice Breyer
wrote, “finding flexibility in ‘any source’ is far more sensible than the Court’s route
of finding it in ‘any air pollutant.’”238 In short, the problem with PSD regulation of
greenhouse gas emitters wasn’t that the pollutants were somehow incompatible with
the permitting program, but that most of the sources were too small for Congress to
have intended them to be included—as evidenced by the majority of Justices’
willingness to allow PSD regulation of “anyway” sources.239 Scalia’s insistence on
finding interpretive flexibility in “any air pollutant,” Breyer noted, “drains the Act
of its flexibility and chips away at our decision in Massachusetts.”240
The cuts to Massachusetts were deep, deep enough to convince that
decision’s longstanding critics (Alito and Thomas) to join. The Massachusetts Court
had at least seemed to rule that “any air pollutant” included greenhouse gases,
anywhere in the statute and that alternative interpretations were foreclosed, beyond
agency deference.241 After UARG, this single interpretation was discarded and
replaced with three potential interpretations. “Any air pollutant,” in different
237. Id.
238. Id. at 337–39.
239. Id. at 336 (“[t]o apply the programs at issue here to [small] sources would be extremely
expensive and burdensome, counterproductive, and perhaps impossible; it would also contravene
Congress’s intent that the programs’ coverage be limited to those large sources whose emissions are
substantial enough to justify the regulatory burdens.”).
240. Id. at 341–43.
241. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–30 (2007).
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statutory contexts, might (1) unambiguously include greenhouse gases, might (2)
unambiguously exclude them, or might (3) be legally ambiguous regarding inclusion
and therefore be committed to agency discretion (which, of course, might change
with administrations). UARG put the scope of pollutants in the PSD program in the
second category (unambiguously excluded). Because Massachusetts was not overruled,
the scope of the Section202 motor vehicle provisions of the statute remained in the
first category (unambiguously included). But the scope of every other provision of
the statue was left indeterminate—it might be in any of the three categories. And
because the availability of different interpretations of “any air pollutant” was crucial
to the outcome in UARG, it could not be dismissed as mere dicta. In this sense,
UARG did more than “chip away” at Massachusetts; it limited the case to its facts: the
single provision of the Clean Air Act at issue. If that was Chief Justice Roberts’
intention, his maneuvering was a masterful exercise of his position’s powers.
In so eroding Massachusetts, UARG threatened the viability and stability of
Clean Air Act climate policy in two distinct ways. First, it opened all subsequent
climate regulatory programs under any CAA provision other than Section202 or the
PSD program to the legal uncertainty that Massachusetts previously appeared to
resolve.242 Second, it opened Clean Air Act climate policy to easier rollback or
reversal by a subsequent, less-ambitious administration. Where the inclusion of
greenhouse gases within the scope of any Clean Air Act provision is ambiguous
(either because a court has not ruled or because a court has ruled it ambiguous),
UARG granted the agency discretion to make that determination, including the
inherent discretion to reverse an earlier determination.243 Should future EPA
leadership want to avoid climate regulation in any part of the statute other than
Section202, only litigation can force the agency’s hand. After UARG, Massachusetts
now must be relitigated for each provision of the Clean Air Act before a Court that
seems substantially more skeptical of climate regulation.
This erosion of regulatory certainty was not limited to relatively minor
programs like greenhouse-gas PSD (so low-priority that EPA was actively avoiding
regulation).244 The new-vehicle emissions rules put in place by EPA up to this point
only covered a small portion of U.S. emissions.245 For Clean Air Act regulation to
draw down U.S. emissions required substantial additional rules, in particular those
for new and existing power plants that the agency had promised in the 2010
settlement agreement. UARG created substantial new legal uncertainty for the
agency’s entire climate regulatory agenda. Each regulatory program was now a
separate battleground, and Massachusetts ceased to be the comprehensive victory it
had appeared to be.
242. See Jody Freeman, Why I Worry About UARG, 39 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 9, 10 (2015).
243. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
244. See generally Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,535.
245. See discussion supra Section II.B.
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For the most part, contemporaneous public reaction to UARG was muted,
treating it as a modest victory for the agency but likely not one with major long-term
implications.246 But some analyses recognized the implicit attack on Massachusetts.247
In an essay written after the decision, Jody Freeman noted that “[w]hile the shortterm outcome was favorable to EPA, UARG struck me as a decision laced with the
legal equivalent of improvised explosive devices.”248 It also, she continued, “invites
more legal challenges should EPA choose to take further action on GHGs under
other Clean Air Act programs.”249
Nor did UARG’s chilling effect on Clean Air Act climate regulation end
with undercutting Massachusetts, Freeman observed. It evidenced a deep skepticism
by much of the Court toward such regulation, including warnings to the agency
against (in Scalia’s view) overstepping its regulatory authority.250 Justice Scalia’s
opinion fired a shot across the bow of EPA’s regulatory ambition and imposed what
amounts to a “clear statement” rule on further inclusion of greenhouse gases within
the scope of Clean Air Act programs:
EPA’s interpretation is also unreasonable because it would bring
about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s
regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.
When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an
unheralded power to regulate ‘‘a significant portion of the
American economy,’’ Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S., at 159, 120
S.Ct. 1291, we typically greet its announcement with a measure of
skepticism. We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to
assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘‘economic and political
significance.’’251
To the extent this position is followed in future cases, it is both a direct and indirect
threat to climate regulation. Indirectly, it shows that the conservative Justices are
skeptical of the agency’s climate regulatory agenda, viewing any extension beyond
246. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court: EPA Can Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions, with Some
Limits, WASHINGTON POST (June 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-courtlimits-epas-ability-to-regulate-greenhouse-gas-emissions/2014/06/23/c56fc194-f1b1-11e3-914c1fbd0614e2d4_story.html.
247. See, e.g., Paul Beard and Daniel Cheung, Federalist Society, Utility Air Regulatory Group v.
EPA:AForeshadowingofThingstoCome?13ENGAGE31(Oct.13,2015),https://fedsoc.org/commentary/
publications/utility-air-regulatory-group-v-epa-a-foreshadowing-of-things-to-come.
248. See Freeman, supra note 242, at 9-10.
249. Id. at 10.
250. Id.
251. UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014).
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motor vehicle rules as suspect. More broadly, it connects the legal battles over
whether particular provisions in the Clean Air Act can be interpreted to apply to
greenhouse gases to wider battles over deference to agency interpretations of law and
the size and power of the administrative state.252 UARG, like Massachusetts before it,
is not just a climate case (or even just an environmental case), but an administrative
law case too.
Directly, it raises the bar for showing that a provision of the Clean Air Act
includes greenhouse gases within its scope—i.e., that it is within the first
(unambiguously included) or even third (ambiguous) category described above.
UARG suggests that implementation challenges with Clean Air Act climate programs
can be resolved in favor of simply excluding greenhouse gases from the scope of the
program, regardless of the agency’s reading of the statute. Because the statute never
mentions greenhouse gases explicitly, the “clear statement” rule will always be
difficult or impossible to satisfy. After reading this part of Scalia’s opinion, one
wonders how Massachusetts survives. The Bush EPA had cited the same language
from FDA v. Brown & Williamson that Scalia cites in UARG for his clear statement
rule, only to have the Court reject that reading in Massachusetts.253 Resurrected, it
threatens to become an insurmountable barrier to expansion of greenhouse gas
regulation beyond Section202 of the statute.
Despite UARG’s warning, the Obama EPA moved ahead with broader
climate regulation under the Clean Air Act, fulfilling its promise in the 2010
settlement agreement to regulate emissions from fossil fuel electric power plants.254
The ultimate failure of that effort is a direct result of the constraints on climate policy
first articulated in UARG. UARG does not get the attention it deserves because it is
in many ways such a strange case, with a fractured opinion and a defendant that
seemed to want to lose. But however narrow it appears to be, it hung a sword of
Damocles over every subsequent Clean Air Act climate rulemaking.

E. The Clean Power Plan (2014-2016)
The Obama EPA’s climate ambitions were never limited to road vehicles—
recall the President’s “another way to skin the cat” response to the failure of
economy-wide cap-and-trade legislation. Indeed the agency had committed in the
2010 settlement agreements to pursue carbon emissions limits for refineries and for
fossil-fuel fired power plants.255 Power plants were at the time the largest source of

252. See Freeman, supra note 242, at 10-13. The reference to Brown & Williamson in the majority
opinion is similarly telling.
253. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 530-31 (2007).
254. See discussion infra Section II.E.
255. See citations supra note 185.
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greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. economy,256 and regulation of their emissions
would, combined with the vehicle standards, make the majority of U.S. emissions at
least potentially subject to regulation. By regulating power plant emissions, the Clean
Air Act could credibly be seen as a vehicle for general, if not comprehensive, climate
policy. Without regulating the power sector, it would be at best a partial solution. In
the ANPRM and in the early years of the Obama administration, there was
significant debate inside and outside EPA over which of the many Clean Air Act
regulatory programs applicable to stationary sources under Title I of the statute
should be used to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.257 By around 2011, expert and
agency opinion coalesced around using performance standards authority under
Section111 of the statute.258
Though EPA was undoubtedly working on power plant performance
standards as early as the late-2010 settlement agreement, if not earlier, and the
agreement promised standards would be proposed in 2011 and finalized by 2012,259
those deadlines were missed. Designing regulations takes time, but there is good
evidence that the Obama administration was wary of proposing sweeping new
climate rules in the run-up to the 2012 election.260 In any case, EPA did not propose
any standards until 2012,261 though this proposal was later withdrawn.262 EPA only

256. SeeGreenhouseGasInventoryDataExplorer,EPA,https://cfpub.epa.gov/ghgdata/inventoryexp
lorer/allsectors/allgas/econsect/all (“U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Economic Sector, 1990-2017”)
(last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
257. See, e.g., ANPRM, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,476–44,516 (July 30, 2008) (discussing options for
stationary source GHG regulation); see also Nathan Richardson et al., Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the
Clean Air Act: Structure, Effects, & Implications of a Knowable Pathway, 41 ENV’T L. REP. 10098 (2011)
(discussing similar policy options and circa-2011 views on their viability).
258. See, e.g., Gregory E. Wannier et al., Prevailing Academic View On Compliance Flexibility Under
§111oftheCleanAirAct,RESOURCESFORTHEFUTURE(July13,2011),https://www.rff.org/publications
/working-papers/prevailing-academic-view-on-compliance-flexibility-under-111-of-the-caa/.
259. See EPA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS FACT SHEET, supra note 185.
260. See, e.g., David Bookbinder, Obama Had a Chance to Really Fight Climate Change. He Blew It,
VOX (Apr. 29, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/4/28/15472508/obama-climate-changelegacy-overrated-clean-power (claiming that “the Obama EPA fought against imposing CO2 standards
for [power] plants. They were fearful of the political consequences.”); see also Juliet Eilperin, Obama
Administration Slows Environmental Rules as It Weighs Political Cost, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/obama-administration-weighs-political-costof-environmental-rules/2012/02/07/gIQAvJzx8Q_story.html (detailing administration delays of
environmental rules).
261. EPA, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (proposed Apr. 13, 2012).
262. EPA, Withdrawal of Proposed Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions
From New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1352 (Jan. 8, 2014).
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issued a replacement proposal in early 2014.263 The initial standards, moreover, only
covered new power plants.264 Not until June of 2014 did EPA propose standards for
existing power plants in what would come to be known as the Clean Power Plan.265
This delay—nineteen months after the 2012 election, two and a half years after the
2010 settlement agreement committed EPA to regulating existing sources, and six
years after the 2008 ANPRM first explored regulation of greenhouse gases under
Section111 performance standards—has never been fully explained.266 The delay
arguably did not affect emissions reductions under the performance standards once
they were finalized because compliance was not required until the 2020s,267 but it did
leave EPA with little ability to react to legal challenges to the regulations before the
end of President Obama’s second term. This, combined with the preliminary success
of those challenges, was fatal to the regulatory program.
Performance standards for new power plants were finalized in August of
2015,268 with standards for existing sources in the Clean Power Plan following in
October.269 In a speech announcing the regulations, President Obama called them
the “single most important step America has ever taken in the fight against global
climate change.”270
Their requirements for the electric power sector were superficially
sweeping, though in practice modest at best. The new source standards effectively
banned construction of new coal power plants by setting the minimum performance
standard based on an assumption that carbon capture and storage (“CCS”) would be

263. EPA, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430 (proposed Jan. 8, 2014) (while not published in the
Federal Register until early 2014, these standards were initially proposed by EPA in September of 2013).
264. Id.
265. EPA, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (proposed June 18, 2014).
266. See, e.g., Bookbinder, supra note 260 (blaming fear of political consequences for delay of the
Clean Power Plan until after the 2012 election but offering no explanation for additional delays until
2014/2015).
267. 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,837 (“[t]he proposed interim goals would apply over a 2020–2029
phase-in period”); Nevertheless, because the Clean Power Plan first required states to submit plans for
EPA approval, an earlier start to the program might have made emissions reductions before 2020 plausible.
268. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015)
[hereinafter Power Plant NSPS].
269. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Clean Power Plan].
270. Press Release, White House, Obama Admin., Remarks by the President in Announcing the
CleanPowerPlan(Aug.3,2015),https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/03/re
marks-president-announcing-clean-power-plan.

112

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

Vol. 10:1

deployed271 (despite claims from industry and some states that such technology was
not yet available).272 However, few, if any, coal plants were likely to be built even
without the standards.273
For existing plants, the Clean Power Plan implemented a complex system
of state-level target emissions rates, calculated based on estimated efficiency
improvements at coal plants, shifting of generation from coal to gas, and construction
of new wind and solar generation.274 States were then given broad flexibility to meet
these targets, with plans for doing so to be submitted to EPA for approval by 2016,
although the deadline was extendable to 2018.275 Emissions reductions would not be
required under the Plan until 2022, with stringency increasing up to 2030.276 EPA
estimated that the Clean Power Plan would reduce greenhouse gas emissions from
the power sector by around 375 million metric tons annually once fully implemented
in 2030—a 32 percent cut relative to 2005 levels.277 Net benefits, the agency
estimated, would range from twenty-six to forty-five billion dollars annually in 2030,
depending on discount rates and compliance options chosen by states, with roughly
half of those benefits coming from greenhouse gas reductions and the remainder from
reductions in conventional co-pollutants.278 The agency estimated no emissions
reductions, and little to no net benefits would come from the performance standards
for new sources, as it projected no new coal plants without CCS would be built even
without the Plan.279 New-source standards, however, were legally required for the
agency to implement the existing-source standards in the Clean Power Plan,280 and
provided a backstop measure in case changing market conditions made new coal more
attractive than the agency predicted.281

271. See Power Plant NSPS, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510, 64,545 (Oct. 23, 2015).
272. See, e.g., Abby Harvey, Partial CCS in NSPS is Note Adequately Demonstrated, Achievable, Court
Briefs Say, EXCHANGE MONITOR (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.exchangemonitor.com/partial-ccs-nspsnot-adequately-demonstrated-achievable-court-briefs-say/?printmode=1.
273. See Benjamin Storrow, Will the U.S. Ever Build Another Big Coal Plant?, CLIMATEWIRE (Aug.
21, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060058864.
274. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,667 (Oct. 23, 2015).
275. Id. at 64,667–69.
276. Id. at 64,669.
277. Id. at 64,924 (converting short tons to metric tons).
278. Id. at 64,679–80.
279. Power Plant NSPS, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510, 64,640 (Oct. 23, 2015).
280. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,702 (Oct. 23, 2015).
281. See EPA, EPA-452/R-15-005, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL STANDARDS
PERFORMANCE FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM NEW, MODIFIED, AND
RECONSTRUCTED STATIONARY SOURCES: ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS 5-11–5-16 (Aug.
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The Clean Power Plan’s estimated impact was smaller than but comparable
to that of the already-issued motor vehicle standards. The Phase I and II vehicle
standards, taken together, were estimated to achieve 513 million metric tons in annual
emissions reductions by 2030, 138 million tons more than the Clean Power Plan.282
Comparing estimated benefits of the programs is more difficult.283 Beyond the
headline estimates, however, there were more significant differences in the programs.
The Clean Power Plan’s reductions would not come until the 2020s, with much of
them delayed until the last years of that decade.284 The vehicle standards, in contrast,
began reducing emissions as soon as affected vehicles were sold and driven, though
those reductions were spread over the life of the regulated vehicles extending into
the 2030s and beyond. Because greenhouse gases are stock pollutants, emissions
reductions are more valuable the sooner they occur.285 Moreover, as subsequent
events would illustrate, the ability of the vehicle standards to lock-in emissions
reductions with more efficient vehicles on the road and structural shifts in the auto
industry made them more resilient to legal challenge and changing political priorities
than the Clean Power Plan would prove to be.
In fact, the Clean Power Plan would never, in practice, require a single ton
of emissions reductions. It would first be suspended by the courts and then
withdrawn by the Trump EPA before the agency even approved a single state plan.286
Like all major EPA rules, the Clean Power Plan attracted legal challenge from states
and industry groups. Among a variety of arguments, opponents alleged the agency
had exceeded its authority by basing emissions reductions targets for regulated
facilities (coal plants) based not only on estimated efficiency improvements but on
“outside-the-fence” changes in the energy mix—shifts to gas generation and new
renewables.287 EPA countered that the statute’s requirement that it set standards
based on the “best system of emission reduction” required or at least permitted an
2015), https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/docs/ria/utilities_ria_final-nsps-egus_2015-08.pdf (showing that
NSPS is binding under assumptions of high natural gas prices).
282. See Phase I Light Duty Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324, 25637 (May 7, 2010); Phase II Light
Duty Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, 62,892 (Oct. 15, 2012).
283. Phase I and Phase II standards estimate benefits over lifetime of vehicles, while CPP does so
on annual basis. Compare Phase I Light Duty Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,637, with Clean Power
Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,679–80.
284. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,669.
285. See Grantham Research Institute and Duncan Clark, Why Does Climate Change Get Described as
a 'Stock-’Low' Problem?, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2012/feb/20/climate-change-stock-flow.
286. See discussion and citations infra Section III.B.
287. See Opening Brief of Petitioners on Core Legal Issues at 41, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir.
2016)(No.15-1363),https://ago.wv.gov/publicresources/epa/Documents/Opening%20Core%20Brief%20
-%20file-stamped%20(M0119247xCECC6).pdf.
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expansive view of opportunities for emissions cuts.288 Challengers requested that the
reviewing court stay the Clean Power Plan until these issues could be resolved, but
the D.C. Circuit refused in early 2016.289
The challengers sought interlocutory appeal of the D.C. Circuit’s refusal to
stay the regulation from the Supreme Court.290 In February of 2016, the Court
granted the stay by 5-4 vote, one of Justice Scalia’s last acts on the Court.291 The
decision halted implementation of the Clean Power Plan until a final disposition by
the Supreme Court.292 No rationale was given. The Court had never before granted
an interlocutory stay of a regulation,293 (though the Court’s receptiveness to
interlocutory relief appears to have increased in the years since).294
Without an opinion from the Court, it is only possible to speculate about
the Court’s rationale for granting the stay. Well-settled doctrine on stays requires a
showing by the challenging party of irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on
the merits, plus a harms-balancing test and public interest factor.295 On the
irreparable harm prong of the test, some on the Court may have been influenced by
EPA leadership’s reaction to the Court’s 2015 Michigan v. EPA decision296 in which
the Court rejected an rule imposing mercury emissions limits on coal power

288. See Respondent EPA’s Initial Brief at 27, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 151363),https://ago.wv.gov/publicresources/epa/Documents/EPA%20Response%20Brief%20(consolidated
)%20(M0122282xCECC6).pdf.
289. See Order Granting Expedition and Denying Stay, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Circ. 2016)
(No.15-1363),https://ago.wv.gov/publicresources/epa/Documents/Order%20granting%20expedition%20
and%20declining%20stay%20(M0116449xCECC6).pdf.
290. See Order Granting Stay, West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016).
291. Id.
292. Id. (or, less likely, a decision by the losing party at the D.C. Circuit not to seek cert).
293. See, e.g., Keith Goldberg, High Court Stay Could Spell Doom for EPA’s Clean Power Plan, LAW360
(Feb.10,2016),https://www.law360.com/articles/757509/high-court-stay-could-spell-doom-for-epa-sclean-power-plan (noting that the Clean Power Plan stay was “the first time the Supreme Court has ever
blocked federal regulations before the D.C. Circuit has completed a merits review”).
294. See Stephen J. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123
(2019).
295. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 19–20 (2008) (summarizing the requirements
for a preliminary injunction of regulatory action: “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest.”).
296. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
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plants.297 Then-EPA Secretary Gina McCarthy had suggested the decision would
have little or no impact because industry had already made investments to comply
with the challenged rule in the three years since it had been issued.298 The Justices
voting for the stay may have wanted to avoid a repeat of that experience.
It is even more difficult to know what led the court to conclude that the
challengers were likely to succeed on the merits. The most likely candidate for such
success is probably the claim, mentioned above, that the agency had exceeded its
authority by basing standards on “outside the fence” emissions reductions. A deeper
UARG-style challenge that Section111 of the statute (on which the Clean Power Plan
is based) is not applicable to climate is also plausible. The Clean Power Plan
challengers made this argument, citing UARG in their initial petition for a stay,
specifically in its broader administrative law context, as a “clear-statement rule” for
broad claims of agency authority.299
However, the Court appeared to foreclose a UARG-style argument in its
2011 American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (“AEP”) decision.300 In that case, states
and environmental groups had sought injunctions against coal power plant
greenhouse gas emissions based on the federal common law of nuisance.301 The Court
ruled, 8-0 with Justice Sotomayor recused, that such actions were displaced by the
federal common law arising from the Clean Air Act, specifically Section111 which,
the Court ruled, “speaks directly” to coal plant carbon emissions.302 Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion was joined by five other Justices (Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy,
Breyer, and Kagan), putting them on record agreeing with the view that Section111
encompassed greenhouse gases.303 (Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote in

297. See Michael S. Greve, Clean Power, Dirty Hands, LAW & LIBERTY (Feb. 1, 2016),
https://www.lawliberty.org/2016/02/01/clean-power-dirty-hands/(noting that the rule challenger’s
discussed Michigan in their motion for stay).
298. See Timothy Cama & Lydia Wheeler, Supreme Court Overturns Landmark EPA Air Pollution
Rule, THE HILL (June 29, 2015), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/246423-supreme-courtoverturns-epa-air-pollution-rule(quoting EPA Administrator McCarthy saying that “even if we don’t
[win the case], it was three years ago. Most of them are already in compliance, investments have been
made, and we’ll catch up. And we’re still going to get at the toxic pollution from these facilities”).
299. See State Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and for Expedited Consideration of Petition for Review
at6-7,WestVirginiav.EPA(D.C.Cir.filedOct.23,2015)(No.15-1363),https://ago.wv.gov/publicreso
urces/epa/Documents/StatePetrsMotionForStay.pdf (describing UARG as a “clear-statement rule” that
§111 fails to meet insofar as EPA relied on it to build broad climate regulation in the Clean Power Plan);
EPA Rules for New and Existing Coal-Fired Power Plants: Litigation and Rulemaking Documents, OFFICE OF
THE WEST VIRGINIA ATTORNEY GENERAL (Oct. 19, 2016), https://ago.wv.gov/publicresources/epa/.
300. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
301. Id. at 418-420.
302. Id. at 424.
303. Id. at 410.
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concurrence solely to note their continuing objection to Massachusetts).304 Of course,
AEP was decided before UARG cast doubt on the extent of Massachusetts’ holding,
but the conclusion that Section111 encompasses greenhouse gases is no mere dicta;
it is necessary for the displacement holding in the case.305 After UARG, therefore,
Section111 became the only section of the Clean Air Act formally recognized by the
Court to extend to greenhouse gases other than Section202 in Massachusetts itself.
AEP’s discussion of Section111 was not entirely favorable, however. In a
bit of black comedy, inconsistencies between the House and Senate versions of the
1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act never resolved in conference led to
alternative restrictions on the agency’s Section111 powers.306 Both versions link
Section111(d) standards for existing sources (like the Clean Power Plan) with
separate, strict regulations under Section112 of emissions of any of a large class of
“hazardous” pollutants (i.e., those that cause cancer or other serious effects at low
concentrations). The Senate version of the text would apparently prevent the agency
from setting Section111(d) standards only for any pollutant regulated under
Section112.307 The House version (adopted by the U.S. Code), read literally, would
prevent the agency from setting standards for any source regulated under
Section112.308 As large, complex industrial facilities, coal plants are universally
subject to Section112 regulation and would under this more restrictive interpretation
be excluded from existing-source Section111(d) standards, including the Clean
Power Plan. The AEP Court noted the Sections111–112 connection in a footnote,
stating that “EPA may not employ [Section111] if existing stationary sources of the
pollutant in question are regulated under...the ‘hazardous air pollutants’
program.”309
This appears to adopt the more restrictive House version. But if so, it
remains unclear why it does not eviscerate AEP’s displacement holding. In any case,
the Clean Power Plan challengers later claimed the Plan was illegal because of this
“Section112 exclusion,” citing the AEP footnote.310 EPA, for its part, claimed that
the presence of two alternate versions of the text constituted a statutory ambiguity it
304. Id. at 429–430 (Alito, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 418–24.
306. See Lesley S. Cruickshank, Note, The “Drafting Error” That Could Derail the Clean Power Plan,
67 ALA. L. REV. 887, 897 (2016) (“By what is undoubtedly a clerical oversight, the version of the bill that
emerged from the conference committee and was eventually signed into law included both provisions.”).
307. Id. at 897–901.
308. Id.
309. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 425 (2011).
310. See Opening Brief of Petitioners on Core Legal Issues at 62, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 151363,(D.C.Cir.FiledFeb.19,2016),https://ago.wv.gov/publicresources/epa/Documents/Opening%20
Core%20Brief%20-%20file-stamped%20(M0119247xCECC6).pdf.
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was forced to resolve, and which therefore entitled the agency to Chevron
deference.311 In short, AEP may have shielded the Clean Power Plan from a UARGstyle facial attack, chipping away at its Massachusetts foundation, but it simultaneously
legitimized another avenue of legal challenge.
Alternatively, a majority of Justices may have simply concluded that the
Clean Power Plan’s challengers were likely to succeed on the merits because EPA’s
regulatory reach had exceeded its statutory grasp. As Jonathan Adler put it:
[i]n promoting the plan, the EPA repeatedly emphasized that
the CPP represented the most ambitious climate-related
undertaking in the agency’s history and crowed that the plan
would lead to the complete restructuring of the energy sector.
Making these claims may have undermined the EPA’s position,
because it made it easier for the stay applicants to argue that a stay
was justified. Put another way, an unprecedented assertion of
regulatory authority may itself have justified an unprecedented
exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction to stay the agency’s action.312
This suggests that the stay, like UARG and Massachusetts before it, is as
much an administrative law decision as a narrow Clean Air Act one. It is possible
that Clean Air Act climate policy was drawn into wider disputes on the Court over
administrative law questions: the scope of agency authority and judicial deference.
Even if UARG did not provide a doctrinal roadmap for the legal challenge
to the Clean Power Plan, both UARG and the stay were indicative of a Court
increasingly skeptical of Clean Air Act climate policy, particularly to the extent it
could be described as a broad expansion of agency authority.313 From its short
statement, it remains unclear which of the arguments the Court concluded gave the
challengers a likelihood of success on the merits, and different arguments may have
swayed different Justices. Recall that Justices Alito and Thomas were on record
supporting overturning Massachusetts—for which Clean Power Plan litigation would

311. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,711 (Oct. 23, 2015). This argument is somewhat persuasive,
but suffers from at least two flaws. First, to the extent Chevron deference is premised on an implied
delegation of interpretive authority from Congress to the agency, it seems unlikely that Congress meant
to create a gap ripe for agency interpretation by passing two inconsistent versions of the same provision.
Second, the AEP footnote suggests the Court views the §111/§112 conflict as one resolvable without resort
to agency deference (i.e., a Chevron step one matter), in that it appears to adopt one interpretation of the
statutory text without reference to the agency’s view, See AEP, 564 U.S. at 425.
312. Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court Puts the Brakes on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, WASH. POST
(Feb.9,2016),https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supremecourtputs-the-brakes-on-the-epas-clean-power-plan/.
313. See UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 323-25 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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have provided another opportunity314—so it was only necessary to convince three
other Justices that one or more of the arguments were persuasive.
The stay left the Clean Power Plan in tatters. States that would have soon
been required to submit plans to the agency or seek extensions to 2018 were now
relieved of that obligation.315 Meetings between state regulators, industry groups,
environmental groups, and other stakeholders aimed at laying the groundwork for
such plans were cancelled.316 Litigation proceeded at the D.C. Circuit level, but no
decision was reached (nor did EPA revise the regulation) before the 2016 election.317
One might suspect, therefore, that pressure on the electric power industry
to close or reduce the use of coal plants in anticipation of the plan would have been
relieved. Perhaps it was in some cases, but a national trend of coal plant closures
continued unabated, driven by market forces and other, non-climate regulations.318
Low prices of renewables and natural gas made operating and building coal plants
increasingly unattractive.319 This illustrates a further indictment of the Clean Power
Plan—in addition to its legal vulnerability and modest ambition compared to the
vehicle standards, it appears that some or all of the emissions reductions it promised
would have been achieved anyway due to “secular” electric power industry changes
the agency did not fully account for in its impact estimates.320 Heralded as the most
significant federal climate regulation ever, the Clean Power Plan was moribund
within six months, dead in three years, and might never have reduced emissions very
much anyway.

314. Id. at 343-345.
315. See Adler, supra note 312 (“this stay means that the EPA may not continue to take any actions
to implement or enforce the CPP pending the resolution of the state and industry challenge to the rule.”).
316. For example, meetings between the South Carolina state regulatory agency and stakeholders,
in which I played a very minor role, stopped shortly after the stay. South Carolina Energy Coalition,
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, (2019),
https://scdhec.gov/environment/your-air/south-carolinas-energy-future/south-carolina-energy-coalition.
317. See Petition for Review, West Virginia et al v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23
2015),http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/casedocuments/2015/20151023_docket-15-1363_petition-for-review.pdf. No final disposition in the case was
reached until September of 2019 when, after repeated delays, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the challenge to
the Clean Power Plan as moot, given the Trump administration’s later withdrawal of the rule. See Order
Granting Motion to Dismiss, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 17, 2019),
http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/
2019/20190917_docket-15-1363_order.pdf.
318. See, e.g., More U.S. Coal-Fired Power Plants Are Decommissioning as Retirements Continue, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 26, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=40212 (citing
flat demand growth and competition from natural gas and renewables as causes of sharp increase in coal
plant retirements).
319. Id.
320. See infra Section II.G, for discussion of the impact of the Obama EPA’s climate regulations.

Fall 2020

The Rise and Fall of Clean Air Act Climate Policy

119

F. The Final Burst: HFCs, Methane, and Trucks (2016)
The Supreme Court’s stay froze and ultimately doomed the Obama EPA’s
signature climate policy. Nevertheless, the agency continued moving through its
climate regulatory agenda in 2016. Much of this action was focused on further
regulation of vehicle emissions under Section202.
In 2015, shortly before the Clean Power Plan was finalized, EPA issued its
first Clean Air Act climate rules aimed at emissions outside the electric power and
vehicle sectors. Based on its authority over ozone-depleting substances under
Section605(a) of the statute, the agency effectively banned or restricted use of some
hydrofluorocarbon (“HFC”) refrigerants that are extremely potent greenhouse gases
(thousands of times moreso than carbon dioxide).321
In August of 2016, EPA issued a “cause or contribute” finding applicable to
greenhouse gas emissions from aircraft.322 As with the 2009 finding for road vehicles,
this both permitted and required the agency to regulate emissions from new vehicles
(in this case, new aircraft and new air engines for use in existing airframes). To date,
however, no actual greenhouse gas emissions regulations on aircraft have been issued,
leading environmental groups to threaten suit against the agency.323
Paramount among its 2016 rulemakings, the agency issued a second round
of emissions standards for heavy-duty vehicles in October, applying to model years
2019-2027.324 These Phase II heavy-duty vehicle standards were projected to
generate an additional billion tons of greenhouse gas emissions reductions over the
lifetime of affected vehicles and $117-229 billion of net benefits.325 These standards
required for the first time that engines installed in new “glider” vehicles meet the
new fuel economy requirements.326 The agency issued one other notable climate
rulemaking in 2016: performance standards for new oil and gas wells under

321. EPA, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Change of Listing Status for Certain Substitutes
Under the Significant New Alternatives Policy Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,870 (July 20, 2015) (to be
codified in 40 C.F.R. pt. 82).
322. EPA, Finding That Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Aircraft Cause or Contribute to Air
Pollution That May Reasonably Be Anticipated to Endanger Public Health and Welfare, 81 Fed. Reg.
54,422 (Aug. 15, 2016) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. pts. 87, 1068).
323. See Rachel Frazin, Green Groups Threaten to Sue EPA Over Airplane Pollution, THE HILL (Jan.
30, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/480764-green-groups-threaten-to-sue-epaover-airplane-pollution.
324. EPA, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and HeavyDuty Engines and Vehicles—Phase 2, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,478, 73,481 (Oct. 25, 2016).
325. Id. at 73,482.
326. Id. at 73,478. Gliders are newly-manufactured truck bodies that require installation of an
existing engine likely manufactured under old, less-stringent emissions standards.
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Section111 of the statute.327 The 2010 settlement agreement had committed the
agency to issue greenhouse gas emissions standards for oil refineries by 2012,328 but
the agency shifted focus to oil and gas extraction, largely driven by concerns over
emissions of methane, a potent short-term greenhouse gas.329 Oil and gas wells had
long been subject to emissions standards, last updated in 2012, but the 2016 standards
restricted methane emissions for the first time.330 The agency estimated methane
emissions reductions of forty to forty-five percent by 2025—relative to 2012 levels—
from the new standards, in addition to reductions in volatile organic compounds
(“VOCs”), benzene, and other toxic air pollutants.331 Just as for power plants, new
source standards were a necessary prerequisite for any regulation of existing oil and
gas extraction under Section111(d) of the statute.332
In late 2016, the agency also issued a binding Information Collection
Request requiring oil and gas extraction companies to “provide extensive information
instrumental for developing comprehensive regulations to reduce methane emissions
from existing oil and gas sources.”333 This strongly suggested that existing-source
standards would be forthcoming. Section111 standards restricting methane from new
landfills followed in August of 2016.334
The methane standards and the 2015 HFC bans signaled an intent to
gradually bring more of the U.S. economy within the scope of Clean Air Act climate
policy. The vehicle standards and Clean Power Plan covered a large share of
emissions from the two sectors with the greatest emissions, but roughly one-third of

327. EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified
Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,824 (June 3, 2016).
328. See EPA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS FACT SHEET, supra note 185.
329. EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified
Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,824, 35,825 (June 3, 2016). Methane traps many times more solar radiation than
carbon dioxide but decays in the atmosphere over roughly a decade; the CO2 it eventually produces sticks
around. Duncan Clark, “How Long Do Greenhouse Gases Stay in the Air?,” THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 16, 2012,
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/jan/16/greenhouse-gases-remain-air.
330. See EPA, FACT SHEET: EPA’S ACTIONS TO REDUCE METHANE EMISSIONS FROM THE OIL
NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: FINAL RULES AND DRAFT INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 2
(May 12, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/nsps-overview-fs.pdf.

AND

331. Id. at 1.
332. See Clean Air Act §111(d)(1) (existing source standards are to be issued only for sources “to
which a standard of performance under this section would apply if such existing source were a new
source”).
333. See EPA, FACT SHEET: EPA’S ACTIONS TO REDUCE METHANE EMISSIONS FROM THE OIL
NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: FINAL RULES AND DRAFT INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 1
(May 12, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/nsps-overview-fs.pdf.

AND

334. EPA, Standards of Performance for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,332
(Aug. 29, 2016).

Fall 2020

The Rise and Fall of Clean Air Act Climate Policy

121

U.S. emissions came from a wide variety of other sectors and industries.335 Unlike a
comprehensive, economy-wide carbon price scheme like carbon taxes or cap-andtrade, the fragmented structure of the Clean Air Act requires the agency to proceed
sector-by-sector.336 So long as agency leadership remained committed to doing so
and the courts allowed, most emitting industries could have been climate-regulated
under the statute. As UARG and the Clean Power Plan stay illustrate, the willingness
of the Supreme Court to permit this expansion was perhaps being pushed beyond its
breaking point. And as Section III below describes, any appetite for climate
regulation by EPA leadership collapsed after the election of President Trump in
2016.

G. Did All This Matter?
The above discussion has noted EPA’s impressive estimates of emissions
reductions and net benefits. A few years of experience can shed some light on the
accuracy of those estimates. The hope and aim of climate regulation was not just a
reduction in U.S. emissions, but a meaningful reduction in the risk of catastrophic
climate change that also required motivating other countries to make similar or
greater commitments. The success of U.S. policy should therefore be evaluated in
large part based on its ability to push or pull other emitters to act.
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions did decline substantially during President
Obama’s tenure in office,337 but that decline was largely unrelated to regulatory
moves under the Clean Air Act, some of the most important of which would not take
effect until after Obama left office (like the 2017-2025 vehicle emissions standards
and the Clean Power Plan). The Phase I vehicle emissions standards had some
effect,338 as did regulations aimed at other pollutants, including the mercury limits at
issue in Michigan v. EPA, which likely caused some coal retirements.339 But the

335. See EPA DRAFT INVENTORY, supra note 133, at ES-26 (identifying substantial emissions from
industry, agriculture, and other sectors).
336. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Title I and Title II (covering stationary and mobile sources,
respectively). Both Titles are further subdivided into a variety of regulatory programs covering specific
categories of pollutants or sources, each in their own Section or subsection.
337. See EPA DRAFT INVENTORY, supra note 133, at ES-5 (reporting 7,206 million metric tons of
CO2-equivalent greenhouse gas emissions in 2008, and 6,526 tons in 2016).
338. The Phase I standards applied to vehicles manufactured during the Obama administration, but
the emissions impact of those vehicles is measured over their lifespan on the road, most of which would
come after 2016.
339. See EIA, Coal Plants Installed Mercury Controls to Meet Compliance Deadlines (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32952 (“Between January 2015 and April 2016, about
87 GW of coal-fired plants installed pollution-control equipment, and nearly 20 GW of coal capacity
retired. About 26% of those retirements occurred in April 2015, meeting the MATS rule's initial
compliance date.”).
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primary causes were the 2009 recession, a large and consistent drop in natural gas
prices (allowing gas to substitute for coal), efficiency improvements, and rapidly
falling prices of renewable generation.340
These pre-existing macroeconomic, energy market, and technological
factors led some to criticize the Obama EPA’s regulatory moves—particularly the
Clean Power Plan—as unambitious or superfluous.341 Recall that the Clean Power
Plan would not require any emissions reductions until 2022, with mandated
reductions increasing until 2030, at which point emissions from the power sector
would be at least thirty-two percent below 2005 levels.342 But by the time the plan
was finalized, U.S. emissions had already dropped roughly fifteen percent since 2005;
to meet the stated target, the Plan would only require an additional seventeen percent
reduction, at a slower rate than that already being driven by other factors.343
Some critics also argued that the target of thirty-two percent below 2005
emissions was an inadequate response to the severity of climate risks and unlikely to
constitute leadership sufficient to push other countries to take measures of their
own.344 The Clean Power Plan, vehicle emissions standards, and other Clean Air Act
regulations proposed or finalized during the Obama administration—had they been
fully implemented—plus reductions from secular and market trends, were projected
to at least put U.S. emissions reductions within striking distance of commitments

340. By far the largest annual decline in U.S. emissions during the Obama administration occurred
in 2009, during the Great Recession; from 2010-2015, emissions increased in as many years as they
decreased. See EPA DRAFT INVENTORY, supra note 133, at ES-5. See also U.S. Energy-Related CO2
EmissionsFell1.7%in2016,U.S.ENERGYINFO.ADMIN.(Apr.10,2017),https://www.eia.gov/todayinen
ergy/detail.php?id=30712 (attributing 2016 emissions decline to fuel switching from coal to natural gas
and reductions in the energy intensity of the economy, and noting that the transportation sector, the most
highly-regulated under the Clean Air Act, was the only sector in which emissions increased).
341. See, e.g., Ben Adler, How Are Environmentalists Reacting to Obama’s Clean Power Plan?, GRIST
(Aug. 3, 2015), https://grist.org/climate-energy/how-are-environmentalists-reacting-to-obamas-cleanpower-plan/ (describing view of some environmental groups that the Clean Power Plan “will not go far
enough and fast enough in reducing emissions). See also Michael Grunwald, 5 Reasons Obama’s
TransformativePowerPlanWon’tTransformAnything,POLITICO(May26,2015),https://www.politico.co
m/agenda/story/2015/05/obama-transformative-energy-power-plan-000016.
342. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,669 (Oct. 23, 2015).
343. See Brad Plumer, A Guide to Obama’s New Rules to Cut Carbon Emissions from Power Plants, VOX
(June 1, 2014), https://www.vox.com/2014/6/1/5770556/EPA-power-plant-rules-explainer.
344. See, e.g., Kyle Ash, Why President Obama’s Clean Power Plan Is an Exaggeration, GREENPEACE
(Aug.3,2015),https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/why-president-obamas-clean-power-plan-is-an-exaggera
tion/ (advocating a 40% cut in U.S. emissions relative to 2005 levels and binding international
commitments).
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under the Paris Agreement.345 While a useful start, the Paris goals are insufficient to
keep temperature change below two degrees Celsius.346
This view led to calls for EPA to substantially increase the stringency of
the program.347 Whether a more aggressive Clean Power Plan was is unclear. EPA’s
decision to drop an energy efficiency component of its “best system of emission
reduction” (“BSER”) calculation (which determined stringency of the Plan) suggests
it believed the final plan was operating at the political or legal margin or both.348 The
success of challengers in getting the Supreme Court to stay the regulation supports
the view that EPA was operating at or near the legal limits of what the Clean Air Act
would support. On the other hand, some evidence suggests that EPA had an adequate
technical basis for substantially increasing the emissions reductions it projected from
improvements in coal plant efficiency (building block 1), the most legally defensible
part of the BSER calculation.349
In any case, emissions reductions from the power sector have mostly
continued since the final Clean Power Plan was released in 2015, though they did
increase slightly in 2018.350 Medium-term projections indicate that power sector
emissions will continue to decline rapidly enough to meet the Clean Power Plan’s
2030 target by around 2020-2022, and continue to decline through the 2020s (See
Figure 1).351 These declines will be driven largely by rapid retirements of coal plants

345. See DOUG VINE, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, ACHIEVING THE UNITED
STATES’INTENDEDNATIONALLYDETERMINEDCONTRIBUTION(Nov.2016),https://www.c2es.org/si
te/assets/uploads/2016/09/achieving-us-indc-nov-2016.pdf (projecting 22% economy-wide emissions
reductions, short of the U.S. commitment of 26-28% reductions, both relative to 2005 levels).
346. See David Roberts, There’s a Huge Gap Between the Paris Climate Change Goals and Reality, VOX
(Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/10/31/16579844/climate-gap-unep2017.
347. See, e.g., David Biello, How Far Does Obama's Clean Power Plan Go in Slowing Climate Change?,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Aug. 6, 2015) (“the Clean Power Plan alone is not enough”).
348. See Nathan Richardson, 10 Things We Looked for in the Clean Power Plan...and What We Found,
RESOURCES (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-resources/10-things-we-looked-forin-the-clean-power-plan-and-what-we-found/.
349. See Dallas Burtraw, Inside the Fence: Keep an Eye on Cofiring under the Clean Power Plan,
RESOURCES (July 16, 2015), https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-resources/inside-the-fence-keep-aneye-on-cofiring-under-the-clean-power-plan/.
350. See EPA DRAFT INVENTORY, supra note 133, at ES-7.
351. See John Larsen & Whitney Herndon, What the Clean Power Plan Would Have Done, RHODIUM
GRP. (Oct. 9, 2017), https://rhg.com/research/what-the-cpp-would-have-done/ (“Our current projections
put power sector CO2 emissions 27% to 35% below 2005 levels [by 2030]—bookending EPA’s [32%] target
for the CPP. Gas prices have stayed lower for longer than EIA predicted, electricity demand has remained
flat, rapidly declining wind and solar costs and a multi-year extension of the PTC and ITC have driven
aggressive renewable energy deployment, and many coal-fired power plants have been retired.”); see also
Tracking Power Sector Changes in the Years Since the Clean Power Plan, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. (Aug. 6,
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and deployment of wind and solar generation.352 The projections indicate that the
climate-hawk critics of the Clean Power Plan were correct. Arguably, if it was not
legally or politically possible to issue a more stringent rule, the administrative
resources and political capital devoted to the Clean Power Plan might have been
better used elsewhere.
Figure I: Current power sector CO2 projections and EPA's CPP headline 2030 target
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Source: EPA, EIA and Ahcxlium Group analysis.

Figure 1: Rhodium Group estimates of emissions reductions from the power sector353

That said, the Clean Power Plan would not have been useless. Because it
imposed individual goals on each state, some states would still have been required to
reduce emissions or purchase emissions allowances in an interstate trading regime.354
Moreover, it is not a given that projections would have come true: coal retirements
and renewable deployment could slow, the economy and its attendant energy needs
could grow faster than expected, or some other factor, like changes in fuel prices,
could push power sector emissions above projections. If so, the Clean Power Plan
2018),https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/tracking-power-sector-changes-in-the-years-since-the-cleanpower-plan/.
352. Larsen & Herndon, supra note 351.
353. Id.
354. Id. (noting “21 states would have had to do more to comply with the CPP than what they were
already on track to achieve in absence of the rule”). See also Martin T. Ross et al., Assessing Impacts of the
Clean Power Plan on Southeast States 1-3 (Duke Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Pol’y Solutions, Working Paper
NI WP 15-03, May 2015), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_wp_1503_full_pdf.pdf (projecting substantial changes in generation mix in the Southeast as a result of the Clean
Power Plan; note that projections are based on the draft CPP, not the final rule).
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would have provided a backstop.355 The Clean Power Plan, had it been upheld, would
have also provided a ready framework for interstate emissions trading and, possibly,
more stringent goals in the future.356
However useful it might have been, the Plan was not sold or apparently
intended as a regional effort or backstop but as a primary driver of national emissions
reductions.357 Had the Obama EPA known in 2014 and 2015 that power sector
emissions would decline as fast as they have, it would (I believe) have either produced
a more ambitious rule or focused on other sectors where emissions were not already
declining. The green critics at the time suggested EPA did know this would happen,
or at least should have known.358
The Clean Power Plan was, like any regulatory climate policy, vulnerable
to being overtaken by events. Although it delegated substantial flexibility to states
in meeting emissions reduction targets, those targets were rigid and set as far as
fifteen years in the future.359 Such delay and long-term certainty is good for industry,
but it is risky when information on climate risks and trends in energy technology and
economics are in flux. Even if the Plan’s targets were defensible as the best
compromise available at the time, the Plan’s rigidity is harder to defend. A future
EPA could and, presumably would, update the Plan in response to new information.
That is exactly what the Trump EPA is doing now, albeit in the opposite direction
of what the Plan’s architects hoped.360
The effect of Clean Air Act climate policy on international agreements is
similarly mixed. Copenhagen and Paris would almost certainly have failed361 without
President Obama’s ability to rely on executive authority under the statute to show

355. Maria Gallucci, Trump’s Order Will Unravel America’s Best Defense Against Climate Change,
MASHABLE (Mar. 27, 2017), https://mashable.com/2017/03/27/trump-climate-change-executive-order/
(quoting Sierra Club climate policy director John Coequyt characterizing the Clean Power Plan as a
valuable “backstop”).
356. Larsen & Herndon, supra note 351.
357. See,e.g.,EPA,FactSheet:OverviewoftheCleanPowerPlan,https://19january2017snapshot.
epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan_.html (“The Clean Power Plan cuts
significant amounts of power plant carbon pollution . . . while advancing clean energy innovation,
development and deployment, and laying the foundation for the long-term strategy needed to tackle the
threat of climate change.”)
358. See, e.g., Grunwald, supra note 341 (predicting that EPA’s projections of coal retirements were
obviously too low and its projections of renewables deployment rates likely too low, leading to “targets
that are likely to be achieved even without the plan”).
359. See Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,665 (Oct. 23, 2015).
360. See supra Section I.C.1.
361. Or failed more completely, if one views their output as inadequate.
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credibility on climate in the wake of the failure of cap-and-trade legislation. 362
Similarly, Clean Air Act policies (chiefly the vehicle standards and the Clean Power
Plan) provided the only credible vehicle for achieving U.S. commitments under the
Paris Agreement in 2015.363 Negotiators in Paris were aware that the U.S. Congress
was unlikely to support climate policy action in 2015: the accord was structured as an
executive agreement rather than a formal treaty specifically to avoid having to seek
U.S. Senate ratification.364 To the extent those negotiators took U.S. emissions
promises seriously, therefore, it could only have been based on Clean Air Act
regulatory powers. Had Congress passed the 2009 cap-and-trade bill or some other
robust climate policy, the Obama administration’s negotiating position would have
been stronger, and an agreement with more ambitious emissions cuts or enforcement
mechanisms might have been plausible in 2009 or 2015. The Paris Agreement is
widely understood to be inadequate.365 But it is better than nothing, and would likely
have been impossible without the Clean Air Act and Massachusetts.
On election day in 2016, Clean Air Act climate policy was at an inflection
point: it had achieved some small emissions reductions and built a basic regulatory
structure, but the jury was still out on its long-term domestic and international
effectiveness. Perhaps a Hillary Clinton administration could have navigated that
uncertainty and built a robust and successful climate policy, although I am skeptical
for reasons discussed in Section IV. In any case, President Trump has done the
opposite, using executive authority to dismantle the Obama administration’s climate
policy.

III.THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ROLLBACK
Before his election to the Presidency, Donald Trump frequently referred to
climate change as a “hoax . . . created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S.
manufacturing non-competitive” (he may or may not have been joking).366 In office,
362. The United States’ “Nationally Determined Contribution” under the Paris agreement (it’s
commitment to future emissions reductions) is largely based on Clean Air Act authority. See U.S.A. First
NDCSubmissionat4-5(Sept.2,2016),https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/
United%20States%20of%20America%20First/U.S.A.%20First%20NDC%20Submission.pdf.
Without
that authority, it is unlikely that the US would have been able to make any credible emissions reduction
commitments.
363. See id.
364. See David Bookbinder, Is the Paris Agreement a Treaty?, NISKANEN CTR. (May 5, 2017),
https://www.niskanencenter.org/paris-climate-agreement-treaty/.
365. See, e.g., Aya Batrawy and Malak Harb, UN chief warns Paris climate goals still not enough,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 30, 2019), https://apnews.com/189872262c4748e6af4752fb96b8da01/.
366. See Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 6, 2012, 2:15 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/265895292191248385 (tweeting that “[t]he concept of global
warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.”); see
also Louis Jacobson, Yes, Donald Trump Did Call Climate Change a Chinese Hoax, POLITIFACT (June 3,
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his administration has done everything within its authority (and perhaps more) to
undo existing climate policy and halt progress toward future emissions controls. The
strongest public signal of the Trump administration’s climate policy views was its
2017 decision to pull out of the Paris agreement.367 But the administration’s most
significant move has been a comprehensive rollback of Clean Air Act climate policy,
beginning in the first months of the President’s term and continuing throughout.
This rollback was initiated under the leadership of President Trump’s first EPA
Secretary, Scott Pruitt, the former Attorney General of Oklahoma and frequent
litigant against the Obama EPA.368 Pruitt’s selection indicated that the Trump
administration intended a sharp reduction in EPA regulatory efforts, particularly on
climate, and was perhaps the best example of then-adviser Steve Bannon’s claim that
cabinet officials were selected to lead the “deconstruction of the administrative
state.”369 Pruitt would resign in 2018 amid allegations of unethical conduct,370 but his
successor, Andrew Wheeler, has continued much the same regulatory agenda.371
The rollback of environmental regulations under President Trump has been
sweeping: by one count the administration has proposed or completed withdrawal or
substantial weakening of ninety-five environmental regulations or executive actions,
twenty-five of which concern air pollution and ten of which are specifically climatedriven and derive from the agency’s Clean Air Act authority (and, thus, at least in
part from Massachusetts).372 Ninety-five is a large number, but it is far from
comprehensive—American environmental law is built on thousands of rules.373 The

2016),https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2016/jun/03/hillary-clinton/yes-donald-trump-did-callclimate-change-chinese-h/ (detailing that Trump later claimed his tweet was a joke). But see Dean Baker
(@DeanBaker13),TWITTER(Feb.28,2020,9:53PM),https://twitter.com/DeanBaker13/status/1233586
110938222593 (arguing that “I think Trump doesn’t use the word ‘hoax’ the way most people do. For him
‘hoax’ means something like ‘problem.’”).
367. See Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, WHITE HOUSE (June 1, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/.
368. See Chris Mooney et al., Trump Names Scott Pruitt, Oklahoma Attorney General Suing EPA on
ClimateChange,toHeadtheEPA,WASH.POST(Dec.8,2016),https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/e
nergy-environment/wp/2016/12/07/trump-names-scott-pruitt-oklahoma-attorney-general-suing-epa-onclimate-change-to-head-the-epa/.
369. See David Z. Morris, Steve Bannon Says Trump’s Cabinet Picks Are Intended to ‘Deconstruct’
Regulation and Agencies, FORTUNE (Feb. 25, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/02/25/bannon-trumpcabinet-cpac.
370. Jeremy Diamond et al., EPA Chief Scott Pruitt Resigns Amid Scandals, Citing ‘Unrelenting Attacks,’
CNN (July 5, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/05/politics/scott-pruitt-epa-resigns/index.html.
371. See, e.g., infra note 428, Administrator Wheeler’s decision to revoke California’s waiver for
setting its own vehicle emissions standards.
372. See Popovich et al., supra note 16.
373. By one count, during the Obama administration (through June 2016) the EPA published
“approximately 3,900” final rules in the Federal Register. Memorandum from the H. Comm. on Energy
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rollback is also not indiscriminate—it has concentrated almost exclusively on Obamaera regulations, and disproportionately on those aimed at climate.374 The Trump
rollback has been significant, but it has not signaled a complete breach with the
traditional regulatory ratchet of environmental law. For the most part, longstanding
environmental law unrelated to climate, such as regulations on criteria or
“conventional” pollutants, like lead and sulfur dioxide, under the Clean Air Act have
been left intact, although the Trump EPA has pursued structural and institutional
changes that could have broad effects on the agency’s ability to identify and regulate
risks in the future.375
Only two Clean Air Act climate policies have survived the rollback intact:
the Phase I light vehicle standards—already implemented for the planned 2012-2016
model years—and the initial 2010 greenhouse gas endangerment finding, though
there have been persistent rumors that the endangerment finding might be
withdrawn.376 Every other Clean Air Act climate policy has been withdrawn, seen
withdrawal proposed, or been damaged in some way. Although not comprehensive,
the following list illustrates the scope of the rollback.
•
•
•

March 2017: Information request on methane emissions from existing
oil and gas wells is withdrawn.377
March 2017: Executive order directs EPA and other agencies to stop
using estimated social cost of carbon in cost-benefit analyses.378
May 2017: EPA announces that landfill methane new source
performance standards (“NSPS”) are being reconsidered and stays

& Commerce, to the Members of the Subcomm. on Energy and Power at 2 (June 30, 2016),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF03/20160706/105153/HHRG-114-IF03-20160706-SD002.pdf.
374. All of the twenty-five air pollution-related rollbacks proposed or completed by the Trump
administration are of actions taken under President Obama. See Popovich et al. supra note 16. While not
all of those rollbacks are of climate rules, a disproportionate number are, and the Trump administration
has to date made no effort to roll back core air quality standards for conventional pollutants like
particulates and ozone.
375. See Laura Bloomer & Joe Goffman, The Legal Consequences of EPA’s Disruption of the NAAQS
Process,HARV.ENV’T&ENERGYL.PROGRAM(Sept.30,2019),https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2019/09/t
he-legal-consequences-of-epas-disruption-of-the-naaqs-process/ (detailing Trump administration moves
“politicizing and weakening [EPA] advisory panels”).
376. See, e.g., Nick Sobczyk & Geof Koss, Conservatives Warn Endangerment Finding Fight Is ‘Still
Alive,’ E&E DAILY (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060094933.
377. EPA, Notice Regarding Withdrawal of Obligation to Submit Information, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,817
(Mar. 7, 2017).
378. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,095 (Mar. 31, 2017) (Promoting Energy
Independence and Economic Growth), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidentialexecutive-order-promoting-energy-independence-economic-growth/.
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enforcement;379 litigation challenging this move is eventually
successful.380
June 2017: President Trump announces that the United States will
withdraw from the Paris Agreement.381 Formal withdrawal is initiated
in 2019.382
October 2017: Repeal of Clean Power Plan is proposed.383
November 2017: EPA proposes withdrawing portions of the Phase II
heavy-duty vehicle standards applying to “glider” trucks.384 In July of
2018, Secretary Pruitt further announces that the glider regulations will
not be enforced, pending further rulemaking,385 though Secretary
Wheeler quickly reversed this non-enforcement policy.386

379. EPA, Stay of Standards of Performance for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills and Emission
Guidelines and Compliance Times for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 82 Fed. Reg. 24,878 (May 31,
2017).
380. State of California v. EPA, No. 18-cv-03237-HSG at 5 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2019),
https://d12v9rtnomnebu.cloudfront.net/diveimages/050619CAEPAEG.pdf (order granting in part and
denying in part Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment) (ruling that EPA “failed to meet its nondiscretionary obligations to implement” the landfill
NSPS when it stayed enforcement pending reconsideration).
381. See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 367.
382. See Press Release, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, On the U.S. Withdrawal from the
ParisAgreement(Nov.4,2019),http://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement.
383. EPA, Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, Proposed Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017)
[hereinafter CPP Repeal Proposal].
384. EPA, Repeal of Emission Requirements for Glider Vehicles, Glider Engines, and Glider Kits,
Proposed Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 53,442 (proposed Nov. 16, 2017).
385. See Memorandum from Susan Parker Bodine, Assistant Administrator, EPA Enforcement and
Compliance to Bill Wehrum, Assistant Administrator, Office of Air and Radiation (July 6, 2018),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-07/documents/glidernoactionassurance070618.pdf
(Conditional No Action Assurance Regarding Small Manufacturers of Glider Vehicles).
386. See U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, Office of the Adm'r., MEMORANDUM FROM ANDREW R.
WHEELER, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, TO SUSAN PARKER BODINE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE AND WILLIAM L. WEHRUM, ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR,OFFICEOFAIRANDRADIATION(July26,2018),https://www.epa.gov/sites/producti
on/files/2018-07/documents/memo_re_withdrawal_of_conditional_naa_regarding_small_manufacturers_
of_glider_vehicles_07-26-2018.pdf (Withdrawal of Conditional No Action Assurance Regarding Small
Manufacturers of Glider Vehicles).
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April 2018: EPA announces it will not enforce bans on HFCs387 (much
of this regulation had already been struck down by the D.C. Circuit in
August of 2017).388
August 2018: EPA proposes the Safe Affordable Fuel-Efficient
(“SAFE”) Vehicles Rule, which would substantially lower Phase II
light-duty vehicle standards for model years 2021-2026 .389
August 2018: The Affordable Clean Energy (“ACE”) Rule is proposed,
replacing the Clean Power Plan with substantially weaker
requirements.390
September 2018: EPA proposes a rule weakening oil and gas methane
NSPS and exempting some facilities from the regulation entirely.391
December 2018: EPA proposes a rule reducing the stringency of NSPS
for power plants such that carbon capture and storage is no longer
required for new coal plants.392
July 2019: The ACE Rule repealing and replacing the Clean Power Plan
is finalized.393
August 2019: EPA proposes partially or fully withdrawing oil and gas
methane NSPS.394

387. EPA, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Notification of Guidance and a Stakeholder Meeting
Concerning the Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP) Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,431 (Apr. 27,
2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82).
388. Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
389. See The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986 (Aug. 24, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
85 and 86) [hereinafter Proposed SAFE Rule].
390. See Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility
Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing Regulations; Revisions to New Source
Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746 (Aug. 31, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, and 60).
391. See Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified
Sources Reconsideration, 83 Fed. Reg. 52,056 (Oct. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
392. See Review of Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified,
and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 83 Fed. Reg. 65,424 (Dec. 20,
2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
393. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations,
84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R pt. 60) [hereinafter ACE Rule].
394. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified
Sources Review, 84 Fed. Reg. 50,244 (Sept. 24, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).

Fall 2020

•

The Rise and Fall of Clean Air Act Climate Policy

131

September 2019: EPA withdraws California’s waiver allowing it to set
independent, more stringent vehicle emissions standards.395

As this list illustrates, while the rollback is sweeping, it is still a work in
progress. Rulemakings cannot be undone by executive fiat—rollback or repeal actions
are themselves rulemakings, and must instead go through the same notice-andcomment process used to give the rule legal effect in the first place.396 Much of the
Trump EPA’s climate rollback is only at the proposed rulemaking stage,397 and many
of the actions that have been finalized are being litigated.398 While agencies are
accorded significant deference, especially when deciding not to regulate,399 the
Trump administration’s track record in administrative law litigation is terrible.400
The rollback of fuel-economy standards seems to have been bungled, leading to
delays and making it perhaps more vulnerable to court challenge.401 The outcome of
that litigation, and of the 2020 election, will have a significant impact on how
extensive the rollback is in practice.
As described above, the light-duty vehicle emissions standards and the
Clean Power Plan were the centerpieces of the Obama EPA’s climate policy efforts,
and it is therefore worth describing the Trump administration’s efforts to roll them

395. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program,
Withdrawal of Waiver, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pats. 531 and
533) [hereinafter CA Waiver Revocation].
396. See Office of the Federal Register, A Guide to the Rulemaking Process at 10,
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf (“[i]f an agency decides to
amend or revoke a rule, it must use the notice-and-comment process to make the change”).
397. See Popovich et al., supra note 16.
398. See, e.g., Nicholas Kusnetz, 17 States Sue EPA Over Auto Emissions Standards Rollback, INSIDE
CLIMATE NEWS (May 1, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/01052018/states-lawsuit-epa-vehicleemissions-standards-fuel-efficiency-rollback-pruitt-climate-change.
399. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (holding that agency inaction is presumptively
unreviewable); but see Biber, supra note 74, at 461 (discussing the Court’s review of agency inaction in
Massachusetts and concluding that “[j]udicial review of agency inaction...is often doctrinally incoherent
and unclear”).
400. See Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The Real Reason the Trump Administration Is Constantly Losing
in Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/thereal-reason-president-trump-is-constantly-losing-in-court/2019/03/19/f5ffb056-33a8-11e9-af5bb51b7ff322e9_story.html (identifying, at the time of publication, 63 cases in which courts had rejected
administrative actions taken by the Trump administration). See also Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in
the Courts, Inst. Pol’y Integrity, https://policyintegrity.org/trump-court-roundup (last updated Feb. 25,
2020) (finding a 10% success rate in APA cases for the Trump administration, relative to a traditional
success rate of around 70%).
401. See Davenport, supra note 104 (describing draft rulemakings sent to OMB for review as
incomplete and rife with errors).
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back in greater detail, then briefly discussing a rollback that did not happen: repeal
of the greenhouse gas endangerment finding.

A. Rolling Back Vehicle Standards
By the time President Trump came into office in early 2017, the Phase I
light-duty standards issued in 2010 had already been implemented and the Phase II
standards, applying to 2017 model year vehicles and set to increase in stringency
through the 2025 model year, had just begun to take effect. The Trump EPA quickly
indicated that it would seek to halt or reverse the Phase II standards.402
From their inception, the standards included a provision for a “mid-term
evaluation,” requiring the agency to determine no later than April 2018 whether the
Phase II standards in the latter half of the compliance period, model years 2022–
2025, were “appropriate.”403 The Obama EPA conducted the required midterm
review and concluded the standards were appropriate, based in part on
manufacturers’ demonstrated over-compliance with the Phase I standards.404 The
review was released in January 2017 as a “midnight rulemaking” (i.e., during the
lame-duck period).405 Just two months later, the Trump EPA and Department of
Transportation announced the midterm review would be reconsidered, signaling that
standards would be weakened.406 EPA’s stated rationale for the reconsideration was
to allow harmonization with as-yet-unreleased NHTSA fuel-economy standards.407
But the true reason appears to have been the impact of the Phase II standards on the
U.S. auto industry, and on manufacturing jobs; President Trump promised an
audience of autoworkers in Michigan at the time: “We are going to ensure that any

402. See Notice of Intention to Reconsider the Final Determination of the Mid-Term Evaluation
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022–2025 Light Duty Vehicles, 82 Fed. Reg.
14,671 (Mar. 22, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 86).
403. Phase II Light Duty Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, 62,628 (Oct. 15, 2012) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, and 600).
404. Env’t Prot. Agency, EPA-420-R-17-001, FINAL DETERMINATION ON THE
APPROPRIATENESS OF THE MODEL YEAR 2022-2025 LIGHT-DUTY VEHICLE GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS STANDARDS UNDER THE MIDTERM EVALUATION (2017) (this document was not published
in the Federal Register before the March 2017 decision by the incoming Trump administration to
reconsider it).
405. Id.
406. See Notice of Intention to Reconsider the Final Determination of the Mid-Term Evaluation
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022–2025 Light Duty Vehicles, 82 Fed. Reg.
14,671 (Mar. 22, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 86).
407. Id. at 14,672.
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regulations we have protect and defend your jobs, your factories. We’re going to be
fair.”408
The Trump EPA released its midterm review (replacing the Obama EPA’s
2017 version) in April 2018, just missing the deadline on the first of the month. 409 It
concluded, unsurprisingly, that the 2022-2025 standards were not appropriate and
should be revised.410 EPA based this determination on changed circumstances since
the 2017 review (e.g., lower fuel prices), projected negative effects on the auto
industry that were given (it argued) insufficient weight in the 2017 review, and
differing policy and analysis choices, such as rejection of the Obama administration’s
estimate of the social cost of carbon.411 Secretary Pruitt claimed when the review was
released that “[t]he Obama Administration’s determination was wrong. . . [it] cut the
Midterm Evaluation process short with politically charged expediency, made
assumptions about the standards that didn’t comport with reality, and set the
standards too high.”412 The eleven-page document made no mention of climate
change and only briefly discussed co-benefits from reduction of conventional
pollutants before rejecting such co-benefits as valid considerations in evaluating the
standards.413
Some legal and policy analysts criticized the review, questioning its claims
of changed circumstances and accusing EPA of failing to provide any economic
evidence to support revising the Phase II standards.414 In May 2018, seventeen states

408. See Alex Guillén, Trump Takes Steps Toward Undoing Obama’s Auto Emissions Limits, POLITICO
(Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/donald-trump-auto-emissions-236070 (“The
auto industry has made it a top priority to review the Obama administration’s 11th-hour attempt to lock
in tough standards...and Trump will deliver on a trip to Michigan Wednesday. He will direct EPA to
reconsider its recent conclusion that automakers would be able to meet strict limits strict limits on
greenhouse gas emissions that would have vehicles getting more than 50 miles per gallon on average by
2025.”)
409. See Mid-Term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022–
2025 Light-Duty Vehicles, 83 Fed. Reg. 16,077 (Apr. 13, 2018).
410. Id.
411. Id. at 16,078.
412. Press Release, Env’t Prot. Agency, EPA Administrator Pruitt: GHG Emissions Standards for
Cars and Light Trucks Should Be Revised (Apr. 2, 2018), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/newsreleases/epaadministrator-pruitt-ghg-emissions-standards-cars-and-light-trucks-should-be.html.
413. See Mid-Term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022–
2025 Light-Duty Vehicles, 83 Fed. Reg. 16,077 (Apr. 13, 2018).
414. See BETHANY NOLL ET AL., INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, ANALYZING EPA’S VEHICLEEMISSIONS DECISIONS: WHY WITHDRAWING THE 2022-2025 STANDARDS IS ECONOMICALLY
FLAWED8(2018),https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Analyzing_EPAs_Fuel-Efficiency_Decis
ions_Policy_Brief.pdf.
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sued EPA, claiming the revised midterm review was arbitrary and capricious.415 The
D.C. Circuit rejected this challenge in October 2019, on the grounds that the
midterm review was not final agency action and, therefore, was not reviewable.416
The revised midterm review committed the agency to reopen the Phase II
standards and signaled they would be weakened or eliminated.417 EPA proposed
revised standards in August 2018, calling the revised standards the Safer Affordable
Fuel-Efficient (“SAFE”) Vehicles Rule.418 As proposed, it would slash the fuel
economy improvements required under the Phase II standards for vehicles in model
years 2021–2025—it invited comment on a variety of alternatives, but the primary
proposal was to freeze 2021-2025 fuel efficiency standards at the 2020 level.419 This
would amount to withdrawing the standards for five of the nine model years
originally regulated under the Phase II standards. EPA also proposed striking
regulations of vehicle GHG emissions from air conditioner refrigerants, methane,
and other greenhouse gases not directly related to fuel economy.420 EPA estimated
that the revised standards would increase greenhouse gas emissions from affected
vehicles by four percent annually in 2025—relative to the 2012 Phase II standards
being replaced—and increasing to 9.1 percent in 2035 (the last year for which the
agency estimated relative impacts).421 Calculating estimated total additional
emissions under the SAFE Rule is difficult because the Trump and Obama rules
present their estimates differently, but outside analysis suggests that the SAFE Rule
would forgo about half of the emissions reductions projected under the Obama Phase
II standards.422
415. See Nicholas Kusnetz, 17 States Sue EPA Over Auto Emissions Standards Rollback, INSIDE
CLIMATE NEWS (May 1, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/01052018/states-lawsuit-epa-vehicleemissions-standards-fuel-efficiency-rollback-pruitt-climate-change.
416. California v. EPA, 940 F.3d 1342, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[b]ecause we conclude EPA has
not engaged in ‘final action’ under the Clean Air Act, the petitions for review are dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.”).
417. See Mid-Term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022–
2025 Light-Duty Vehicles, 83 Fed. Reg. 16,077, 16,078 (Apr. 13, 2018) (“the Administrator believes the
MY 2022–2025 GHG emission standards are not appropriate and, therefore, should be revised. . . [EPA]
will further explore the appropriate degree and form of changes to the program through a notice and
comment rulemaking process.”)
418. Proposed SAFE Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986 (Aug. 24, 2018).
419. Id. at 42,988.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 43,326.
422. See Sean O’Kane, Automakers Still Want to Lower Emissions Standards in the US, THE VERGE
(June 7, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/7/18656986/automakers-lower-emissions-standards-usenvironment-pollution-trump; Hiroko Tabuchi, The Oil Industry’s Covert Campaign to Rewrite American Car
Emissions Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/climate/cafeemissions-rollback-oil-industry.html.
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A large group of automakers claimed in an open letter that they would have
preferred an approach “midway” between the Obama EPA’s standards and the
Trump EPA’s freeze.423 A lack of strong support for a rollback of the standards from
the auto industry suggests that it was not motivated by industry lobbying, but rather
by the administration’s own ideological preferences (or, perhaps, by lobbying from
another industry: oil).424 California criticized the proposed rule in comments,
claiming it “abdicate[d] the Agencies’ statutory directives to promulgate increasingly
stringent requirements to ensure continued reductions of air pollutants and
continued increases in fuel economy from motor vehicles” and failed to meaningfully
address climate change.425 Environmental groups were similarly critical.426 This
opposition suggests states and environmental groups will challenge the SAFE Rule
in court when it is finalized (if there was ever any question about that).427
But wait, you may ask—why does California care so much about changes in
the federal vehicle emissions standards if it has a waiver allowing it, alone among
states, to set its own standards? Because in addition to proposing rollback of the Phase
II standards, the SAFE Rule also proposed revoking that waiver. While the
substantive changes to the standards have yet to be finalized, EPA did issue a final
rulemaking revoking California’s waiver in September 2019.428 The agency claimed
revoking the waiver was necessary to preserve a “harmonized” national standard in
line with what it saw as “Congress’s intent to provide for uniform national fuel
economy standards.”429 The agency further claimed that regulation by California (or
any other state) of vehicle carbon dioxide emissions is indistinguishable from fuel
economy standards, which are preempted by the federal Energy Policy and

423. Dieter Bohn, 17 Automakers Reportedly Ask Trump to Back Off His Plan to Lower Emissions
Standards, THE VERGE (June 6, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/6/18655820/ford-gm-toyotaautomakers-trump-lower-emissions-standards-letter-california.
424. See O’Kane, supra note 422; Tabuchi, supra note 422.
425. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., ANALYSIS IN SUPPORT OF COMMENTS OF THE CALIFORNIA AIR
RESOURCES BOARD ON THE SAFER AFFORDABLE FUEL-EFFICIENT (SAFE) VEHICLES RULE FOR
MODEL YEARS 2021-2026 PASSENGER CARS AND LIGHT TRUCKS 73 (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2018-10/2018-10-26%20FINAL%20CARB%20Detailed%20Co
mments%20on%20SAFE%20NPRM.pdf.
426. See, e.g., Heather Smith, A 17 Million Car Pile-Up: The Trump Administration’s Plan to Freeze
TailpipeRegulationsCouldWrecktheAutoIndustry,SIERRA(Aug.2,2018),https://www.sierraclub.org/sierr
a/trump-epa-auto-efficiency-standards-automakers-emissions.
427. In fact, the rule is already the subject of legal challenge, but by groups alleging that it is too
strong, not too weak. See Chris Knight, US fuel-economy rollback hit with first lawsuit, ARGUS MEDIA (May
1, 2020), https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2101891-us-fueleconomy-rollback-hit-with-first-lawsuit.
428. CA Waiver Revocation, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019).
429. Id. at 51,311–13.
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Conservation Act.430 After the agency proposed revocation of the waiver as part of
the 2018 SAFE proposal, California entered into a voluntary agreement with some
automakers to meet fuel economy standards similar to those in the original 2012
Phase II standards.431 This move inspired EPA to revoke the waiver ahead of release
of the full final SAFE Rule.432 Ironically, in the waiver revocation, EPA claimed that
the fact that the standards agreed to in the voluntary agreement were (marginally)
weaker than those in the 2012 Phase II standards compelled the agency to act, despite
the fact that the agency itself was in the midst of the SAFE rulemaking that would
torpedo the standards.433
The revocation of the waiver was motivated by Trump administration
antipathy toward California, rather than the claimed principled stand in favor of
centralized standards (and against federalism).434 President Trump was reported to
have been “blindsided and angered” by California’s voluntary agreement with
automakers, and “wanted to press forward with a policy that would punish
California.”435 After the voluntary agreement was announced, the president tweeted
that “Henry Ford would be very disappointed if he saw his modern-day descendants
wanting to build a much more expensive car, that is far less safe and doesn’t work as
well, because execs don’t want to fight California regulators.”436
Announcing the revocation, Secretary Wheeler said, “We embrace
federalism and the role of the states, but federalism does not mean that one state can
dictate standards for the nation.”437 While other states could adopt the California
standards, and thirteen did so by 2019,438 the waiver does not, despite Wheeler’s
claim, allow California to dictate standards outside its borders. After the waiver was
revoked, the Department of Justice announced an antitrust investigation into the

430. Id. at 51,313.
431. See California and Major Automakers Reach Groundbreaking Framework Agreement on Clean
EmissionStandards,OFFICEOFGOVERNORGAVINNEWSOM(July25,2019),https://www.gov.ca.gov/2
019/07/25/california-and-major-automakers-reach-groundbreaking-framework-agreement-on-cleanemission-standards/.
432. CA Waiver Revocation, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,312 (Sept. 27, 2019).
433. Id. at 51,312–13.
434. See Davenport, supra note 158.
435. Id.
436. See Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 21, 2019, 7:01 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1164311594081247233.
437. See Davenport, supra note 158.
438. Id.
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voluntary agreement.439 The investigation was criticized as inconsistent with
accepted principles of antitrust law,440 and even characterized as an abuse of power.441
Civil subpoenas were issued to manufacturers in November 2019, 442 but the
investigation was dropped in early 2020.443
In any event, California and twenty-two other states have sued to block
revocation of the waiver, arguing inter alia that EPA lacks statutory authority to
revoke it and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in doing so. 444 Few court decisions
have considered the boundaries of EPA’s authority under the waiver provision in the
Clean Air Act.445 A 2018 analysis by the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York
University reached the conclusion that the agency has authority to grant waivers but
not to revoke them.446 EPA argues in the waiver revocation that it does have the
requisite authority, noting that “[a]gencies generally have inherent authority to
reconsider their prior actions” and that nothing in the relevant part of the statute
“indicates Congressional intent to remove that authority with respect to waivers.”447

439. See Hiroko Tabuchi & Coral Davenport, Justice Dept. Investigates California Emissions Pact That
EmbarrassedTrump,N.Y.TIMES,Sept.6,2019,https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/06/climate/automake
rs-california-emissions-antitrust.html.
440. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Are Regulatory Agreements to Address Climate Change
Anticompetitive?,REGULATORYREV.(Sept.11,2019),https://www.theregreview.org/2019/09/11/hovenk
amp-are-regulatory-agreements-to-address-climate-change-anticompetitive/ (arguing that the California
agreement would be likely to survive antitrust challenge under the general rule of reason doctrine even if
not shielded by the state action doctrine).
441. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Trump’s Justice Department’s Antitrust ‘Investigation’ of
California’s Deal with Car Makers Is an Abuse of Power, CALMATTERS (Oct. 20, 2019),
https://calmatters.org/commentary/auto-investigation/. (quoting “abuse of power”).
442. See Brent Kendall & Ben Foldy, Justice Department Issues Civil Subpoenas to Auto Makers in
California Emissions Pact Probe, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justicedepartment-issues-civil-subpoenas-to-auto-makers-in-california-emissions-pact-probe-11573161496.
443. See Coral Davenport, Justice Department Drops Antitrust Probe Against Automakers That Sided
WithCaliforniaonEmissions,N.Y.TIMES(Feb.7,2020)https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/climate/tr
ump-california-automakers-antitrust.html.
444. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4, California v. Chao (D.D.C. 2019)
(No.1:19-cv-02826),http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/
16/case-documents/2019/20190920_docket-119-cv-02826_complaint-1.pdf.
445. The D.C. Circuit has twice ruled that state standards not are preempted by the EPCA, as the
EPA alleges in its waiver revocation, however. See CA Waiver Revocation, 84 Fed. Reg. 51310, 51323
(Sept. 27, 2019); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
446. See generally DENISE A. GRAB ET AL., INST. POL’Y INTEGRITY, NO TURNING BACK: AN
ANALYSIS OF EPA’S AUTHORITY TO WITHDRAW CALIFORNIA’S PREEMPTION WAIVER UNDER
SECTION 209 OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (Oct. 26, 2018), https://policyintegrity.org/publications/detail/noturning-back.
447. CA Waiver Revocation, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51,331 (Sept. 27, 2019).
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Assuming that the final SAFE Rule is similar to the proposal, the
revocation of the California waiver will effectively eliminate the Phase II light-duty
vehicle standards for model years beyond 2020, severely limiting greenhouse gas
reductions under the Clean Air Act. By one estimate, the freeze of federal standards
in the SAFE Rule would increase emissions by 493–684 million metric tons between
2020 and 2035 relative to the Phase II standards as originally issued.448 Revocation
of the California waiver could increase that reduction by an additional 562–633
million metric tons.449 Taken together, the rollbacks have an estimated emissions cost
of over a billion metric tons (for comparison, U.S. annual emissions are currently
around 6.5 billion metric tons).450 However, whether the impact of the rollback on
emissions will be so severe is currently unclear. The rollback (and the waiver
revocation) is being litigated, and even if it survives, its effects will be not be felt
until after the 2020 election (starting with model year 2021);451 if that election yields
a president for whom climate policy is a priority, the rollback could itself be rolled
back before taking effect. The voluntary agreement between automakers and broader
industry commitments to electric vehicles suggest a secular trend towards lower
vehicle emissions regardless of federal standards,452 though the increasing popularity
of SUVs and other large vehicles in the U.S. market cuts in the opposite direction.453
As a matter of law and policy, the rollback is unprecedented. Federal fuel
economy and vehicle emissions standards had never been weakened before—perhaps
the strongest illustration of the Clean Air Act regulatory ratchet.454 Nor had
California’s waiver ever been revoked. On only one occasion had EPA denied a
request for a waiver—the Bush administration revocation in the wake of

448. Emily Wimberger & Hannah Pit, Come and Take It: Revoking the California Waiver, RHODIUM
GRP. (Oct. 28, 2019), https://rhg.com/research/come-and-take-it-revoking-the-california-waiver/.
449. Id.
450. See EPA DRAFT INVENTORY, supra note 133, at ES-5.
451. See SAFE Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986 (proposed Aug. 24, 2018) (applicable to 2021-2026 model
year vehicles).
452. See, e.g., Patrick Hertzke et al., Expanding Electric-Vehicle Adoption Despite Early Growing Pains,
MCKINSEY & CO. (Aug. 2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/ourinsights/expanding-electric-vehicle-adoption-despite-early-growing-pains (reporting doubling of U.S. EV
sales to 360,000 vehicles in 2018, though noting that rollback of emissions standards may limit future
attractiveness of EVs).
453. See, e.g., Bill Vlasic, Bigger, Faster, More Lavish: Americans Crave S.U.V.s, and Carmakers Oblige,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/12/business/suv-automakers-fueleconomy-new-york.html.
454. See A Brief History of US Fuel Efficiency Standards, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Dec.
6, 2017), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/brief-history-us-fuel-efficiency (detailing increase of light
vehicle fuel economy standards from 1975-1985, with a plateau until the 2007 EISA and subsequent Phase
I and Phase II standards).
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Massachusetts.455 The courts and the 2020 presidential race will determine how
important the rollback of light-duty vehicle standards is for climate change. The
proposal is poorly drafted, and a similarly incomplete final rule would face increased
judicial scrutiny.456 Nevertheless, the rollback of the Phase II standards is already
among the most sweeping repudiations of a previous administration’s environmental
regulation.

B. Undoing the Clean Power Plan
Perhaps the only other contender for that crown is the Trump EPA’s
parallel rollback of the Clean Power Plan. President Trump was a longstanding
opponent of the Plan, criticizing and promising to repeal it during his campaign457
while accusing the Obama administration of a “war on coal.”458 Soon after taking
office and just weeks after withdrawing the midterm evaluation of the Phase II
vehicle standards, President Trump issued an executive order on “Promoting Energy
Independence and Economic Growth.”459 In the order, he directed agencies to
“immediately review existing regulations that potentially burden the development or
use of domestically produced energy resources and appropriately suspend, revise, or
rescind those that unduly burden the development of domestic energy resources
beyond the degree necessary to protect the public interest or otherwise comply with
the law.”460 The order went on to direct EPA to “suspend, revise, or rescind” the
Clean Power Plan,461 and EPA announced days later that it was reviewing the Plan
as directed.462 Meanwhile, the agency asked the D.C. Circuit to delay ruling on the
455. See EPA, California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision
Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008).
456. See Davenport, supra note 104 (reporting basic drafting errors, analysis showing costs exceed
benefits, and incomplete sections of the proposal).
457. See Ashley Parker & Coral Davenport, Donald Trump’s Energy Plan: More Fossil Fuels and Fewer
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27/us/politics/donald-trumpglobal-warming-energy-policy.html detailing a speech by then-candidate Trump on energy policy, in
which he said “[r]egulations that shut down hundreds of coal-fired power plants and block the construction
of new ones—how stupid is that?”).
458. See Coral Davenport, Donald Trump, in Pittsburgh, Pledges to Boost Both Coal and Gas, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/23/us/politics/donald-trump-fracking.html
(“[W]e will end the war on coal and the war on miners.”).
459. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017) (Promoting Energy
Independence and Economic Growth), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidentialexecutive-order-promoting-energy-independence-economic-growth/.
460. Exec. Order No. 13,783, supra note 378.
461. Id.
462. EPA, Review of the Clean Power Plan, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,329 (Apr. 4, 2017).
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Plan463 (oral arguments had been held in 2016 but no decision on the merits had yet
been made).464
In October 2017, Secretary Pruitt announced that the agency had completed
review of the Plan and would, as requested, repeal it.465 In its proposed repeal, the
agency claimed it lacked authority under Section111(d) to implement the Plan, or to
base required emissions reductions on “outside the fence” measures466 (interestingly,
the agency did not cite conflict with Section112 as a legal barrier to the Plan).467 The
agency further said it “had not determined” whether it would issue any replacement
for the Plan or, if it did, when it might happen or what form a replacement might
take.468
Why say anything about a replacement at all? Clearly the Trump
administration had little interest in emissions regulations, particularly of coal plants,
so why not simply repeal the Clean Power Plan and be done with Section111(d)
regulation? The answer is that there is a strong argument that regulation of
greenhouse gases under that part of the statute is mandatory, based on the Court’s
rulings in Massachusetts and AEP—or at least that not regulating required taking
political and/or legal risks that the administration was unwilling to take.469 One way
to avoid regulating would be to withdraw the endangerment finding on which all
Clean Air Act climate regulation is based (more on that below). Failing that, the
agency could simply refuse to replace the Clean Power Plan, inviting or
strengthening opponents in inevitable litigation. That might not be all bad, from the
Trump EPA’s perspective: if repealing the endangerment finding was the bold move,
the really bold move would be to do nothing, invite legal challenge, then ask the
Supreme Court to overrule Massachusetts. But the agency was unwilling to take the

463. See Notice of Executive Order, EPA Review of Clean Power Plan and Forthcoming
Rulemaking, and Motion to Hold Cases in Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 151363),http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/casedocuments/2017/20170328_docket-15-1363_notice.pdf.
464. See Jonathan Adler, Opinion, The En Banc D.C. Circuit Meets the Clean Power Plan, WASH.
POST (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/09/28/theen-banc-d-c-circuit-meets-the-clean-power-plan/.
465. CPP Repeal, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017).
466. Id. at 48,039–40.
467. See discussion related to note 306 supra.
468. CPP Repeal Proposal at 48,036.
469. Withdrawing the Clean Power Plan without replacement would have exposed the agency to
at least two legal challenges. One is that EPA must provide reasons grounded in the statute and consistent
with the endangerment finding to refuse to regulate power plant GHG emissions, citing Massachusetts.
Another is that failure to regulate these emissions exposes power plant operators once again to federal
nuisance suits. See discussion of AEP, supra Section II.E.
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risk.470 Even if successful, failure to regulate power plants under Section111(d) would
undercut the displacement analysis in AEP, possibly allowing suits under the federal
common law of nuisance to proceed again.
The minimalist approach seems to have appeared attractive: replace the
Clean Power Plan, but do so with a rule that does as little as possible. Typically, it is
easier for an agency to defend inaction as opposed to action.471 But, given
Massachusetts, AEP, the 2011 settlement agreements, and the endangerment finding,
that was less true here. Rather than do nothing, it was easier to do little and defend
the resulting action as within agency discretion. This is the approach the agency took,
proposing, and in June 2019 finalizing, its ACE Rule.472
The ACE Rule is relatively simple: it drops the Clean Power Plan’s
estimated emissions reductions from shifting coal to gas generation and constructing
new renewables (the “outside the fence” measures the agency found legally
objectionable).473 It retains in barest form the Clean Power Plan’s estimates of
emissions reductions available from efficiency improvements at coal plants (“inside
the fence” measures).474 But instead of using these estimated improvements to set
emissions-reduction targets for states to meet, as the Clean Power Plan did, it simply
invited states to submit plans for meeting the now-undefined standards, effectively
allowing them to set their own targets.475
Given its lack of ambition or direction, the ACE Rule was projected to do
far less to reduce emissions than the Clean Power Plan would have. EPA estimated
that it would reduce emissions by 10.9 metric tons annually in 2025, declining to 8.4
metric tons in 2035.476 This was compared to the 375 million metric tons of annual
emissions reductions projected for the Clean Power Plan in 2030.477 EPA did not
compare estimated impacts of the ACE to Clean Power Plan, on the grounds that

470. The agency could have also argued that any §111(d) standards for coal plants were preempted
because those sources were also subject to §112 regulations, as discussed above. But the agency’s failure to
even discuss that argument in the proposed and final repeal of the Clean Power Plan suggests it never
took it seriously.
471. See Biber, supra note 74.
472. ACE Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019).
473. Id. at 32,523–32.
474. Id. at 32,534–43.
475. Id. at 32,549–53.
476. Id. at 32,561 (converting from short to metric tons).
477. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,924 (Oct. 23, 2015) (converting short tons to
metric tons).
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the earlier rule had already been repealed.478 An analysis by Amelia Keyes and other
economists suggests that under some circumstances the ACE Rule could increase
emissions compared to no policy at all due to a rebound effect, wherein more efficient
plants run more often..479 According to the analysis, as many as eighteen states plus
D.C. would see their emissions increase, though emissions would still decline by a
small amount nationally.480 In short, the ACE Rule was designed to do as little as
legally possible, and sometimes does even less than that.
The repeal-and-replace-with-a-weak-rule approach the agency took with
the Clean Power Plan contrasts superficially with its approach to the Phase II lightduty standards. The agency effectively repealed those standards by freezing them at
the 2020 model year level and withdrawing California’s waiver.481 The difference in
approach can be explained by the fact that in the case of vehicle standards, a rule was
in place; all that was necessary was for the agency to weaken it and then play legal
defense. Challengers could (and did) allege that EPA had acted arbitrarily and
capriciously, or that the vehicle standards were so weak that they failed to fulfill the
agency’s legal duties.482 But they could not argue the agency failed to act at all. With
the Clean Power Plan first stayed by the Court and then repealed, the agency was on
weaker footing, since it had no rule at all. The ACE rule therefore put the agency in
a position for power plant regulation similar to the one it was in for vehicle standards
after those rollbacks.
Because the Clean Power Plan was never implemented, repealing it and
replacing it with the ACE Rule was a less radical move than rolling back the lightduty vehicle standards; it ostensibly does not violate the traditional Clean Air Act
policy ratchet, especially if one takes the view that the Clean Power Plan was always
legally tenuous and unambitious in emissions terms. But the end of the Clean Power
Plan and, with it, any meaningful regulation of power plant emissions, is nevertheless
a major blow to viable Clean Air Act climate policy. The Clean Power Plan was
intended to prove that Massachusetts augured more than just a one-sector regulatory
program and was intended as the model for regulation of other sectors. The ACE
Rule is a poor model, to say the least, and hardly worth the administrative effort of
duplicating. And even if the repeal-and-replace strategy is less radical, it is more

478. ACE Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. at 32,561 (“As noted earlier in this section, the illustrative policy
scenario is compared against a baseline that does not include the CPP. This is because the ACE action
only occurs after the repeal of the CPP.”).
479. Amelia T. Keyes et al., The Affordable Clean Energy Rule and the Impact of Emissions Rebound on
Carbon Dioxide and Criteria Air Pollutant Emissions, 14 ENV’T RESEARCH LETTERS 1(2019).
480. Id. at 5-6.
481. See supra Section III.A.
482. Initial Opening Brief of Public Health and Environmental Petitioners, American Lung Ass’n
v. EPA (D.C. Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1140), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wpcontent/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2020/20200417_docket-19-1140_brief-6.pdf.
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cynical, suggesting Clean Air Act climate policy is politically malleable, untethered
from serious consideration of climate harms.
As with the rollback of vehicle standards, the ACE Rule is being challenged
in court by states and environmental groups.483 Meaningful success in this litigation
seems unlikely. As the 2016 stay indicates, elements of the Clean Power Plan were
always legally vulnerable,484 making repeal and replace likely even under an
administration favoring serious climate policy. And as weak as the ACE Rule is,
would the D.C. Circuit really be willing to say it is so weak as to fail to meet the
agency’s statutory obligations? Would such a ruling survive Supreme Court review,
without triggering a UARG-style exclusion of climate from Section111 (or, less likely,
a repeal of Massachusetts)? And even if the Supreme Court did, somehow, rule in
favor of the challengers and remand the ACE Rule to a Trump EPA for revision,
would the new rule be meaningfully more stringent in light of the fact that the Clean
Power Plan itself was pretty weak? It seems unlikely. The chances of real and durable
emissions limits on the power sector from the Clean Air Act appear extremely low.

C. Bullet Dodged or Loaded Gun—The Endangerment Finding
What remains after the Trump rollback of Clean Air Act climate policy?
Only three rulemakings of any significance were left intact. Two, the Phase I light
and heavy-duty vehicle standards, had been fully implemented by 2017, so there was
nothing to roll back. Only one rule had continuing relevance—the 2009
endangerment (and cause-and-contribute) finding on which all other Clean Air Act
climate rules are ultimately based.
Why go through so many complex rollback rulemakings, non-enforcement
decisions, and ensuing litigation when Clean Air Act climate policy could be
removed, root and branch, by repealing the endangerment finding? This is a
surprisingly difficult question to answer. Certainly, many within and connected to
the Trump administration appear to have advocated for withdrawal of the
endangerment finding. Myron Ebell, a member of the Trump transition team and a
strident climate denier, advocated such a move in 2017:
“You can’t just take out the flowers—you have to take out the
roots—starting with the endangerment finding. . . [y]ou can undo
the Obama climate agenda on the surface by reopening the Clean
Power Plan Rule, the Methane Rule, rescinding the [auto

483. See Sonal Patel, 22 States, Environmental Groups Mount Legal Challenges to EPA ACE Rule Power,
POWER (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.powermag.com/22-states-environmental-groups-mount-legalchallenges-to-epa-ace-rule/.
484. See supra Section II.E.
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emissions] standards and so on. But the underlying foundation
remains.”485
Secretary Pruitt criticized the endangerment finding, claimed to be unconvinced by
consensus climate science,486 and repeatedly suggested that repeal was on the table,
but never took action to do so.487 Internal emails obtained as a result of records
requests in 2018 indicate that Pruitt pushed for a “red team-blue team” review of
climate science and, separately, for a public request for comment on repeal of the
endangerment finding.488 But although the former was temporarily given the goahead,489 no formal review of the finding was ever announced. Outside the
administration, opponents of climate policy continually criticized EPA for failing to
repeal the finding.490
However, in an interview with the Washington Post after being named
Pruitt’s replacement as EPA Secretary, Andrew Wheeler referred to the
endangerment finding as “settled law” that would not be revisited under his
leadership without a “major, compelling reason” to do so.491 When the ACE Rule
was finalized in 2019, EPA Office of Air and Radiation Assistant Administrator
William Wehrum stated: “Just to be clear, this [the ACE Rule] is a regulation of
485. John McQuaid, One Big Legal Obstacle Keeps Trump from Undoing Greenhouse Gas Regulation,
SCI.AM.(Apr.26,2017),https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/one-big-legal-obstacle-keepstrump-from-undoing-greenhouse-gas-regulation/.
486 . See Doina Chiacu & Valerie Volcovici, EPA Chief Unconvinced on CO2 Link to Global Warming,
REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-epa-pruitt/epa-chief-unconvinced-onco2-link-to-global-warming-idUSKBN16G1XX.
487. See Ledyard King, EPA’s Pruitt Says Challenge to Endangerment Finding Still on the Table, USA
TODAY (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/01/30/epas-pruitt-sayschallenge-endangerment-finding-still-table/1078282001/.
488. Emily Holden, Scott Pruitt Never Gave up EPA Plans to Debate Climate Science, Records Show,
THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 22, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/dec/21/scott-pruittepa-climate-change-science-red-team-blue-team-debate.
489. Coral Davenport & Mark Landler, Trump Administration Hardens Its Attack on Climate Science,
N.Y.TIMES(May27,2019),https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/us/politics/trump-climate-science.ht
ml.
490. E.g., Marianne Lavelle, Climate Policy Foes Seize on New White House Rule to Challenge
Endangerment Finding, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (May 14, 2019), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/
13052019/climate-change-epa-endangerment-finding-challenge-cei-trump-omb-memo-healthenvironment; James Delingpole, Obama’s Climate Legacy is Toast, BREITBART (Aug. 22, 2018),
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2018/08/22/delingpole-obamas-climate-legacy-is-toast/ (“But the
situation is still not ideal. Arguably the most damaging of all Obama’s climate policies is still live and
dangerous: the EPA’s notorious 2009 CO2 Endangerment Finding.”).
491. Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, Incoming EPA Chief: ‘This is the right Job for Me.,’ WASH. POST
(July6,2018),https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2018/07/06/incomingepa-chief-this-is-the-right-job-for-me/.
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greenhouse gases...[n]o doubt about it.”492 At least for the time being, the agency
appears to have little appetite for revisiting the endangerment finding.
Determining why is difficult, and without a window into internal
deliberations, likely impossible. Repealing the finding would have invited litigation,
but as the above discussion of the Trump rollback efforts makes clear, litigation was
inevitable. It is possible that the administration feared losing that litigation, which
would have been embarrassing and would have cemented the finding. EPA would
presumably have been accorded substantial deference on its scientific judgments by
reviewing courts, under Chevron, so proving that an endangerment finding repeal was
arbitrary and capricious (or otherwise contrary to law) could be difficult for
challengers. That said, scientific evidence for human-caused climate change and
associated harms has increased since the endangerment finding was issued, making it
difficult for the agency to argue that the best available evidence points toward
repeal.493 Despite Chevron deference on scientific questions, EPA leadership may
have concluded that policy choices—like the ACE Rule versus the Clean Power Plan,
or the freezing the model-year 2020 vehicle standards—would be safer ground to
defend. Alternatively, leadership may have concluded that putting all their eggs in
one legal basket (endangerment repeal) was simply less risky than defending multiple
policies. Democratic Senator Brian Schatz attributed the more conservative approach
under Secretary Wheeler to agency concerns over legal risk: “My sense is that
because they keep losing in court, they’ve now got some smart lawyers trying to
figure out how to actually comply with the law.”494
Or, the decision may not have been driven by legal risk at all, but rather by
politics. Industry groups that may have welcomed climate regulatory rollbacks may
not have relished a high-profile fight over climate science in the courts and in the
media. There is some evidence that large firms and industry groups pushed the
Trump administration to leave the endangerment finding intact as early as 2017.495
Industry and, perhaps, some within the administration may have concluded that a
fight over climate science would be less politically attractive than one over regulation.

492. Sobczyk & Koss, supra note 376.
493. See generally Philip B. Duffy et al., Strengthened Scientific Support for the Endangerment Finding
forAtmosphericGreenhouseGases,363SCI.(2019),https://science.sciencemag.org/content/363/6427/eaat5
982.
494. Sobczyk & Koss, supra note 376.
495. See Mark Hand, Industry Opposition Leads ALEC to Withdraw Anti-Climate Resolution,
THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 7, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/alec-resolution-fails-b576afd1456f/; see also
Timothy Cama, ExxonMobil Opposes ALEC’s Attempt to Fight EPA Climate Policy, THE HILL (Dec. 5, 2017),
https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/363389-exxon-opposes-alecs-attempt-to-fight-epaclimate-policy.
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It is possible that all of these reasons and others, including personal or
power struggles,496 played a role. It is hard to say how close the administration came
to pursuing repeal of the endangerment finding. That the debate spilled out into
public view suggests that repeal was considered, though it is possible that a few vocal
advocates attracted media attention disproportionate to their actual influence.
Secretary Pruitt’s ethical troubles and eventual resignation seem to have been the
final blow for repeal efforts.497
The failure of the Trump EPA to repeal the finding suggests that there are
still some limits—either to the administration’s anti-climate-policy ambitions or to
the instability of Clean Air Act climate policy. Even if substantive rulemakings on
climate have not been normalized and integrated into the traditionally static Clean
Air Act firmament, the endangerment finding itself seems to have been so integrated.

IV.WHY HAS CLEAN AIR ACT CLIMATE POLICY FAILED?
The Obama EPA built the most ambitious and detailed climate policy any
President has considered, using only the powers made available to it under the
existing Clean Air Act and Massachusetts. Three years after Obama left office, there
is almost nothing left. Massachusetts’s foundations were sand. Clean Air Act climate
policy was never normalized into the regulatory firmament. Moreover, the policies
not yet rolled back by the Trump EPA have been superseded by events.
Why did Clean Air Act climate policy fail? How did this happen so quickly?
Was it inevitable? Who is to blame?

A. Leadership
Two easy answers are tempting: one blames President Obama for not going
far enough, fast enough, while the other blames President Trump for reckless
destruction. The vast difference in policy priorities and leadership style between the
two men plays a major role. But focus on the two Presidents leads to a simplistic
understanding that ignores other actors and structural factors. Nevertheless, the
policy decisions of both administrations are central, and it is worth laying out the
case that one or the other is primarily responsible for the Clean Air Act’s climate
failure.

496. There is little reporting on the internal politics of decisions on the endangerment finding, but
some related decisions have been personality-driven. See, e.g., Andrew Restuccia, How Bannon and Pruitt
BoxedinTrumponClimatePact,POLITICO(June1,2017),https://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/31/tru
mp-paris-climate-agreement-239008 (detailing the importance of personal conflicts and power plays in
President Trump’s decision to exit the Paris Agreement).
497. See supra note 494 and related discussion.
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Trump, Breaker of Norms

Donald Trump is a norm-breaking president who campaigned on rejecting
traditional approaches to governing.498 Trump appointed officials with the clear
intent of “deconstruct[ing] the administrative state.”499 His administration is
inexperienced and at times reckless, failing to appreciate the consequences and legal
difficulties of radical regulatory change.500 It should therefore come as little surprise
that the longstanding norm of stability in environmental regulations is among those
it disregards.501
The Trump administration’s rollback of Clean Air Act climate regulation
has however been particularly aggressive, even by the administration’s own
standards. Trump’s antipathy to signature Obama-administration policies and to
climate policy in particular is well-established.502 The Trump administration is the
first and only administration to openly reject climate science.503 And while it has
rolled back other environmental regulations (or attempted to do so), these efforts
have nowhere been as extensive as with climate regulation under the Clean Air Act.504
Perhaps most notably, the Trump EPA has made no attempt to roll back Clean Air
Act limits on conventional “criteria” air pollutants like ozone, lead, and sulfur
dioxide(though it has engineered structural changes aimed at undercutting the
process for updating these limits).505
498. See, e.g., Ezra Klein, Donald Trump and the Destruction of America's Political Norms, VOX (June
7, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/6/7/11872834/donald-trump-norms.
499. See Morris, supra note 369.
500. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 427 (detailing errors and sloppiness in EPA’s rollback of fuel
economy standards, leading to conflict with OMB).
501. See supra Section III.
502. See supra note 366 and related discussion on President Trump’s views on climate change. See
also David Smith, The Anti-Obama: Trump's Drive to Destroy His Predecessor's Legacy, THE GUARDIAN (May
11,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/may/11/donald-trump-barack-obama-legacy
(“[f]rom climate change to criminal justice to international relations, rarely has one occupant of the Oval
Office appeared so obsessed with taking a chainsaw to the work of another.”).
503. George H.W. Bush took climate change seriously and signed the UNFCCC. See Scott
Waldman and Benjamin Hulac, This Is When the GOP Turned Away from Climate Policy, E&E NEWS (Dec.
5, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060108785/. While the George W. Bush administration tried
to avoid regulating GHGs under the CAA, spawning the Massachusetts challenge, it did not (at least
openly) question climate science, as the ANPRM it issued illustrated. Only President Trump called
climate change a hoax.
504. See Popovich et al., supra note 16.
505. Most recently, the Trump administration has decided to preserve the existing NAAQS for
particulate matter. See EPA, Review of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate
Matter, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,094 (Apr. 30, 2020); see also supra Section I.C.3 for discussion of this long-term
pattern of stability of most Clean Air Act standards; Laura Bloomer and Joe Goffman, Harvard
Environmental and Energy Law Program, The Legal Consequences of EPA’s Disruption of the NAAQS Process
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The Trump administration is uniquely disdainful of regulation, norms, and
climate policy. If the failure of Clean Air Act climate regulations could be attributed
solely to an aberrant, possibly naive president, other potential causes could be
rejected. On this view, a return to “normal” behavior by future presidents of either
party who hold greater respect for norms would make for more stable climate policy.
But norms are contingent: having been broken, it may be difficult or impossible to
reestablish them.
All this presupposes that the Trump rollbacks will be successful. Some of
the administration’s efforts remain incomplete more than three years into its first
term, and many of those that have been finalized are being litigated.506 The Trump
administration’s track record in administrative law cases is abysmal.507 Richard
Lazarus suggests rollbacks will fail because the Trump administration is making the
same mistakes as the Bush administration did, failing to act on climate and risking
reversal in the courts a la Massachusetts.508 Even if so, that reversal would almost
certainly be narrower in scope.
The largest source of legal risk in those moves are their ham-handedness,509
not their compliance with underlying statutory mandates.510 Unlike the Bush
administration in the 2000s, the Trump administration is not trying to escape climate
regulation under the Clean Air Act but instead to regulate as little as possible, as the
ACE Rule, SAFE Rule, and its decision not to repeal the endangerment finding
illustrate.511 It may face setbacks as its poorly crafted rollbacks are remanded back to
(Sept. 30, 2019), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2019/09/the-legal-consequences-of-epas-disruption-of-thenaaqs-process/.
506. See Popovich et al., supra note 16.
507. Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, supra note 400.
508. Richard Lazarus, INSIGHT: Harvard’s Lazarus Expects More EPA Blundering on Climate Change,
BLOOMBERG
ENV’T
(Feb.
28,
2020),
https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/
environment-and-energy/insight-harvards-lazarus-expects-more-epa-blundering-on-climate-change.
509. See Davenport, supra note 104 (reporting basic drafting errors in the Trump administration’s
SAFE rule).
510. I have little doubt that the Supreme Court would accept a pause or rollback in vehicle
emissions standards that was carefully crafted, with clear justifications articulated. It is possible that no
such rollback is possible—that the cost-benefit case for emissions reductions from vehicles in a time of
increasing climate risk and market shifts toward electric cars is so clear that any well-crafted rule must
conclude that tighter standards are warranted. But I am skeptical that a court would conclude as much
over a contrary agency position. One should not underestimate the ability of a motivated agency to
selectively present and interpret evidence, or of the Court’s necessarily deferential approach to “hardlook” arbitrary & capricious review to license that approach. If the Trump EPA’s rollbacks of vehicle
standards are rejected by courts, it is far more likely to be due to sloppiness than their substance. And
even if they are rejected, the result will be remand to the agency for another try.
511. Morris, supra note 369. The typical Trump administration’s strategy has been to heighten the
contradictions, inciting political and legal conflict to remake the status quo (see, for example, Steve
Bannon’s claim that cabinet officials were selected to lead the “deconstruction of the administrative state”).
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the agency, but only a change in leadership will prevent rollback over the longer term.
In the face of an administration determined to regulate as little as possible, the courts
are unlikely to be much of a barrier.
The Trump rollback may not even be that radical. Rules like the Phase II
vehicle standards and the Clean Power Plan, with compliance dates in the future,
may not have survived intact under a more “normal” Republican administration
either; it is possible that only the rules that industry is already complying with have
the Clean Air Act’s trademark durability.512
The failure of Clean Air Act climate policy cannot, therefore, be attributed
to the Trump administration’s norm-breaking destructiveness alone. A regulatory
program vulnerable to attack and courts willing to permit or encourage that rollback
were necessary too.

2.

Did Obama Fail to Do Enough?

Despite all its regulatory efforts, missteps by the Obama administration
contributed to the failure of Clean Air Act climate policy. The first and probably
most significant error was delay: the Obama administration dragged its feet, taking
far too long to finalize climate regulations, particularly the Clean Power Plan.
Initially the administration moved quickly, issuing the Section202
endangerment finding in 2009 and the first round of vehicle standards in 2010;513 any
subsequent momentum was quickly lost, though. Despite President Obama’s
December 2010 claim after the failure of cap-and-trade that there were “other ways
to skin the cat,”514 significant climate regulation was not proposed until the Clean
Power Plan proposal three and a half years later. The Clean Power Plan was not
finalized until August 2015, two months after Donald Trump announced his
candidacy for president.515 Writing detailed regulation takes time, but should it really
have taken more than four years to finalize the Clean Power Plan? If so, that alone is
an indictment of climate policy via Clean Air Act regulation: any policy route that
takes an entire Presidential term to build is impractical.
Had the Obama EPA released the plan earlier, there would have been more
time to resolve legal challenges and begin implementation of the Rule before the
2016 election. Industry might have made more investments toward compliance,
solidifying the Rule. Industry would certainly have challenged the Rule, but would
512. See supra Section II. Some elements of the rollback do stand out as unusually aggressive,
however, such as the refusal of Secretary Pruitt to enforce Phase II standards for glider vehicles (a policy
reversed by his successor), or the agency’s suspension of the landfill methane NSPS (rejected by a
reviewing court).
513. See supra Sections II.A and II.B supra for a full discussion of this regulatory timeline.
514. See Press Release, White House, Obama Admin., Press Conference by the President (Nov. 3,
2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/03/press-conference-president.
515. See Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015).
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the Supreme Court have stayed it pending litigation if faced with that decision a year
or two earlier, before having been publicly stung by EPA’s eye-rolling response to
the Court’s Michigan decision?516 Even if so, the agency would still have had more
time to get a merits decision from the D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court, and perhaps
enough time to issue a revised regulation on remand. Concurrently, the agency could
have begun work in earnest on performance standards for other sectors. In reality it
barely had time to issue standards for one sector of the economy—the oil and gas
industry.
Another tactical error was the Obama EPA’s decision to delay the
compliance date for the Clean Power Plan until 2022, seven years after the Rule was
finalized.517 Power plant operators were under little or no pressure to prepare to
comply with the rule while it was under legal challenge and the subject of political
controversy. The result was that no emissions reductions were “baked in” by the time
the Rule was stayed or the 2016 election intervened. This is not to suggest that the
Obama EPA was wrong to target emissions reductions that would (it then believed)
only be achievable over the long term, out to 2030. But not requiring any emissions
reductions for seven years seems like a misstep in retrospect, making the regulation
particularly vulnerable to rollback by the next administration.
Relatedly, the Clean Power Plan was almost certainly too lax when it was
issued. As discussed above, some greens lamented at the time that it would achieve
little, and reductions in emissions from the power sector since 2015 have vindicated
that view.518 The Obama EPA either underestimated opportunities for low-cost
emissions cuts or overestimated the political cost of more ambitious targets, or both.
Paradoxically, a more stringent rule might have been more resilient to challenge. A
rule requiring deeper inside-the-fence emissions cuts at coal plants could have
remained robust even if courts had stripped outside-the-fence measures. A more
stringent rule might have also pushed power plant operators to make structural
changes sooner.
One defense is that these critiques of the Clean Power Plan are evaluating
it on the wrong criteria. Maybe it was less about raw emissions cuts than it about
pushing Congress to act on climate legislation by threatening a more expensive
regulatory approach.519 Possibly, but the Plan’s limited stringency and long

516. A macabre counterpoint to the claim of unnecessary delay is that if the Clean Power Plan had
been finalized a week later, the Supreme Court would not have considered the request for an interlocutory
stay until after Justice Scalia had died. In the presumptive event of a 4-4 deadlock, no stay would have
been granted.
517. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,664 (Oct. 23, 2015).
518. See supra Section II.G.
519. Or maybe it was a feint, designed to check a statutory box, attract political attention, and
occupy opponents while other regulations actually achieved meaningful emissions reductions. If so, it is
unclear what the real emissions-cutting move shielded by the Clean Power Plan feint was supposed to be.
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compliance times limited its ability to motivate Congress and attract political
attention.
In contrast to the Clean Power Plan, the Obama EPA’s vehicle emissions
standards required relatively rapid compliance and were stringent enough to force
manufacturers to make real changes to their fleets.520 This has not stopped the Trump
administration from attempting to roll them back. But some emissions reductions
have already occurred and will persist because standards have forced the mix of
vehicles on the road to get cleaner.521 Having already made compliance investments,
the auto industry broadly favors leaving the Obama standards in place.522 A Clean
Power Plan released earlier, with earlier compliance deadlines, might have been
similarly successful.
Despite these apparent errors, hindsight bias means some caution is
warranted before attributing much blame to the Obama administration for climate
policy failures. Would a bold push for the Clean Power Plan in 2012 have really hurt
Obama’s reelection prospects? It seems unlikely, given Obama’s eventual margin of
victory,523 but it is impossible to say for sure. It is easy to underappreciate political
and administrative constraints from the outside.

B. Structural Limitations
It is possible that the differences between Trump and Obama matter less
than what they have in common: the constraints of climate politics in America, and
of the Clean Air Act itself.

1.

Political Constraints

Perhaps it is not Trump that is different, but the climate issue itself. The
traditional one-way-ratchet pattern of Clean Air Act regulation may have persisted
because air quality issues are just not that politically salient. Environmental and
industry groups care a great deal, and exert some influence, but they don’t get
everything they want. Green groups don’t get all the regulatory stringency they want
under Democratic administrations, and industry groups are rarely if ever able to push

520. See EPA, The 2019 EPA Automotive Trends Report, Executive Summary at ES3-ES4 (March
2020), https://www.epa.gov/automotive-trends/download-automotive-trends-report (detailing sharp
increase in fleet-average fuel economy and resulting decline in carbon emissions per mile from 2013-2018).
521. Id.
522. See supra Section III.A (discussion of industry opposition to Trump administration rollbacks
of the standards).
523. SeeUSElection2012Results,THEECONOMIST(Nov.7,2012),https://www.economist.com/
graphic-detail/2012/11/07/us-election-2012-results (“Barack Obama handily won the American
presidential election, gaining an expected 332 electoral-college votes to Mitt Romney’s 206”).
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Republican administrations to roll back air quality regulations.524 Air quality is not a
high-profile political issue, at least so long as policy operates within certain
boundaries—the air doesn’t get dirty enough nor do regulations get costly enough.525
The result is the traditional one-way ratchet. Climate’s political salience means it
does not fit this technocratic/interest group model.
The reverse could be true. Rolling back regulations on traditional pollutants
could be difficult or impossible because it invites opponents to claim that those
rolling back the regulations are in favor of dirty air, smog, and the palpable health
effects that come with them—problems the American public takes seriously and
views as responsibilities of government.526 Climate, in contrast, is a relatively new
danger in the public consciousness, is politically contested, and has effects that are
less direct, less observable, and which may not be felt for decades. Climate regulatory
rollbacks are therefore less politically costly. In either case, climate’s high profile and
politicized nature distinguish it from most other areas of environmental regulation.
It is not just industry but also large segments of the Republican base that
oppose strong climate regulation.527 This raises the political cost to a Democratic
administration of proposing and implementing climate rules. The Obama
administration was able to finalize significant rulemakings, but only after delay over
political fears, and at political cost: those regulations became a campaign issue in the
form of “war on coal” rhetoric.528 This added political cost to climate regulations may
help explain why the Clean Power Plan was not more ambitious.
Clean Air Act regulation is not as separate from partisan politics as it may
have previously appeared. When an air pollution issue is politically salient,
regulatory actions (new rules or repeal of old ones) will follow. At some level this
should not be surprising. The Clean Air Act and its 1990 Amendments would never
have passed Congress had air quality issues not become sufficiently politically

524. See supra Section I.C.3 (discussion of this historical pattern).
525. See, e.g., Jason West and Barbara Turpin, As air pollution increases in some US cities, the Trump
administration is weakening clean air regulations, THE CONVERSATION (May 2, 2019),
https://theconversation.com/as-air-pollution-increases-in-some-us-cities-the-trump-administration-isweakening-clean-air-regulations-115975 (arguing that air pollution “does not receive the attention it
deserves as a public health threat” despite killing “more Americans than all transportation accidents and
gun shootings combined”); but see Gallup, In Depth: Topics A to Z: Environment,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/1615/environment.aspx (finding a consistent majority of Americans
“personally worry about” air pollution either a “great deal” or a “fair amount”).
526. Gallup, supra note 525.
527. See Pew Research Center, U.S. Public Views on Climate and Energy (Nov. 25, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2019/11/25/u-s-public-views-on-climate-and-energy/ (finding that
only 39% of Republicans/Republican leaners think the federal government is doing too little to reduce the
effects of climate change).
528. See Davenport, supra note 458 (describing Trump’s campaign promise to “end the war on coal”
and repeal the Clean Power Plan).
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significant.529 No major climate legislation has passed in Congress, but that does not
mean the issue is not politically relevant; in fact the opposite—the polarization of
the issue appears to be a key factor blocking legislation. That same polarization also
appears to have weakened climate regulation and made its subsequent repeal more
likely.

2.

A Poor Fit for Climate?

Critics of climate regulation under the Clean Air Act have long alleged that
the statute is ill-suited for regulating greenhouse gases, most notably the Bush EPA
in Massachusetts itself.530 The statute does not mention climate change. It primarily
targets domestic emissions, while climate is a global problem. Critics suggest that
using the statute to regulate climate is anti-democratic in that it circumvents a public
debate on climate policy that would occur as a predicate to new climate legislation.531
There are structural problems too. The most robust sections of the statute
for controlling stationary-source emissions, the Section 110 NAAQS program and
Section 112 for hazardous air pollutants, are, most observers believe, a poor fit for
climate.532 Some of the parts of the statute most suited to greenhouse gases are
skeletal and rarely-used gap-fillers. 533 The tools in the statute most useful for limiting
greenhouse gas emissions (vehicle standards in Section202 and stationary source
standards in Section111) must be applied to classes of emissions sources separately;
EPA must issue rulemakings for motor vehicles, power plants, refineries, etc.534 This
529. See, e.g., Richard Revesz and Jack Lienke, Nixon's "Environmental Bandwagon": Richard Nixon
Signed the Landmark Clean Air Act of 1970 -- But Not Because He Had Any Great Concern about the
Environment,SALON(Jan.3,2016),https://www.salon.com/2016/01/02/nixons_environmental_bandwag
on_richard_nixon_signed_the_landmark_clean_air_act_of_1970_but_not_because_he_had_any_great_co
ncern_about_the_environment/ (describing political competition between Nixon and Senator Edward
Muskie as the driving force behind passage of the 1970 Clean Air Act).
530. See supra Sections I.A.
531. See, e.g., William Yeatman, Competitive Enterprise Institute, EPA’s Illegitimate Climate Rule
(July28,2014),https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Yeatman%20-%20EPAs%20Illegitimate%20Climate%20
Rule_0.pdf (calling the Clean Power Plan “an illegitimate exercise in executive authority” and a “power
grab” “never. . . vetted with voters”).
532. Richardson, supra note 22.
533. See supra Section II. Section 111 deals mostly with standards for new sources, with standards
for existing sources restricted to pollutants not covered under Section 110 (and possibly under Section 112.
Section 115, covering international emissions, has also been proposed as a climate regulatory vehicle, but
is even more skeletal and rarely-used. See Nathan Richardson, An Elephant in the Room or the Elephant in
the Mousehole: The Legal Risks (and Promise) of Climate Policy Under §115 of the Clean Air Act, 69 ADMIN. L.
REV. 291 (2017).
534. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q, 7411, 7521 (7411 shows directing EPA to issue
performance standards applicable to “source categories,” 7521 is applicable to motor vehicles and motor
vehicle engines only).
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increases administrative expense and complexity relative to a single economy-wide
policy and makes emissions trading between sectors difficult or impossible. Some
emitting sectors, like agriculture, are probably outside of the reach of the statute
entirely.535 Regulation of greenhouse gases under these provisions also has other
limitations, ranging from the frustrating to the possibly fatal.536
The Clean Air Act is therefore less durable, adaptable, and flexible when
applied to greenhouse gases than it has been when applied to other air pollution
problems in the past. Instead, climate regulation is (the argument goes) out on a legal
limb, vulnerable to rhetorical attack, constraint by courts skeptical of administrative
authority, and abuse by bad faith actors.537
While parts of this account are correct, it cannot alone explain the lack of
success of Clean Air Act climate regulation. First, whether climate was envisioned as
an issue the Clean Air Act might address when it was first passed is irrelevant. While
the statute does not mention climate change, it does envision change, as science reveals
new air pollution risks and technology for mitigating them evolves—something the
Massachusetts Court recognized.538 It grants the agency authority to identify new
pollutants and new harms and then to regulate them.539 Climate is no different, or if
it is different, it is so in scope, not in kind.
In practice, at least some of the statute’s diverse regulatory programs can
be effective tools for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Vehicle emissions standards
(Section202) and stationary-source performance standards (Section111) may be
second-best alternatives to an economy-wide carbon price, but their long track record
shows they can drive emissions reductions. Clean Air Act regulatory tools have to be
command-and-control dinosaurs; EPA has proven that flexible regulations involving
market-based mechanisms like emissions trading are compatible with the Clean Air

535. Much of the carbon emissions associated with agriculture, such as those from land-use change
or from livestock animals, do not fit into the broad categories of polluting sources (mobile and stationary)
regulated under the Clean Air Act.
536. For example, the interpretation of conflicting versions of §111 that would forbid regulation of
emissions from sources also subject to hazardous air pollutant regulation under §112, discussed above.
Even if one concludes (as I do) that this argument is unlikely to succeed, if it does it is fatal to effective
§111 regulation of greenhouse gases because all significant carbon emissions sources are large facilities
already subject to §112 regulations.
537. For example, the Trump administration’s EPA, claiming to fulfill statutory requirements to
limit greenhouse gas emissions in the ACE rule.
538. See supra I.B.
539. Supra note 1 (Massachusetts itself illustrates this: §202 of the statute directs EPA to regulate
emissions of “any air pollutant” that it identifies as a threat to public health or welfare). See supra Section
I.A.
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Act.540 Both the vehicle fuel economy standards and the Clean Power Plan allowed
emissions trading.541
Nor is the sector-by-sector approach required by the Clean Air Act a major
limitation, at least in the short term. The key advantage of an economy-wide carbon
price over a piecemeal regulatory approach is that it allows achievement of an
environmental goal without requiring knowledge of how or where in the economy
emissions can most cost-effectively be reduced.542 But in 2015 and today, the best
opportunities for emissions reduction are obvious: power plants (especially
inefficient coal plants) and road vehicles are the largest emitters.543 How emissions
reductions should be achieved in those sectors—that is, which coal plants should shut
down, and how the vehicle fleet should become more efficient—is a harder question,
but that is why the regulations do allow flexibility and trading within their sectoral
domains. Once the low-hanging fruit are picked, cross-sector or economy-wide
regulations that the Clean Air Act cannot readily provide may be needed. But this
limitation of the statute is not yet significant.
The fractured, sectoral nature of Clean Air Act regulation could also make
it more stable, rather than less so. It is harder for new agency leadership to repeal
many regulations than it is to repeal just one. It was far easier for the Trump
administration to withdraw from the Paris Agreement that it has been to roll back
Clean Air Act climate regulation. Congress could repeal many regulations at once by
stripping climate from the statute. But such efforts have been unsuccessful to date.544
The Supreme Court has been more successful at undercutting broad regulatory
authority all at once, as UARG illustrates and the next subsection discusses in more
detail.
The claim that using Clean Air Act for climate policy is somehow antidemocratic rings hollow as well. Agencies frequently apply old statutes to new
problems without creating a legitimacy crisis.545 If agencies go too far, Congress, the
courts, and the ballot box can, and do, constrain them.
No one creating a regulatory scheme for dealing with greenhouse gas
emissions would re-create the Clean Air Act, but it provides all the tools (and
540. See Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, Policy Evolution under the Clean Air Act, 33 J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 27–50 (2019) (describing evolution in policy tools used under the Clean Air
Act, to include various forms of emissions trading).
OF

541. See Phase I Light Duty Standards at 25,338. See also Clean Power Plan at 64,665.
542. See Richardson & Fraas, supra note 22, at 10,477-10,478.
543. See EPA Draft Inventory, supra note 133, at 2-25 (estimating transportation sector emissions
at 27.9% of total U.S. GHG emissions, slightly more than the electric power industry at 26.9%).
544. See, e.g., Stopping EPA Overreach Act of 2017, H.R. 637 115th Cong (2017),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/637?r=84&s=1.
545. For example, the Sherman Antitrust Act has remained the bedrock of U.S. antitrust law
throughout its evolution since the 19th century.
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legitimacy) necessary for a robust climate policy. This makes its failure to create such
a regulatory scheme all the more bitter. In a recent volume on the Clean Air Act,
Ann Carlson and Dallas Burtraw describe it as “a remarkable statute” with a nearly
fifty-year track record of “large reductions in harmful air pollutants.”546 They
attribute this success to the statute’s durability (in that it has outlasted the political
coalition responsible for its creation), adaptability (in that it is capable of addressing
new air pollution problems), and flexibility (in that it allows for use of innovative
regulatory tools).547 This praise is deserved, but the strengths of the statute have not
held for climate.

C. A Hostile Court
Until 2016, the most significant limiting factor for Clean Air Act climate
policy was the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the scope of agency authority. Until
Massachusetts, it was unclear whether the Clean Air Act could be applied to
greenhouse gases at all. For a time, Massachusetts seemed to have resolved that
question. But subsequent decisions, UARG (quietly) and the Clean Power Plan stay
(loudly and clearly), demonstrated otherwise. Every Supreme Court case on climate
policy since Massachusetts has constrained EPA authority, with the possible and
limited exception of AEP.548 As a result, Massachusetts is constrained, maybe limited
to its facts, and there is now substantial legal risk for any Clean Air Act climate
policy.
The Court’s has restricted Clean Air Act climate authority both directly
and indirectly. The Clean Air Act stay blocked the highest-profile part of the Obama
EPA’s climate policy, and suggested the Court would eventually have rejected the
rule on the merits. UARG created substantial legal risk for climate regulation under
each provision of the statute, forcing the agency to replay Massachusetts for each new
program.
More broadly, the Court has become skeptical of agency authority in recent
years; in particular its Clean Air Act cases since Massachusetts have been vehicles for
constraining and criticizing the administrative state.549 Gillian Metzger has

546. LESSONS FROM THE CLEAN AIR ACT, supra note 4, at 3.
547. Id.
548. See discussion of UARG, AEP, and the Clean Power Plan, supra Sections II.D and II.E.
549. See, e.g., UARG v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 323-24 (2014) (“We expect Congress to speak clearly
if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.”); see also Michigan
v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (denying deference to an agency statutory interpretation despite its
ambiguity, i.e., at Chevron’s Step Two). Massachusetts itself is arguably anti-administrative if it is viewed
as insufficiently deferential to the agency’s interpretive authority and/or setting of priorities for
regulation.
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characterized this project as “contemporary anti-administrativism.”550 In her view, it
has become sufficiently ascendant that the administrative state can be described as
“under siege,” with battles over the scope of administrative power thought resolved
in the New Deal era now being refought.551
In UARG, Justice Scalia further solidified a clear-statement rule for
statutory provisions that an agency claims give it significant powers,552 constraining
deference to agency readings under Chevron by increasing the scope of its nodeference Step One inquiry.553 Justice Scalia’s Michigan v. EPA opinion was a rare
loss for an agency at Chevron’s deferential Step Two.554 As discussed above, EPA’s
reaction to it may have contributed to the Court’s decision to stay the Clean Power
Plan. The stay may have been driven in part or whole by anti-administrativism, with
the Court skeptical of asserted EPA authority to regulate a broad sector of the
economy based on thin statutory text.555 Even Massachusetts itself could be
characterized as an anti-administrativist decision, in that the Court refused to defer
to the agency’s interpretation, though the result was to block the agency’s attempt to
shrink its own authority, not to constrain that authority.556 The revival of the “major
questions” exception to Chevron deference in 2015’s King v. Burwell decision further
eroded deference to agencies.557 The Court’s palpable skepticism toward
administrative agencies in general and toward Clean Air Act climate policy in
particular will continue to be a constraint for the foreseeable future.
The Court’s Clean Air Act jurisprudence post-Massachusetts is a double
barrier to climate policy under the statute. It constrains administrations that want to
use the statute’s powers and enables administrations that do not use this statutory
power, or that want to roll back existing regulations. Under President Obama, EPA
was not blind to these trends on the Court. This likely caused EPA to be more
cautious in crafting the Clean Power Plan than it would have otherwise, though any
caution was little help in the end.558 Under President Trump, the Court’s skepticism
550. Gillian E Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4
(2017).
551. See id. at 2-8.
552. UARG, 573 U.S. at 323–25.
553. See Richardson, supra note 46, at 371–77, 419-22.
554. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2718.
555. See Adler, supra note 312.
556. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532-535 (2007); see also Freeman & Vermeule, supra
note 3.
557. See generally Richardson, supra note 46, at 367–71.
558. To be sure, the Court has not ruled that Section 111 stationary source standards are wholly
inapplicable to climate, a la UARG, whatever reservations about the Clean Power Plan led it to stay that
rule. But that should not inspire much confidence that Section 111 remains a solid vehicle for future policy
for the power sector or other sectors with large contributions to U.S. emissions. A majority including the
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has worked hand-in-glove with the administration’s desire to halt and roll back
climate regulation. As the ACE Rule illustrates, the Trump administration can
readily claim that its rollbacks are driven by legal constraints on the agency, rather
than different policy preferences that must be supported by evidence. This makes
the administrative burden of rollback rulemakings substantially lower, and constrains
the scope of legal challenges to them.
The Court’s skepticism and hostility toward climate regulation turned
Massachusetts from a license to build a regulatory program into a trap, drawing the
Obama EPA into a legal quagmire and enabling the Trump EPA’s rollback. Jody
Freeman characterized UARG as a doctrinal “improvised explosive device” shortly
after it was decided.559 As it turns out, the bomb doesn’t even have to go off to do
severe damage to Clean Air Act climate policy. Instead, it merely upends the
traditional environmental policy ratchet for Clean Air Act climate regulation, making
it harder to implement rules and easier to repeal them. The same has not occurred
for other Clean Air Act programs where there has been no parallel shift in the Court’s
jurisprudence (e.g., on authority to set national ambient air quality standards).560
This may explain why Trump administration rollback efforts have been so much
more successful for climate programs than in other areas. The Court’s skepticism
toward the scope of EPA authority under the Clean Water Act (i.e., the extent of
“waters of the United States”) and its scattered jurisprudence on that question appear
to have had a similar, parallel effect—making expansion of authority more difficult
and retraction easy.561 The fragmented structure of the statute, requiring multiple
rulemakings for various programs and sectors, exacerbates this risk.
That said, there have already been some changes in personnel on the Court
since UARG (and the Clean Power Plan stay) were decided. Justices Kavanaugh and
Chief Justice did rule in AEP that Section 111 was applicable to greenhouse gas emissions, 564 U.S. 410
(2011), but I do not have confidence that determination would hold were the Court faced with a merits
decision on Clean Power Plan-like regulation. The alleged conflict between Section 112 and Section 111,
noted in AEP itself, provides one ready escape, and there are likely others. And even if the basic
applicability of Section 111 to climate is preserved, that it may not be sufficient to allow meaningful
emissions standards if the Court were to adopt the position advanced by Clean Power Plan critics (and
the Trump EPA) that “outside the fence” emissions reduction opportunities cannot be considered. If the
agency can only base its standards on incremental efficiency improvements at coal plants, the emissions
gains will be minimal (as the ACE rule illustrates). A possible way for the agency to circumvent a narrow,
inside-the-fence only reading of Section 111 is to redefine the regulated source categories. If performance
standards apply to, say, all fossil-fuel power plants rather than separate standards for coal and natural gas,
then EPA could presumably take natural gas as the “best system of emissions reduction”, effectively
requiring existing coal plants to shut down (or install carbon capture technology). Such a move, even if
legal, would be politically risky.
559. Freeman, supra note 242, at 10.
560. But see generally Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). This case is an exception, but is
limited to a one-off provision of the statute.
561. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opinion) (narrowly
interpreting the scope of the Clean Water Act’s application to “waters of the United States”).
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Gorsuch have not yet ruled on a Clean Air Act climate case at the Court, but their
statements and track record in other cases suggest they would be skeptical of EPA
authority. While serving on the D.C. Circuit, Justice Kavanaugh dissented from his
colleagues’ denial of en banc review of the panel decision upholding the Tailoring
Rule in the case that became UARG, arguing in favor of an even narrower
interpretation of “any air pollutant” than that eventually adopted by the Supreme
Court.562 Kavanaugh has also shown a consistent skepticism toward expansion of
agency authority, repeatedly ruling against EPA.563 In particular, he has consistently
interpreted grants of authority in regulatory statutes narrowly, applying UARG’s
“clear statement” rule in matters of “vast economic and political significance.”564 It
seems unlikely that Kavanaugh would vote to expand EPA authority over climate
under the Clean Air Act. Similarly, he is likely to be skeptical of any agency claims
of expansive or flexible authority. With the replacement of Justice Kennedy, the
presumptive swing vote in Massachusetts, with Justice Kavanaugh, The legal future of
Clean Air Act climate authority appears bleaker now than it has ever been.
Justice Gorsuch’s judicial record shows similar skepticism toward agency
authority and even greater dedication to textualism, though his service on the Tenth
Circuit means he has relatively little experience with Clean Air Act cases.565 His 2020
decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia,566 however, might offer some hope that
he would accept a broad reading of the Clean Air Act, along the lines of Massachusetts.
In Bostock, Gorsuch rejected an “elephants in mouseholes” argument that the bar on
sex discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act should not be read to forbid

562. See Order on Petitions for Rehearing En Banc, Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA,
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (No. 09–1322), 2012 WL 6621785, at *14 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc). Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in UARG quotes Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent
favorably. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 328 (2014).
563. See F. William Brownell et al., From Judge to Justice: What Brett Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court
Nomination Could Mean for Environmental Jurisprudence, HUNTON NICKEL REPORT BLOG (July 16, 2018),
https://www.huntonnickelreportblog.com/2018/07/from-judge-to-justice-what-brett-kavanaughssupreme-court-nomination-could-mean-for-environmental-jurisprudence/.
564. Id.
565. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (“There’s an elephant in the room with us today. We have studiously attempted to work our
way around it and even left it unremarked. But the fact is Chevron and Brand X permit executive
bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power
in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.
Maybe the time has come to face the behemoth.”). See also Neil M. Gorsuch, Lecture, Of Lions and Bears,
Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of Justice Scalia, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 909 (2016) (2016
Sumner Canary Lecture at Case Western Reserve University School of Law (Apr. 7, 2016)) (“[A]n
assiduous focus on text, structure, and history is essential to the proper exercise of the judicial function.”).
566. Bostockv.ClaytonCounty,Ga.,No.17-1618,slipop.(June15,2020),https://www.supreme
court.gov/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf.

160

Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law

Vol. 10:1

discrimination against homosexual and transgender employees.567 Congress may not
have explicitly intended the statute to reach LGBT protections, Gorsuch noted, but
as “a major piece of federal civil rights legislation . . . written in starkly broad terms,”
Congress did intend it to have wide reach, including “unexpected applications.”568
Even if extension to LGBT protections was an elephant, Title VII was no
mousehole.569 A very similar argument could be made for the CAA: even though
climate regulation is an elephant not explicitly anticipated by Congress, the statute’s
“any air pollutant” language and broad reach throughout the economy mean it is no
mousehole.570 This argument may be constrained by Justice Scalia’s UARG clear
statement rule, finding that climate regulation in at least some provisions of the CAA
is impermissible mousehole-stuffing.571 On the other hand, Justice Gorsuch has also
expressed interest in a revival of the nondelegation doctrine, which would
substantially constrain broad delegations to agencies, perhaps fatally dooming Clean
Air Act climate regulation.572 Time may tell how these threads in Justice Gorsuch’s
thinking, currently in some tension, are resolved. It would not be surprising for
Justice Gorsuch to be the pivotal vote in a future CAA/climate case.
The antipathy on the Court towards Massachusetts runs sufficiently deep
that some have speculated it will be overturned.573 That remains possible, and some
Justices would clearly vote to do so, having already called for the case to be
overturned in their UARG dissents.574 But in my view, five votes for overturning
seems unlikely. No confrontation with stare decisis is therefore necessary. The reason
is that Massachusetts is now so weak that it is hardly worth overturning (though fear
the Court might overrule or further constrain Massachusetts may deter environmental
groups from suing over rollbacks).575

567. Id. at 30.
568. Id. at 34.
569. Id. at 30.
570. See Jennifer Hijazi, LGBT Rights Ruling: 'Potent New Precedent' on Climate?, E&E NEWS (June
18, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063407045.
571. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S. at 2432 (“EPA’s interpretation would also bring about an
enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional
authorization.”).
572. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
573. See, e.g., Amanda Reilly, Is Massachusetts v. EPA a Goner?, CLIMATEWIRE (June 28, 2018),
https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2018/06/28/stories/1060087211.
574. UARG, 573 U.S. at 344 (Alito, J., dissenting).
575. See Reilly, supra note 573 (quoting David Bookbinder, former general counsel of the Sierra
Club saying “If there's a bad environmental decision in an appellate court, whereas previously you might
have asked the Supreme Court to take it, they will now not do so. . . Better to limit the damage than turn
a circuit court opinion into a Supreme Court one.”).
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Environmental lawyers that cheered Massachusetts thought it would push
EPA to embark on a broad climate regulatory program. But it did no such thing. The
Obama EPA did not need Massachusetts to regulate climate; even Justice Scalia’s
Massachusetts dissent would have left that decision to agency discretion. The
unpunished inaction of both the Bush EPA in the year after Massachusetts and the
Trump EPA today illustrate that there is no effective pressure from the courts to
regulate greenhouse gases. The Court’s jurisprudence therefore does little or nothing
to push the agency to regulate carbon, while doing a great deal to constrain it. It’s not
just that Massachusetts doesn’t deserve its rank among the most important
environmental cases: it’s that it does almost nothing at all. The narrowest reading of
the case is that it prevents EPA from refusing to act on climate. In practice, a decade
of the Court’s Clean Air Act cases show it doesn’t even do that.

D. Conclusions
American federal environmental law is at a point of crisis, driven by its
failure to grapple with the challenge of climate change. Obstruction and delay by the
George W. Bush administration and wholesale rollback of climate policy by the
Trump administration have wasted over a decade. The years in between saw the rise
and fall of a grand policy experiment under President Obama. The contours of Clean
Air Act climate policy have been under constant evolution since the mid-1990s. Such
delay is hardly ideal but could perhaps be justified if there were something to show
for it. Lack of a meaningful policy outside of one round of vehicle emissions
standards, in the face of a grave climate emergency, is unforgivable. It is true that
the cornerstones of Clean Air Act climate policy—Massachusetts and the
endangerment finding—remain in place. But prospects for meaningful future climate
policy under the statute are dim. Continuing rollback seems more likely.
Massachusetts seemed to settle the most important legal questions, normalizing Clean
Air Act climate policy, but it has failed in practice to do so.
Any future president interested in meaningful action on climate therefore
should not rely on the Clean Air Act. This is not widely understood: all the major
contenders for the Democratic nomination in 2020 announced climate policy plans
that rely to some extent on using the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions for sectors other than vehicles.576 New climate regulatory programs would

576. See, e.g., Biden for President, Joe’s Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice
(last visited Mar. 4, 2020), https://joebiden.com/climate/ (promising “aggressive methane pollution limits
for new and existing oil and gas operations.”); see also Mike Bloomberg for President, 100% Clean Power
(last visited Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.mikebloomberg.com/policies/plan-for-100-percent-clean-power
(“Mike also will reverse Trump’s rollbacks of environmental rules and put in place aggressive standards
for carbon and other air pollution from coal and gas plants.”); Elizabeth Warren, Tackling the Climate Crisis
Head On, (last visit. Mar. 4, 2020), https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/climate-change (“She will work to
decarbonize our electric sector by restoring the Clean Power Plan to put limits on carbon pollution emitted
from our power plants.”); Bernie Sanders, The Green New Deal (last visit. Mar. 4, 2020),
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require a large number of rulemakings, occupying much of EPA’s regulatory
resources. But given past experience their likelihood of surviving legal challenge and
meaningfully reducing emissions over the medium- to long-term is low. Any future
Clean Air Act climate rules will need to be crafted to minimize legal risk, rather than
to maximize environmental and cost-effectiveness.
This is a shame, not least because the Clean Air Act has proved itself
environmentally successful, economically efficient, flexible, and politically robust in
addressing a wide variety of other air pollution problems.577 It remains one of the
most important and successful statutes in American law. The Clean Air Act
regulations proposed and finalized by the Obama administration were the most
significant federal actions yet taken on climate, whatever their flaws and limitations.
They could have provided the basis for continued regulatory efforts that would have
substantially reduced U.S. emissions and, perhaps, unlocked more ambitious
international climate policy commitments. A good part of my career has been
devoted to legal analysis of climate policy options under the Clean Air Act. I continue
to believe that its text and design are compatible with environmentally meaningful,
reasonably cost-effective, and durable climate policy. Many others have reached
similar conclusions.578 But any hopes of this actually materializing have now nearly
vanished.
Some of the reasons why were baked in: structural limitations in the Clean
Air Act made regulating a globally-mixed and economy-wide pollutant particularly
difficult and unusually vulnerable to legal challenge. EPA under President Obama
could also have moved more quickly or sought greater emissions reductions, though
the extent to which either would have led to more durable policy is ambiguous.
The primary reasons for the failure of Clean Air Act climate policy are
political and legal—the 2016 election, the Supreme Court’s 2014 UARG decision, and
its 2016 stay of the Clean Power Plan stand out as turning points. The political story
is so obvious it barely merits retelling: the contrast between President Trump and
President Obama in both their views on climate policy and respect for norms is stark.
Some degree of climate policy rollback was likely inevitable under Trump. But the
change in administrations is insufficient to explain the retreat from Clean Air Act
climate policy. No other change in administrations has resulted in so great an
environmental policy rollback.

https://berniesanders.com/issues/green-new-deal/ (promising “economy-wide regulations to limit carbon”
under the Clean Air Act).
577. LESSONS FROM THE CLEAN AIR ACT, supra note 4, at 3.
578. Most obviously and notably, the EPA itself under President Obama, as illustrated by their
regulatory program. Outside government, many scholars and observers reached similar conclusions. See,
e.g., Ann Carlson, An Ode to the Clean Air Act, 30 LAND USE AND ENV’T LAW 119 (2014); Dallas Burtraw
et al., The Costs and Consequences of Clean Air Act Regulation of CO2 from Power Plants, 104 AM. ECON. REV.
557 (2014).

Fall 2020

The Rise and Fall of Clean Air Act Climate Policy

163

Though they have attracted far less attention than President Trump’s policy
shifts, the Supreme Court’s skepticism towards Clean Air Act climate authority
specifically and broad administrative authority more generally have enabled and
empowered those rollback efforts. If the story of the failure of Clean Air Act climate
policy has one author, it is Donald Trump, but if it has a second it is Chief Justice
Roberts. The Court’s antipathy toward Clean Air Act climate regulations directly
undercut the assertion that they were in any sense “normal” rules under the statute.
Nothing made that clearer than the Court’s unheard-of interlocutory stay of the
Clean Power Plan. Any future president attempting to build climate policy through
the Clean Air Act will have to contend with the skepticism or outright hostility of
this majority of Supreme Court Justices. Environmental and state litigants can, and
will, still challenge rollback rulemakings, but they will be forced by the Court’s
subsequent jurisprudence to concede the commanding heights they thought they had
gained with Massachusetts.
That said, Congress’ inability to pass new climate legislation, or even to
update and clarify decades-old environmental statutes, is the root problem. It is
unreasonable to rely on the courts to shape national environmental policy, and
perhaps even unfair to force them to do so. Relying on executive action without a
clear legislative mandate substantially increases the risk of sharp policy swings
between administrations. For meaningful progress on climate to be made, Congress
must act. Even more deeply, political elites and much of the American public have
all failed over the past few decades to take climate change seriously, as the issue has
been drawn into the twin maws of partisan polarization and ideological battles on the
Court. The Clean Air Act’s failures are ultimately a symptom of this wider neglect.

V. CODA: A WAY FORWARD?
Where, then, from here? Global carbon emissions must be reduced sharply
in the coming decades if catastrophic climate change is to be avoided. Substantial
U.S. reductions are both practically and diplomatically necessary (though not
sufficient) for such global cuts to occur. For a decade, the Clean Air Act has been the
primary vehicle for federal climate policy. But absent major political shifts, including
new views on core questions of administrative law on the Supreme Court, spending
resources on ambitious climate regulation under the Clean Air Act appears unwise.
A new foundation for climate policy is desperately needed at the federal level.
First, it is important not to overreach by declaring Clean Air Act climate
policy a complete failure. Climate-driven emissions standards for new motor vehicles
still have a relatively firm legal foundation. With transportation now the sector of
the U.S. economy with the greatest emissions,579 this is an extremely valuable policy
tool. Future presidents should consider tightening car and truck emissions standards,
579. See EPA DRAFT INVENTORY, supra note 133, at 2-25 (estimating transportation sector
emissions at 27.9% of total U.S. GHG emissions, slightly more than the electric power industry at 26.9%).
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as past presidential administrations have successfully done. Standards for ships and
aircraft should also be considered. Regulatory authority over vehicle emissions is
extremely strong, but nevertheless limited: the agency could in principle ban the
internal combustion engine, but standards only apply to new vehicles. This limitation
means standards have to stay in place for the long term as vehicle fleets turn over in
order to be effective. But the ability of the Trump administration to roll back much
of the Obama EPA’s vehicle standards suggests that long-term stability cannot be
assumed.
Other Clean Air Act regulations might yield substantial carbon emissions
reductions as co-benefits even if not aimed explicitly at greenhouse gases. Reimposition of limits on mercury emissions on coal plants put in place by the Obama
administration and rolled back under Trump would likely force marginal coal plants
to close, reducing carbon emissions as well.580 Tighter NAAQS for nitrogen oxides,
ozone, particulate matter, or other pollutants could speed turnover of vehicle fleets,
power plants, and industrial emissions sources.
However much Clean Air Act climate policy and Massachusetts have been
eroded, the statute’s ability to push greenhouse gas emissions cuts can’t be fully
dismantled without two additional major moves: overturning Massachusetts and
repealing the Section202 endangerment finding. Despite much noise about both
from some Justices and Trump administration officials, respectively,581 neither
appears likely soon. These Clean Air Act tools are valuable, but inadequate. The
statute lacks tools to reduce transportation sector emissions quickly, and lacks durable
and reliable tools for regulating other sectors at all. Beyond transportation, another
way to skin the cat must be found.
In the long term, the only viable solution is new legislation. In the wake of
Massachusetts, some commentators noted the necessity of climate legislation even
while praising the decision’s empowerment of EPA.582 To the extent that any of us
believed that the Clean Air Act could alone provide the tools for broad climate policy,
we had far too much faith in administrative technocracy divorced from politics. That
faith seems naïve in hindsight. Hope springs that a federal carbon tax, the Green
New Deal, or some other economy-wide climate policy could pass in the near future.
The failure of any such legislation to pass, or even to come close since 2010,
sometimes makes those hopes appear foolish. But, to paraphrase a view on America

580. Until their rollback, the mercury standards had been a driver of coal plant retirements. See
EIA, Coal plants installed mercury controls to meet compliance deadlines (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32952.
581. See discussion of endangerment finding rollback, supra Section III.C and discussion of
overturning Massachusetts, supra Section IV.C.
582. See, e.g., Cannon, The Significance of Massachusetts v. EPA, supra note 3 at 59 (“Further action
by Congress and the President [i.e., beyond the CAA] will be necessary to achieve a comprehensive
climate change policy.”)
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itself often attributed to Winston Churchill, perhaps Congress will do the right thing,
after trying everything else.583
The fates of Clean Air Act climate policy and new climate legislation may
yet be linked. The day may come again when regulatory authority might be traded
away in legislative negotiations for more robust and enduring climate policy.584 Clean
Air Act authority is of course a smaller bargaining chip now than in was in 2009, but
it is worth something. On the other hand, many green groups that historically have
opposed any sacrifice of hard-won regulatory powers might be more willing to do so
now. Whether this tradeoff is wise will probably remain contentious.
The failure of the Obama administration’s executive-led climate policy
illustrates not just the limitations of the Clean Air Act described at length above, but
the risks inherent in executive branch-led policymaking. It should be noted that
persistent legislative and judicial attack on the Affordable Care Act show that
legislation is not immune to rollback either. Australia’s imposition and subsequent
repeal of a carbon tax show the difficulty of creating enduring climate policy even
through the legislature.585
But what to do if new legislation remains elusive? Congress may move
slowly but the climate crisis does not. The risks of executive-led action on climate
having been noted, there are tools outside the Clean Air Act available to the President
to reduce emissions and to pressure Congress into action.586 Some of these tools have
been used to a limited degree by past presidents: for example, the executive branch
has permitting authority over interstate and international oil and gas pipelines, as
most famously illustrated by controversy over the Keystone XL pipeline.587 The
executive also controls (within constraints set by courts) the degree to which climate
impacts are considered in the National Environmental Policy Act analysis of all

583. See Scott Horsley, A Churchill 'Quote' That U.S. Politicians Will Never Surrender, NPR (Oct. 28,
2013)https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2013/10/28/241295755/a-churchill-quote-that-u-spoliticians-will-never-surrender (finding little evidence that Churchill ever said “Americans will always
do the right thing, only after they have tried everything else.”).
584. As it would have been in the last climate bill to pass either house of Congress. See discussion
of ACES (“Waxman-Markey”), supra Section II.C.
585. See Padraig Collins, How Not to Introduce a Carbon Tax: The Australian Experience, IRISH TIMES
(Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/environment/how-not-to-introduce-a-carbon-tax-theaustralian-experience-1.3746214.
586. See, e.g., Nathan Richardson and Peter Anderson, Resources for the Future, CLIMATE
CHANGE REGULATORY AUTHORITY BEYOND THE CLEAN AIR ACT (2012), https://www.rff.org/
publications/working-papers/climate-change-regulatory-authority-beyond-the-clean-air-act.
587. See Caitlin McCoy, Energy EOs In Depth: New Presidential Permit for Keystone XL and Changes
to Presidential Permitting, HARVARD ENV’T & ENERGY LAW PROGRAM (Apr. 30, 2019),
https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2019/04/energy-eos-in-depth-new-presidential-permit-for-keystone-xl-andchanges-to-presidential-permitting/ (“[t]he President has the authority to grant permits for projects that
cross international borders based on the President’s inherent foreign affairs power”).
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federal projects.588 Acting as landowner or steward rather than as regulator, the
executive also has authority to restrict (or even halt) extraction of fossil fuels on
federal lands. The role of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in balancing
interests of fossil-dependent utilities, nominally independent energy markets, and
state governments intent on limiting emissions has become increasingly salient;589 a
President’s choice of nominees to the commission could therefore be among his or
her most significant actions on climate. The President also has expansive authority
to impose tariffs on imported goods, as amply illustrated by President Trump
(though this authority is constrained, at least in theory, by World Trade Organization
obligations).590 This authority could be used to impose tariffs based on the carbon
content of imports, in hopes of influencing exporting countries to limit their own
emissions.591 More radical options available to a future President facing continued
congressional inaction may include declaring climate change to be a national
emergency, unlocking additional Presidential powers.592
Another option is to use the CAA, but as a political rather than a policy
move. For example, a future EPA could issue a rule similar in structure to the Clean
Power Plan, but simpler much more stringent, possibly going so far as to ban coal.
Litigation would ensue, but if there is sufficient public support for action on climate
change, rejection of the rule by the Supreme Court could be politically beneficial.
Either such a bump in public support or the threat of the rule itself could motivate
Congress to act. Whether this scenario is plausible depends on assessment of political
factors beyond my expertise. But even if it is, it does not use the CAA as a primary
regulatory tool, as envisioned under the Obama EPA (and as I suggest above would
be unwise).

588. See, e.g., Council on Environmental Quality, Draft National Environmental Policy Act Guidance
on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 84 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (June 26, 2019).
589. See Shelley Welton, Rethinking Grid Governance for the Climate Change Era (forthcoming
2020) (on file with author) (“U.S. electricity law suffers from a gaping and growing accountability gap, in
which neither FERC nor states have the authority needed to make electricity markets bend to
democratically established prerogatives that harm industry incumbents. To remedy the situation, federal
and state regulators need more robust authority to shape energy market rules to public aims.”).
590. See Yong-Shik Lee, Three Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: The Conundrum of the US Steel and
Aluminum Tariffs, 18 WORLD TRADE REV. 481–501 (2019).
591. See Josiah Neeley, Climate Tariffs are Coming,
https://www.rstreet.org/2019/07/19/climate-tariffs-are-coming/.
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592. See, e.g., Dan Farber, Bold but Realistic Climate Actions, LEGAL PLANET (Feb. 13, 2020),
https://legal-planet.org/2020/02/13/bold-but-realistic-climate-actions/.
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Beyond the federal government, state and local government action593 and
private firms’ increasing prioritization of emissions reductions594 may drive emissions
reductions. In my view, the global nature of the climate problem means federal and,
eventually, international policy commitments are necessary. But this is not to suggest
that sub-federal action is not useful or, in the absence of federal action, vitally
important to maintain some progress. Nor is it incompatible with future federal
policy, as California’s leadership on vehicle emissions under the Clean Air Act
illustrates. Nevertheless, sub-federal policy options are an immense topic of their
own, well-covered elsewhere.
Massachusetts inspired great hope, now revealed to have been misplaced.
The Trump administration’s environmental rollbacks have inspired great pessimism.
The near future will show whether that, too, is misplaced. In my view, progress must
largely come through new politics, not old law.

593. See State and Local Regulation of Climate Change, REGULATORY REV. (Feb. 19, 2018),
https://www.theregreview.org/2018/02/19/state-local-regulation-climate-change/ (series of essays on state
and local climate policy).
594. See generally MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS:
THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (2017).

